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  INTRODUCTION   
Much scholarly attention has focused on possible impedi-
ments to both science and innovation arising from extensions of 
patent protection to research tools and to other upstream 
knowledge assets in ways that threaten to undermine the coop-
erative norms of basic scientific research.1 Until recently, how-
ever, far less attention has been paid to the growing capacity of 
global copyright law and related rights to impede access to, and 
use of, the cumulative scientific literature and data that digi-
 
 1. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, 
Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1059, 1093–97 (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 
698, 698–701 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/ 
.698full.pdf; Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy 
Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Ge-
netics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193, 1193 (2009) (finding that gene patents de-
crease public genetic knowledge); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, When Ideas Are 
Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research, 7 INNOVATION POL‘Y & 
ECON. 33, 54–60 (2006) (finding some evidence that patents reduce the use of 
knowledge); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 94–100, 115–29 
(1999). See generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AF-
TER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 184–92 (2004) (discussing potential risks of patent-
ing scientific research); Fiona Murray & Siobhán O‘Mahony, Exploring the 
Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science, 
18 ORG. SCI. 1006, 1009–17 (2007) (discussing the importance of access to 
knowledge for innovation); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Devel-
oping Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078 pas-
sim (2008), available at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10 
.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0060262 (commenting that attributing U.S. economic 
growth to the Bayh-Dole Act is misleading).  
 2012] COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE 1365 
 
tally integrated scientific research methods massively ingest.2 
In this Article, we contend that this latter phenomenon poses a 
more immediate and pervasive threat to basic scientific re-
search methods today than the still controversial claims about 
thickets of rights and anticommons effects attributed to excess-
es of the patent system in recent years.3  
A. POTENTIALLY BOUNDLESS SCIENTIFIC OPPORTUNITIES IN 
THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 
Information technology is transforming fields as diverse as 
molecular biology, especially genomics and proteomics,4 and 
conservation ecology,5 while spawning new fields, such as met-
 
 2. For pioneer works, see, for example, Reto Hilty, Copyright Law and 
Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW, A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RE-
SEARCH 315, 318–21 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007) [hereinafter Hilty, Copyright 
Law and Scientific Research]; Reto Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the 
Information Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection 
and What Policy Makers Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 103, 
109–18 (2006) [hereinafter Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright]; Jerome H. 
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons 
for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 319–22, 396–413 (2003); Matthew Sag, Copy-
right and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607–16 (2009) 
(finding the fair use doctrine crucial to information dissemination); Pamela 
Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science, 293 SCI. 2028 passim 
(2001), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/293/5537/2028.full.pdf; 
see also infra Part I. 
 3. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: 
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1–6 
(2008) (finding that the costs associated with patents have often exceeded 
their benefits); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 49–53 (2008) (stressing 
that the types of patentable subject matter have grown); DAN BURK & MARK 
A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 154–61 
(2009); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNER-
SHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 16–20, 49–69 
(2008) (discussing how anticommons can create innovation gridlock). But see 
Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation 
and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 
297–301 (2007) (minimizing the effects of utilitarian patent thicket objections). 
 4. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND 
PROTEIN RESEARCH & NAT‘L RES. COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GE-
NOMICS AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNO-
VATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (2006); COMM. ON A NEW BIOLOGY FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY & NAT‘L RES. COUNCIL, A NEW BIOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTU-
RY 49–52 (2009) [hereinafter A NEW BIOLOGY].  
 5. See, e.g., JAMES B. CAMPBELL, INTRODUCTION TO REMOTE SENSING xv 
(4th ed. 2007); Karin S. Fassnacht et al., Key Issues in Making and Using Sat-
ellite-based Maps in Ecology: A Primer, 222 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 167, 
167 (2006).  
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agenomics6 and metabolomics.7 The combination of massive 
storage capacity, powerful data manipulation techniques, and 
graphical capabilities has revolutionized both how basic re-
search is conducted and how the resulting knowledge is pre-
served and disseminated in nearly all fields of science.8 These 
methodologies have also helped to generate networked commu-
nities of users and collaborators, often working in dynamic 
 
 6. Metagenomics has been defined as ―the application of modern ge-
nomics techniques to the study of communities of microbial organisms directly 
in their natural environments, bypassing the need for isolation and lab culti-
vation of individual species.‖ Kevin Chen & Lior Pachter, Bioinformatics for 
Whole-Genome Shotgun Sequencing of Microbial Communities, 1 PLOS COMPU-
TATIONAL BIOLOGY 0106, 0106 (2005), available at http://www.ploscompbiol.org/ 
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.0010024. Advances in bioinfor-
matics, refinements of DNA amplification, and the expansion of computational 
power have greatly facilitated analysis of DNA sequences recovered from envi-
ronmental samples. These advances have enabled the adaptation of shotgun 
sequencing to metagenomics samples, for example, in global ocean sampling ex-
peditions. See generally Mya Breitbart et al., Genomic Analysis of Uncultured 
Marine Viral Communities, 99 PROCEEDINGS NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 14250 
passim (2002); J. Craig Venter et al., Environmental Genome Shotgun Sequenc-
ing of the Sargasso Sea, 304 SCI. 66, 66–67 (2004), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/304/5667/66.full.pdf. 
 7. ―Metabolomics is the systematic study of the unique chemical finger-
prints that specific cellular processes leave behind,‖ i.e., the study of their 
small-molecule metabolite profiles. Bennett Daviss, Growing Pains for Metab-
olomics, SCIENTIST, Apr. 25, 2005, at 25–28. A closely related field is ―metabo-
nomics,‖ which extends metabolic profiling at the cellular or any level to in-
clude information about perturbations of metabolism caused by environmental 
factors and other extragenomic influences, such as gut microflora. See general-
ly D.G. Robertson, Metabonomics in Toxicology: A Review, 85 TOXICOLOGICAL 
SCIS. 809, 809–10, 815–18 (2005) (comparing metabonomics with metabolom-
ics and discussing the latter‘s impact on toxicology). These disciplines rely 
heavily on mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, 
among other detection methods, and on complex statistical software programs 
that analyze the data resulting from the use of these tools. See, e.g., METABO-
LOMICS: METHODS AND PROTOCOLS vii–viii, 142, 229–46 (Wolfram Weckwerth 
ed., 2007); METAGENOMICS: THE FRONTIER OF SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 2–5, 8, 26–32 
(M. Tomita & T. Nishioka eds., 2005). For the aspirations of systems biology 
and functional genomics to integrate proteomic, transcriptomic, and metabo-
lomic information into a more complete picture of living organisms, see A NEW 
BIOLOGY, supra note 4, at 21–38.  
 8. Scholars are attempting to discuss and understand the impact of this 
newer ability to share large amounts of scientific research. See generally pa-
pers presented at The Future of Scientific Knowledge Discovery in Open Net-
worked Environments: A National Symposium and Workshop, Bd. on Res. Da-
ta and Info. in Collaboration with Computer Sci. and Telecomm. Bd., Nat‘l 
Acad. of Scis., Washington D.C., March 10–11, 2011, available at http://sites 
.nationalacademies.org/PGA/brdi/PGA_060424. For another example, see The 
Digital Side of Biology, AGENCY FOR SCI., TECH. & RES. (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.research.a-star.edu.sg/feature-and-innovation/6291 (describing 
huge changes to biological research stemming from digital technology). 
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knowledge hubs,9 whose interactive communications steer com-
putational applications in potentially more fruitful directions10 
and fill open repositories with new data and information.11 
In this promising new research environment, scientists in-
creasingly rely on automated knowledge discovery tools to mine 
and recombine vast amounts of data and literature that are 
flowing at rates that exceed the capacity of a single investigator 
to comprehend and manage.12 Exploitation of these new oppor-
tunities, in turn, requires integration of information and data 
scattered over a broad range of articles and databases that may 
or may not be available online for extensive computational re-
search.13 For example, the use of networked computational 
techniques for linking global collections of articles and data to 
generate relevant research results makes it possible to build 
 
 9. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 68–90 (2006); SCOTT 
STERN, BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS: KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE 
SCIENCES 36–55 (2004); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infra-
structure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1017–20 (2005). 
 10. See, e.g., James Boyle, Mertonianism Unbound? Imagining Free, De-
centralized Access to Most Cultural and Scientific Material, in UNDERSTAND-
ING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 123, 123–40 
(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AS A 
COMMONS]; Paul W. Jeffreys, The Developing Concept of e-Research, in WORLD 
WIDE RESEARCH: RESHAPING THE SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 51, 51–52 (Wil-
liam H. Dutton & Paul W. Jeffreys eds., 2010) (noting that cooperation be-
tween research groups is necessary to perform complex research and analysis, 
and describing the pooling of ―computational resources and research skills‖); 
THE METAGENOMICS RAST SERVER (MG-RAST), http://metagenomics.anl.gov 
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (community resource for metagenome data set 
analysis). 
 11. See Jeffreys, supra note 10, at 51 (noting the possibility of a ―data  
deluge‖).  
 12. See, e.g., Mark Segal, Accessing Microbiological Data: A User‘s Per-
spective, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: PROCEEDINGS 
OF AN INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP 161, 161–63 (Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2011) [here-
inafter DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS]; Thinh Nguyen, The 
Web-Enabled Research Commons: Applications, Goals, and Trends, in DESIGN-
ING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra, at 91, 94. 
 13. See, e.g., Minna Allarakhia, Microbial Commons: Governing Complex 
Knowledge Assets, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra 
note 12, at 145, 148; NANCY L. MARON & K. KIRBY SMITH, CURRENT MODELS 
OF DIGITAL SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBRARIES 27 (Nov. 
2008), http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/current-models-report.pdf; Victoria Stodden, 
Open Science: Policy Implications for the Evolving Phenomenon of User-Led 
Scientific Innovation, J. SCI. COMM. 2–6 (Mar. 22, 2010), http://jcom.sissa.it/ 
archive/09/01/Jcom0901%282010%29A05/Jcom0901%282010%29A05.pdf. For 
similar applications to digital research in the humanities, see, for example, Sag, 
supra note 2, at 1607–08, 1611–12. 
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field-specific knowledge repositories that capture reams of rele-
vant scientific data and technical information and to apply gen-
eral data-mining tools in the chosen environment.14 Users re-
ceive more value when such tools can also be readily applied to 
the scientific literature.  
The digitization of research inputs and outputs has thus 
engendered opportunities for the enhanced speed of dissemina-
tion of publicly funded scientific data, for the development of 
high performing search engines that diminish the search time 
for publications, and for automated cross-linking and text-
mining based on standardized metadata. The goal of this digi-
tal infrastructure should be to maximize these opportunities for 
public research institutes and universities in both developed 
and developing countries, while maintaining the classical func-
tions of certification and diffusion of research results of the 
predigital print markets. 
B. COPYRIGHT AND RELATED LAWS AS DIGITAL GRIDLOCK 
To make full use of search engines, data-mining tech-
niques, and other automated knowledge discovery tools, scien-
tists need unrestricted access to a broad range of journals and 
databases, and unrestricted rights to extract, use, and reuse 
the published research results they contain for purposes of fu-
ture research.15 The convergence of computerized technologies 
and telecommunications networks has now made this goal the-
oretically feasible, and the sharing norms of science pull in the 
same direction.16 Researchers anywhere should, in principle, be 
able to locate, analyze, and disaggregate collections of scientific 
information and data once they have been digitally transmitted 
and made available to the public, subject only to the prevailing 
community norms of attributions.17  
 
 14. See, e.g., Peter Dawyndt et al., Knowledge Accumulation and Resolu-
tion of Data Inconsistencies During the Integration of Microbial Information 
Sources, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 
1111, 1111–12, 1124 (2005). 
 15. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 16. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITC-622, WIRELESS 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 27–28 (2005) (explaining 
the benefits and challenges of wireless information sharing).  
 17. The scientists‘ incentives flow primarily from reputational benefits, 
not pecuniary interests, with regard to actual publication of upstream re-
search results, and the costs of the research itself are normally borne by public 
funders, foundations, and universities. However, scientists do have an interest 
in not sharing either results or data until they can obtain these reputational 
benefits via publication. See Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
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In reality, intellectual property laws, as currently config-
ured, stand in the way of attaining these goals. Since the 
1990s, in particular, there has been an unprecedented exten-
sion of copyright law and related rights protecting both litera-
ture and collections of data into the realm of basic science, with 
no adequate exceptions for research as such.18 These develop-
ments tend to subject the growing profusion of scientific data 
and information to the same unbridled proprietary impulses 
that have lately dominated the regulation of creative endeavors 
in the traditional arts.19 
For example, global copyright laws automatically confer 
exclusive proprietary rights on authors of scientific literature,20 
who routinely transfer those rights to commercial publishers.21 
Database protection laws, now enacted in more than fifty-five 
countries, simultaneously endow compilers and publishers (as 
assignees) with exclusive rights to the very data that copyright 
laws traditionally left unprotected.22 Publishers, in turn, sur-
round both scientific data and literature with a variety of tech-
nological protection measures (TPMs)—so-called electronic 
fences and digital locks—that cannot be penetrated or pried 
open even for purposes of scientific research without violating 
global norms rooted in an array of multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral treaties, as well as in a host of national legislative and 
regulatory instruments.23 
 
Human Subjects Research: Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 92–94 (2003) (noting importance of publication 
and priority for scientists); Philip M. Davis & Matthew J. L. Connolly, Institu-
tional Repositories: Evaluating the Reasons for Non-Use of Cornell University‘s 
Installation of DSpace, D-LIB MAG. (Mar./Apr. 2007), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/ 
march07/davis/03davis.html (noting researchers‘ reluctance to release results 
before publication).  
 18. See infra Part I.  
 19. See BOYLE, supra note 3, at 122–59 (discussing the harmful conse-
quences of over extending music copyrights). 
 20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 9.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works arts. 2, 5; Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Conven-
tion (1971)] (as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971). The TRIPS Agreement 
incorporated the Berne Convention (1971) into the Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 
[hereinafter Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization]. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 21 
[hereinafter Database Directive]. 
 23. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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The end result is a growing conflict between private rights 
and public goods at the core of today‘s most promising research 
techniques.24 Enlightened policymakers view these upstream 
data and information resources as public goods that need to be 
widely shared in order to produce more downstream commer-
cial applications that advance public welfare.25 In contrast, in-
tellectual property laws now impede access to scientific data 
and literature, just at the time when developments in scientific 
research methods require the use of automated knowledge dis-
covery tools that depend on unfettered access and re-use condi-
tions for their successful applications.26 
C. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE 
This Article examines the complex challenges posed by 
copyright and related laws for digitally integrated scientific re-
search, which have emerged, piece by piece, from several dec-
ades of disjointed legislative initiatives undertaken at the glob-
al, regional, and national levels. We explain how this state of 
affairs came about and why fairly radical legislative reforms 
would be needed to undo the harm that this tangled regulatory 
net inflicts on global scientific research. More realistically, we 
then explore a number of self-help measures that the scientific 
 
 24. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of 
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOB-
ALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 3–45 (K.E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP] 
(discussing IP roadblocks to the diffusion of public knowledge). See generally 
Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND IP, supra, at 48, 61–64 (commenting on the impact of IP treaties 
on developing nations‘ access to public goods); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as 
a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308–20 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (explain-
ing how knowledge is a global public good). 
 25. See, e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of ―Open Science‖ and the 
Balance Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific 
Data and Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19, 19–34 (Julie M. Esanu & 
Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003); Paul Uhlir, Discussion Framework, in THE ROLE OF 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 
supra, at 3, 3–4 (discussing public welfare advantages of sharing scientific 
knowledge and data widely).  
 26. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 46–47 (2011); David, supra note 25, at 27–28. 
Except, of course, for the growing number of scientific journals whose publish-
ers have adopted full or partial open access policies. See, e.g., infra notes 496–
507 and accompanying text.  
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community could itself adopt to alleviate some of the pressures 
emanating from a bevy of poorly conceived intellectual property 
laws. The overall goal is to persuade policymakers to avoid 
measures that might further fragment and balkanize the re-
search environment and to affirmatively empower the public 
good functions of these laws once again, with a view to stimu-
lating more and better scientific outputs and more downstream 
commercial applications.  
In Part I, we map the historical context and evolution of 
the current deep divide between copyright law and science. 
Given that digital scientific research is necessarily global in its 
sweep, we focus considerable attention on comparative laws 
that tend to fragment essential research inputs into diversely 
accessible territorial compartments and to marginalize the 
need for unified fields of enquiry. We demonstrate that, under 
current conditions, scientists using automated knowledge dis-
covery tools will likely become collective infringers of both do-
mestic and international copyright laws and of national data-
base protection laws where applicable.27  
In Part II, we assess the limits of incremental legislative or 
judicial action traditionally associated with copyright reform 
processes and make the case for a strong and broad exception 
for scientific research. Such an exception, we argue, must be 
buttressed by imposing limits on the use of digital locks and re-
lated contractual restraints on users, lest publicly funded sci-
ence become a hostage to the privatization impulses engen-
dered by para-copyright regimes. We further propose 
complementary reforms to both national database protection 
laws and international intellectual property standards con-
sistent with the need to empower e-science to flourish in a digi-
tally integrated research space.  
Finally, in Part III we argue that the best outcome for the 
future of scientific research may well be for the scientific com-
munity itself to take responsibility for managing the conditions 
under which its own knowledge assets will be created and de-
ployed. We reconsider the wisdom of continuing to rely on pro-
prietary publishing intermediaries in an environment increas-
 
 27. Cf. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND 
YOU xix–xxi (2011) (noting how easily individuals can violate modern day cop-
yright laws); Sag, supra note 2, at 1608 (stating that ―[c]opy-reliant technolo-
gies tend to interact with copyrighted works by copying them routinely, auto-
matically, and indiscriminately. These technologies are vital to the operation 
of the Internet, but they are vulnerable to claims of copyright infringement at 
key stages of their operation‖). 
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ingly characterized by an array of promising open access op-
tions. This Article concludes with some final observations on 
the need to overcome the disconnect between private rights and 
public scientific research goals as a step towards the elabora-
tion of a more rational, long-term innovation policy. 
I.  THE GROWING DIVIDE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT LAW 
AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE   
Traditionally, copyright law and science operated in two 
relatively distinct spheres, with patents seen as the primary 
source of incentives for applications of research results to in-
dustry. Although most national copyright laws protected scien-
tific literature,28 this protection narrowly covered the author‘s 
mode of expressing research results, and not facts, data, or ide-
as as such.29 In a major decision in 1991, the U.S. Supreme 
Court further truncated compilers‘ rights30 by allowing third 
parties to make use of the disparate facts and data revealed 
even in an otherwise eligible compilation, notwithstanding the 
copyright owner‘s exclusive right to prepare derivative works.31 
Since 1994, international copyright law has also cautiously lim-
ited protection of so-called factual works—that is, compilations 
of facts and data—to their original selection and arrangement, 
but not to the underlying facts and data themselves.32  
Questions about unauthorized reproductions of published 
research results in scientific journals were typically resolved by 
limitations and exceptions in the domestic copyright laws,33 es-
 
 28. Cf. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 2(1) (―The expression 
‗literary and artistic works‘ shall include every production in the literary, sci-
entific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expres-
sion . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–(b) (2006). See generally Paul Edward 
Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPY-
RIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2, at para. 2(c) (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2011). 
 30. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining ―compilations‖); id. § 103 (compilations 
as subject matter); id. § 106 (exclusive rights). 
 31. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 
(1991). 
 32. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.2, 10.2; see also 1 SAM 
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOR-
ING RIGHTS 484 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that compilations have ―long received 
protection under most national laws‖ and that protection for compilations is 
required under Art. 2(5) of the Berne Convention).  
 33. Technically, ―exclusions‖ refer to content excluded from protection, 
while ―exceptions‖ are ―limitations‖ on the exclusive right in question. See 
WIPO STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENT-
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pecially a fair use exception in the United States and a private 
use exception in European copyright laws,34 although these is-
sues became much more complex with the advent of photocopy-
ing machines.35 Moreover, U.S. copyright law has long dedicat-
ed government-generated data and literature to the public 
domain,36 a practice that, until recently, had been rejected by 
many other members of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD).37 What emerged, at least in 
 
ABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO PATENTEES‘ RIGHTS 7 (2011), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf. 
For historical and philosophical efforts, ultimately fruitless, to distinguish ―ex-
ceptions‖ from ―limitations‖ in copyright law, see Christophe Geiger, Promot-
ing Creativity through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Ex-
clusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 518–24 (2010) 
(finding that, in fact, ―the terms . . . are always used together systematically in 
international copyright treaties and European legislation‖). Both terms now 
often refer to ―users‘ rights‖ in the literature. 
 34. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2. 
 35. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY 63–116 (2003) 
(describing conflicts between photocopying and copyright law); Barton Beebe, 
An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 559–60 (2008) (noting problems posed for fair use by photo-
copying technology).  
 36. Much of today‘s most valuable scientific data and information is gen-
erated by government agencies or, increasingly, by intergovernmental consor-
tiums of scientific undertakings. In the United States, copyright law denies 
protection for all works that government employees produce within the scope 
of their employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). Moreover, as a policy matter, 
government-generated data is distributed to would-be users at the marginal 
cost of dissemination, and does not reflect the actual cost of production. See 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget Exec. Office of the President, Circular No. A-130 
(Revised) (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.pdf; COMM. ON ISSUES IN THE 
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA ET AL., BITS OF POWER 111–13 
(1997) [hereinafter BITS OF POWER].  
 37. See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 12 (Can.); Heather J. 
Ritch, European Research Infrastructure Consortiums: Privately Ordered and 
Publicly Funded Research Commons for Data 45–57 (unpublished S.J.D. dis-
sertation, Duke University) (on file with Goodson Library, Duke University). 
See also Council Directive 2003/98, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 90 (EU). Efforts to move 
these countries towards the U.S. position have produced mixed results. For 
example, Australia, which still retains crown copyright, has reached results 
similar to that in the United States by attaching Creative Commons licenses 
to government-generated works. See Intellectual Property Principles for Aus-
tralian Government Agencies, ATTORNEY-GENERAL‘S DEPT. (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/Statement%20of%20IP%20Principles%20for
%20Australian%20Government%20Agencies2.pdf. The United Kingdom cur-
rently licenses government generated information and databases covered by 
crown copyright under an Open Government Licence (OGL). OGL grants a 
royalty-free, perpetual, non-exclusive licence to use the information, subject to 
certain exemptions, including a requirement for attribution. See Open Gov-
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the United States, was a relatively benign regulatory tradition 
that was further complemented by the sharing ethos of science, 
which favors open access to published research results for pur-
poses of verification and the progressive generation of further 
research.38  
This traditional approach, however, has been subverted by 
much discussed high-protectionist trends evolving in multiple 
directions.39 For example, in an effort to restrain perceived acts 
of misappropriation, some federal appellate courts in the  
United States devised subtle doctrinal arguments to justify 
greater protection of disparate facts and data than the Su-
preme Court‘s ―thin copyright‖ approach to compilations would 
otherwise seem to have warranted.40 Outside the United 
States, efforts to strengthen the protection of factual compila-
tions led some fifty-five countries, mostly, but not exclusively, 
affiliated with the European Union, to enact sui generis data-
base protection laws that deviate from copyright tradition by 
directly protecting facts and data as such.41  
Meanwhile, both the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (TRIPS Agreement) and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization‘s (WIPO) Copy-
 
ernment Licence for Public Sector Information, THE NAT‘L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ ( last visited 
Apr. 16, 2012). Meanwhile, in the United States, some government agencies 
have begun to license data suppliers from the private sector without waiving 
ownership and intellectual property interests, while a bill to impose some form 
of crown copyright on government-generated works has been presented to 
Congress. See H.R. 5704, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing to allow faculty mem-
bers at Department of Defense service academies and schools of professional 
military education to obtain copyright in scholarly articles).  
 38. See Séverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property 
Through Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1401–02 (2007) (―Sci-
entists and researchers have become increasingly opposed to the trend of the 
biotech industry to patent more and more biotechnological inventions. They 
have developed a strong ethos of sharing and a desire to keep the scientific 
commons available to all.‖); David E. Winickoff et al., Opening Stem Cell Re-
search and Development: A Policy Proposal for the Management of Data, Intel-
lectual Property, and Ethics, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 52, 54 (2009) 
(noting the ―tradition of openness and sharing in the biomedical sciences‖).  
 39. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 420–25. 
 40. Compare CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999) (al-
lowing estimates of prices to fall under copyright law), and CCC Info. Servs. 
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that logically organized price estimates can be original work of author-
ship), with Feist Publ‘n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(concluding that facts are never protected under a ―thin copyright‖ analysis of 
compilations). 
 41. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7; infra Part I.C.2. 
 2012] COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE 1375 
 
right Treaty of 1996 (WCT)42 have imposed outer boundaries 
on limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights recognized 
in national copyright laws. These laws cast some doubt on the 
continued ability of prior doctrinal tools to alleviate impedi-
ments to the conduct of scientific research.43 Finally, the advent 
of digital technologies, and the global response to their impact 
on the transmission of copyrighted works online, has led both 
the United States and the European Union to adopt regulatory 
regimes, ostensibly pursuant to the WCT,44 that can prevent 
the use of most existing limitations and exceptions, and even 
prevent third parties from accessing unprotectible facts and 
ideas.45 As these privatizing trends increasingly encroach on 
the realm of scientific research,46 access to basic knowledge in-
puts becomes ever more complicated and potentially difficult or 
costly to obtain.  
A. TWO CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES IN THE APPLICATION OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW TO SCIENCE 
The well-known philosophical differences between Conti-
nental ―authors‘ rights‖ laws, rooted in natural law tradition, 
including protection of the author‘s personality interest, and 
the copyright laws of common law countries, rooted in utilitari-
an notions of social welfare,47 led logically to contrasting views 
of limitations and exceptions to the basic bundle of authors‘ 
 
 42. See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat. 2860, 
2186 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WCT]; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13. 
 43. See infra Part II.B.  
 44. WCT, supra note 42, arts. 11–12. 
 45. See infra Part I.B. Bilateral trade agreements have extended these 
approaches to many other countries, both developed and developing. See Rob-
ert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the 
Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for 
U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL‘Y 259 (analyzing U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners‘ Di-
lemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can Open Access Provisions Provide 
an Escape?, 11 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 631, 641 (2011).  
 46. See Winickoff, supra note 38, at 54–55 (describing increasing privati-
zation of scientific research). 
 47. See F. Willem Grosheide, Paradigms in Copyright Law, in OF AU-
THORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 203, 203–28 (Brad Sherman 
& Alain Strowel eds., 1994); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 763, 770 (2001) (―Madison‘s view that copyrights and 
patents were monopolies that should be tolerated because of the public good 
they could produce was in essence the common law justification for these lim-
ited-term monopolies.‖). 
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rights.48 Under the Continental tradition, largely embodied in 
the Berne Convention of 1886, most uses of an author‘s creative 
work presumptively require compensation.49 Any exceptions to 
or limitations on that principle should be narrowly drawn, lest 
authors be saddled with obligations to finance public goods that 
were not imposed on other forms of property.50 Under the copy-
right approach, instead, as elaborated most fully in the United 
States, authors should receive only those entitlements needed 
to overcome the risk of market failure posed by free-riding copi-
ers, and these entitlements remain subject to carve outs that 
support the public interest ab initio.51  
These different philosophical foundations produced two dif-
ferent approaches to limitations and exceptions bearing on the 
exclusive rights that copyright law confers on authors of liter-
ary and artistic works. In Europe, the standard approach was 
to establish a list of enumerated exceptions, with the under-
standing that activities not covered by any of the listed excep-
tions were usually proscribed, even if they sometimes appeared 
to be natural extensions of an existing exception.52 These codi-
 
 48. See, e.g., Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copy-
right‘s Legal Traditions—The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 521, 524–27 (2010). 
 49. See Geiger, supra note 33, at 520, 527 (―The fact that an exempted use 
is not necessarily a free use is important to keep in mind . . . . Copyright limi-
tations do not mean that works can always be used free of charge, and legisla-
tures may provide a right to appropriate remuneration for all uses that copy-
right limitations legitimate.‖). 
 50. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524–25. But see Paul Edward 
Geller, A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for TRIPS Criteria for 
Copyright Limitations, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 553, 555–601 (2010) 
(noting new trend in German case law favoring liberal construction of limita-
tions based on constitutional considerations). See also Senftleben, supra, at 
525–26 (―From an economic perspective, it can be added that copyright mo-
nopolies, while spurring investment in new information products, also impede 
follow-on innovation requiring the use of preexisting, protected material. 
Hence, there is a delicate balance between freedom and protection inherent in 
copyright law. The cultural innovation cycle supported by copyright law re-
quires both rights broad enough to spur investment and creativity, and limita-
tions broad enough to provide sufficient breathing space for freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of competition.‖). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (IP Clause); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON & 
STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS‘ RIGHTS 
163–76 (1991); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair 
Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 155–61 (2001).  
 52. See Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water—How Much 
Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 295–96 (2009) (contrasting civil and common law ap-
proaches to copyright exceptions). Hence some states carved out more expan-
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fied exceptions thus need updating at regular intervals, and 
they are interpreted narrowly by courts, who tend to view them 
as undermining the dominant theme of authors‘ property 
rights.53 
In contrast, U.S. legislation combines a list of fairly specific 
express exceptions to the exclusive rights of authors with a 
broad fair use provision that carves out additional space for 
noninfringing activity, usually transpiring within specified 
normative guidelines.54 This open-ended carve-out then applies 
not only to new situations not directly reached by the codified 
list of exceptions, but it may sometimes retroactively expand 
even the scope of those exceptions that are codified. 
The differences between these two approaches have clearly 
diminished over time, as policymakers on both sides of the At-
lantic rely on both incentives to create and natural-property-
rights thinking to justify ever higher levels of copyright protec-
tion.55 Conversely, scholars in Europe increasingly focus atten-
tion on the need for an appropriate balance between protection 
and free uses.56 As will be seen below, a degree of harmoniza-
tion has also been superimposed upon all the domestic copy-
right laws of WTO Members by international law. Nonetheless, 
these historical foundations help to explain the differences that 
 
sive exceptions for science. See Sam Ricketson, International Conventions and 
Treaties, in THE BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT—ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS 3, 5–10 (Libby Baulch et al. eds., 1997) (noting recurring excep-
tions in national copyright laws for, inter alia, ―general enhancement of scien-
tific and intellectual discourse‖). 
 53. See infra notes 164–198 and accompanying text; see also Christophe 
Geiger, supra note 33, at 519–20 (noting narrow interpretation of copyright 
limitations and exceptions in civil law countries).  
 54. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–22 (2006); see also William W. Fisher, III, Recon-
structing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1704 (1988); Ruth L. 
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L 
L. 75, 117–23 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2537, 2618 (2009).  
 55. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 10 (2001) (stating 
that the traditions differ ―more in emphasis than in outcome‖); see also Jane C. 
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1014 (1990) (noting that a mix of 
both utilitarian and natural rights reasoning underlie French and United 
States copyright laws). For an important attempt to reduce these differences 
by a fuller interpretation of the Lockean justification for property rights, see 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544–
45 (1993). 
 56. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 33, at 517–18 (citing authorities); 
Senftleben, supra note 48, at 525–26.  
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still characterize the distinctive approaches to limitations and 
exceptions in the European Union and the United States. 
1. Harmonizing the Designated Limitations and Exceptions 
that Defend Scientific Research in the European Union 
In Continental Europe, limitations and exceptions to copy-
right law emerged from state practice and over time were large-
ly incorporated into revisions of the Berne Convention of 
1886.57 The Berne Convention thus supplied the primary har-
monizing platform for limitations and exceptions throughout 
the twentieth century, even though there still remained some 
undefined, if contested, space for supplementary state action.58 
In this context, early exceptions for science were squeezed into 
Article 10(2) of the Berne Convention, which as late as the 
Brussels Revision of 1948 allowed States to provide exceptions 
for ―excerpts from literary or artistic works in educational or 
scientific publications,‖ but only ―in so far as this inclusion is 
justified by its purpose.‖59  
Even this simple, if rigid, approach (still extant in the copy-
right law of the United Kingdom),60 was not mandatory.61 
 
 57. For an account of the development of limitations and exceptions in the 
Berne Convention, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 477–548 (1987) 
[hereinafter RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION]. For an overview of limita-
tions and exceptions in the international copyright system, see Ruth L. Okedi-
ji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public In-
terest Considerations for Developing Countries, Issue Paper No. 15, UNCTAD - 
ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (May 2006), avail-
able at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Okediji%20-%20 
Copyright%20and%20DC%20-%20Blue%2015.pdf; see also SAM RICKETSON, 
WIPO STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT (2003) [hereinafter RICKETSON, WIPO 
STUDY], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/ 
sccr_9_7.pdf. 
 58. See Mihaly Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO ―Internet‖ 
Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 204–05 (1997) (noting belief that 
Berne allows some flexibility in creating and expanding limitations and  
exceptions). 
 59. Berne Convention, art 10(2), 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (as revised at Brussels 
on June 26, 1948). 
 60. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29–30 (Eng.) 
(amended to implement the 2001 European Union Copyright Directive), avail-
able at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents; Lionel Bently, 
R. v. The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 1, 99 (2008) (noting lack of flexibility in U.K. copyright law); Robert G. 
Howell, Recent Copyright Developments: Harmonization Opportunities for 
Canada, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 149, 170 (2003–04) (noting the ―narrow‖ 
nature of U.K. copyright infringement test). 
 2012] COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE 1379 
 
States attempting to facilitate science under its aegis need not 
have followed any particular model or any agreed view of the 
needs of science as distinct from or constrained by the economic 
interests of authors and publishers.  
Things changed, however, when at the Stockholm Revision 
Conference in 1967, the Berne Convention formally incorpo-
rated an exclusive reproduction right into Article 9(1), along 
with a three-step test for enabling exceptions to that same re-
production right in Article 9(2).62 That test confined national 
legislation on exceptions to the reproduction right to ―certain 
special cases,‖ that did ―not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work‖ and that did ―not unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the author.‖63  
Although nothing in this provision dealt expressly with 
science, the legislative history confirms that it was intended to 
govern the use of scientific literature for research purposes.64 
For this very reason, the express reference to science in regard 
to permissible excerpts under Article 10(2) was deleted at the 
same time.65 A truncated version of Article 10(2), which now 
only regards excerpts for teaching, was ultimately incorporated 
into the 1971 Revision of the Berne Convention.66 The decision 
 
 61. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 57, at 499.  
 62. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 9(1)–(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter RBC 1967] (as re-
vised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967). 
 63. Id. art. 9(2). Both the legislative history and commentary suggest 
that, as originally conceived, all three factors must be answered affirmatively 
for any given national exception to satisfy this international minimum stand-
ard of legitimacy. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND 
THE THREE-STEP TEST 43–53 (2004); Ficsor, supra note 58, at 214–15. But see 
infra text accompanying notes 447–65. 
 64. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 32, at 782, § 13.34. 
 65. Id.; see also RICKETSON, supra note 57, at 499. (―Article 10(2) no long-
er contains an exception for works ‗having a scientific character‘ . . . . [It] was 
deleted on the recommendation of the Working Group which took the view 
that it was unnecessary ‗in view of the expansion of the field of science and the 
number of exceptions to the right of reproduction which were already included 
in the Convention‘. This must be correct: the legitimate interests of scientific 
research are now adequately served by the broader right of quotation allowed 
under article 10(1) and by the general exception to reproduction rights allowed 
under article 9(2).‖).  
 66. See Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 10(2) (permitting 
―utilization, to the extent justified by the purpose of literary or artistic works 
by way of illustration in publications . . . for teaching, provided such utiliza-
tion is compatible with fair practice‖). The 1971 text was largely incorporated 
into the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1, and is therefore binding on 
some 153 WTO members. 
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to deal with the principal exception for science under the newly 
enacted three-step test of Article 9(2), rather than by means of 
a separate provision, introduced new levels of uncertainty67 
about the scope of permissible scientific activities without 
mandating any specific action favoring scientific research as 
such.  
Meanwhile, because the exceptions covered in the Berne 
Convention still were not exhaustive, a number of states adopt-
ed supplementary measures. For example, language ambigu-
ously allowing reproductions and other uses ―for the sole pur-
pose of illustration for teaching or scientific research‖ was 
adopted in some national copyright laws.68 State practice in 
mostly European countries also recognized a ―private use‖ ex-
ception69 that enabled scientists to make verbatim copies by 
hand of literary works for research purposes.70 It was this lat-
ter provision that effectively promoted scientific research over-
and-above other designated exceptions in the Berne Convention 
or state copyright laws, at least until the advent of photocopy-
ing machines, and then digital reproduction technologies, 
which led to regulation of the use of these devices in the inter-
est of publishers.71  
 
 67. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 32, § 13.37 (―The decision of the 
Stockholm Conference to delete any list of permissible purposes leaves a con-
siderable area of discretion to national legislation. . . . [T]his means that there 
will be divergences between national laws on these matters.‖). 
 68. See, e.g., Congo Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (No. 24/82 
of 7 July 1982), art. 98; Copyright Act adopted on 11 November 1992, as last 
amended on February 15, 2000, § 19(3) (Est.), in 2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, CUMULATIVE INDEX OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOR-
ING RIGHTS LAW AND TREATIES (2001) [hereinafter CUMULATIVE INDEX OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW]; Romania Consolidated Law No. 8 of 14 March 1996 on Cop-
yright and Neighboring Rights, art. 33(1)(d), in 4 CUMULATIVE INDEX OF COP-
YRIGHT LAW, supra. 
 69. See, e.g., Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights art. 22bis (as 
amended by the Law of April 3, 1995) (Belg.), in 1 CUMULATIVE INDEX OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 68; Copyright Law, art. 53, (Text of Sept. 9, 1965, 
as last amended by the Law of July 16, 1998) (Ger.), in 3 CUMULATIVE INDEX 
OF COPYRIGHT LAW, supra. See generally BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., INST. OF 
INFO. LAW, UNIV. OF AMSTERDAM, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVI-
RONMENT, FINAL REPORT 10–31 (2003) (discussing the European Union pri-
vate copying provisions). 
 70. See J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 435,¶ 10.03 (2d ed. 
2003) (noting acceptance of copying by hand for private use until the advent of 
photocopying and other replicating technologies); see also Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 29(1) (U.K.); STERLING, supra, at 437–38  
¶ 10.09 (noting that there is a distinction in some national laws between pri-
vate use and use for purposes of research). 
 71. STERLING, supra note 70, at 437–38. 
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A major effort to harmonize limitations and exceptions at 
the regional level then occurred in 2001, with the adoption of 
the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc Di-
rective).72 Ostensibly devised to implement the WCT of 199673 
and the TRIPS Agreement of 1994,74 this Directive sets out a 
deliberately exhaustive list of permissible exceptions and limi-
tations to the exclusive rights of authors that European Union 
member states may enact at their discretion.75 Besides allowing 
reproductions for photocopying, subject to payment of fair com-
pensation, and for noncommercial reproductions by public li-
braries under Article 5(2),76 the Directive expressly mentions 
scientific research in Article 5(3)(a). Echoing some prior state 
practice, this provision allows ―use for the sole purpose of illus-
tration for teaching or scientific research,‖ so long as the 
source, including the author‘s name, is indicated . . . and ―to the 
extent justified by the noncommercial purpose to be 
achieved.‖77 
The meaning of this ambiguous provision is hard to pin 
down with any degree of certainty. Narrowly, it seems to limit 
excused uses to cases of ―illustration‖ for both teaching and sci-
entific research, unless the term ―scientific research‖ can legit-
imately be detached from ―the sole purpose of illustration‖ lan-
guage. Although some state practice may lean towards such a 
broader construction favoring reuse of information for further 
research,78 language concerning related rights in the Rome 
 
 72. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC) [hereinafter 
InfoSoc Directive]. 
 73. WCT, supra note 42. 
 74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20. 
 75. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. art. 5(3)(a). Technically, the Commission has thus taken the ―by 
way of illustration‖ language out of Berne Convention 1971, art. 10(2), which 
applies to teaching, and ostensibly applied it to excerpts of scientific research, in 
addition to the three-step test discussed infra text accompanying notes 120–36. 
 78. For example, the German legislature resolved this ambiguity by en-
acting one provision allowing use of certain published works for the purpose of 
illustration for teaching in schools, universities and the like and a second pro-
vision allowing use of such works for individual research purposes. Guido 
Westkamp, The ―Three-Step Test‖ and Copyright Limitations in Europe: Euro-
pean Copyright Law Between Approximation and National Decision Making, 
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 1, 34–36 (2008) (citing sections 52(a)(1)–52(a)(4) 
of the German Copyright Act and observing that these provisions may exceed 
what the InfoSoc Directive expressly permits). The provision aims, ―as a mat-
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Convention of 1961 avoided any such ambiguity. It excused 
―use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research‖ 
without mention of illustrations or a non-commercial purpose 
as qualifying conditions.79 Current applications of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties may make it difficult to ig-
nore this difference in language when courts take the InfoSoc 
Directive as a standard for construing national laws that im-
plement its provisions, which renders a broad interpretation 
favoring science less likely to pass muster.80 
Even if a broader interpretation were to prevail (by limit-
ing the term ―illustration‖ to exceptions for teaching), it must 
still overcome the Directive‘s noncommercial purpose qualifi-
er.81 Because universities now routinely engage in commercial 
exploitation of their scientific research results in both the Eu-
ropean Union and the United States, rights holders (typically 
publishers) can argue that the bulk of such research is com-
mercial in the strict sense of the word. Such an interpretation 
was recently upheld in a decision concerning university patents 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,82 
although it is not clear that European courts would take a simi-
larly strict line in regard to either patents or copyrights. 
In this unfavorable setting, Article 5(3) of the InfoSoc Di-
rective has done little to strengthen or encourage digital scien-
tific research or the rights of scientific investigators. To the 
contrary, the Directive may have fatally weakened them by de-
finitively subjecting the old private use exception to a ―pay eq-
uitable compensation‖ principle. This conclusion follows be-
cause, empirically, there is reason to believe that scientific 
 
ter of national legislation . . . to allow researchers such as in universities, etc., 
to take advantage of digital technology.‖ Id. at 35. Separate exceptions for pri-
vate noncommercial use and noncommercial research purposes were also en-
acted in Austria. COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A GUIDE TO NA-
TIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE 70–71 (Brigitte 
Lindner & Ted Shapiro eds., 2011). 
 79. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations art. 15(1)(d), Oct. 26, 1961, 
496 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 80. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See generally Bryan Mercurio 
& Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Out-
standing Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. 
INT‘L L. 275 (2009) (analyzing recent WTO Appellate Body decisions applying 
the Vienna Convention). 
 81. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a); see also id. art. 
5(2)(b) (restricting private use to non-commercial ends). 
 82. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–64 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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research in the European Union actually relied on the private 
use tradition found in most domestic copyright laws, but never 
directly mentioned in either Berne or TRIPS.83  
In any event, the ability of scientific researchers to fall 
back upon the traditional private use exception had already 
been compromised by the advent of modern means of technical 
reproduction, which risked allowing the exception to swallow 
the exclusive reproduction right and invited countervailing 
regulatory action in national laws. In this vein, the InfoSoc Di-
rective responds with a double-edged regulatory sword in Arti-
cle 5(2)(b) by subjecting both photocopying and private copying 
to an express obligation to pay fair compensation.84 Arguably, 
these provisions cut back upon the preexisting ability of scien-
tists to broadly copy literature for research purposes under the 
private use exception.85 Moreover, apart from certain noncom-
mercial library reproductions, these provisions in effect largely 
confine scientific research to the vague and somewhat ambigu-
ous language of Article 5(3)(a) as implemented in actual state 
practice.86  
Finally, the exhaustive list of permissible exceptions in the 
EC‘s Directive contains no fair use provision that might afford 
a greater degree of flexibility.87 On the contrary, Article 5(5) of 
the EC‘s InfoSoc Directive imposes three additional require-
ments that negatively circumscribe all the limitations and ex-
 
 83. With specific regard to scientific research, the InfoSoc Directive‘s os-
tensibly permissive language did nothing to clarify preexisting ambiguities or 
the lack of standard approaches among member states. For example, U.K. law, 
which has continued to tinker with preexisting exceptions inherited from the 
predigital age, further limited provisions allowing research and use for private 
study, already subject to a ―fair dealing‖ proviso, by ―inserting the require-
ments of non-commercial use and sufficient acknowledgement.‖ COPYRIGHT IN 
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 78, at 572 (citing CDPA, §§ 29(1)(a), 
32, 36, 38, 39, 43 and § 61(4)(a)). Protests by user organizations were disre-
garded. Id. Because the Directive‘s merely permissive language concerning sci-
ence requires no affirmative action whatsoever, there was arguably no need for 
these measures. 
 84. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2)(b). 
 85. Of course, paying equitable compensation in appropriate cases is bet-
ter than imposing a duty to negotiate private uses under the burden of exclu-
sivity. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 33, at 524. However, it is a bad idea to 
compel researchers to pay other researchers for research uses of their pub-
lished works, especially when most of the research in question was probably 
government-funded to begin with. See also infra Part II.A. 
 86. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3).  
 87. Id. art. 5(2). 
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ceptions it otherwise allows.88 This three-step provision—
derived from Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement—embodies a 
retroactive and excessively narrow reading of the applicable in-
ternational minimum standards, and thus appears to ignore 
more flexible language later embodied in the WCT of 1996 and 
more clearly amplified in the accompanying Agreed State-
ments.89 As we demonstrate in Part I.A.3, the end result is that 
the InfoSoc Directive, regardless of how it is implemented, 
could significantly cut back on the already narrow sphere of ex-
ceptions favoring scientific research in the past, whether or not 
this was its intended purpose.90  
2. The Fair Use Approach in the United States 
In contrast, the United States, which did not join the Berne 
Convention until 1989,91 adopted a different approach to limi-
tations and exceptions in general and to those bearing on re-
search in particular. The designated limitations and exceptions 
in the U.S. Copyright Law of 1976 that are most relevant to 
scientific research include limitations on the reproduction 
rights for libraries in § 10892 and, above all, the fair use excep-
tion codified for the first time in § 107.93 By setting out the con-
ditions under which library reproductions and interlibrary 
loans might be made for purposes of private study, scholarship, 
or research, § 108 operates in effect as a codified specification of 
fair use as it applies to libraries in general.  
There are no other designated exemptions bearing on quo-
tations, excerpts, or scientific research as such in the 1976 Act, 
like those under the Berne Convention94 and the European 
Commission‘s InfoSoc Directive.95 Hence, it is the codified fair 
use doctrine, as judicially interpreted, that effectively governs 
 
 88. Id. art. 5(5) (―The exceptions and limitations provided for in para-
graphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.‖). 
 89. WCT, supra note 42. 
 90. Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2; Hilty, Five 
Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 113–18; see also Westkamp, supra 
note 78, at 26 (stressing that art. 5(5) will likely diminish public interest uses 
in the digital environment). 
 91. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (effective date of entry March 1, 1989). 
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006). 
 93. Id. § 107.  
 94. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 10. 
 95. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a). 
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the rights of researchers in the United States to avoid or miti-
gate the exclusive rights of authors and publishers. Any so-
called private use exceptions, comparable to those traditionally 
found in European copyright laws,96 must stand or fall as fair 
uses in U.S. law. 
Section 107 of the 1976 Act expressly recognizes a set of 
preambular uses or ―purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research‖ for which an open-ended fair use 
exception is deemed particularly suitable.97 These uses promote 
public goods in ways that courts must reconcile with the pri-
vate rights of authors in an appropriately balanced copyright 
system. Much depends, however, on how judges determine 
whether the harm incurred by the copyright owner is justified 
by the benefit to the public from allowing the use in question.98 
To answer that question, the statute requires courts to 
evaluate four separate criteria that may pull in different direc-
tions and evince different weights, viz: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use (such as a noncommercial use or a so-called 
transformative use); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work (for 
example, is it of a factual or scientific character to begin with); 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used (in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms); and (4) the effect of any 
given use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted 
work.99  
In the past, and for a fairly long period of time, it was the 
fourth factor—the so-called market harm test—that predomi-
nated in the case law.100 Following Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,101 
however, all four factors must now be weighed by the courts, 
and the predominant factor has become the first, in practice, as 
courts focus increasingly on the presence or absence of a so-
 
 96. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. See generally Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001). 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
 98. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.2 to 10.1.4 (2d ed. 
1996). 
 99. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 576–94 (1994) (explaining each of the four factors in § 107).  
 100. Jane C. Ginsburg, Conflicts of Copyright Ownership between Authors 
and Owners of Original Artworks: An Essay in Comparative and International 
Private Law, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 401 n.22 (1993) (noting that 
―the inquiry into potential market harm remains dominant‖). 
 101. 510 U.S. at 569.  
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called transformative use, i.e., a new use not necessarily envi-
sioned by the original author that enriches culture or the pur-
suit of knowledge.102 This transformative use factor has pre-
vailed in the digital arena, as seen in cases involving search 
engines that access and index massive amounts of data and in-
formation on the Internet.103 Courts in the United States have 
now routinely held that the use of thumbnail images as mark-
ers for search engines, for example, is transformative and that 
the fair use defense can avail notwithstanding some use for 
commercial gain.104 
Empirically, it can be demonstrated that judges also invoke 
other factors, especially a hidden fifth factor—namely, ―the ex-
tent to which the claimed fair use serves the public interest‖—
without which few, if any, major federal appellate decisions af-
firming fair use are likely to be found.105 In other words, the 
federal appellate courts look for transformative uses that ad-
vance the public interest, especially as identified with those 
 
 102. See id. at 579 (emphasizing uses that ―provide social benefit[s] by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and in the process, creat[e] a new one‖); see 
also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 
(2d Cir. 2006) (promotional posters used in biography about rock music was ―a 
purpose separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional pur-
pose for which the images were created‖); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 
305 F.3d 924, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 103. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–67 
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of thumbnails as highly transformative use); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the use of 
thumbnail images in search engine as fair use); see also A.V. v. IParadigms, 
L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 638–40 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding fair use for archival cop-
ies of student papers stored in digital form to help detect and prevent plagia-
rism); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 104. Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1163–68 (holding that search engine com-
pilation of thumbnail-sized photographs was fair use); Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d at 822 (same). For the view that these cases really turn on nonexpressive 
uses that do not substitute for the author‘s original expression, see Sag, supra 
note 2, at 1636–37. 
 105. See, e.g., Cliff ‘s Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ‘g Grp., 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding parody not infringing given pub-
lic interest in free expression); Corp. of Am. Sony v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (finding the factor of societal benefits weighted 
in the outcome of fair use determination); Jerome H. Reichman, ―Marching to 
a Three-Step Tune,‖ (Comments, Program on the International Harmonization 
of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, Cardozo School of Law, March 30–
31, 2008); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Free Expression: 
Analyzing the Convergence of Conflicting Normative Frameworks, 4 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 68–69 (2004) (discussing several cases and arguing, 
―[w]hat is of interest here, however, is that in applying the fair use doctrine, 
courts have sought to introduce an element of ‗public interest‘ clearly not ex-
pressly mandated under the traditionally understood requirements of fair use‖). 
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public goods set out in the preamble,106 without unduly com-
promising the author‘s reasonable expectations of commercial 
gain. In this context, public scientific research had fared rela-
tively well under the fair use doctrine,107 at least until the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was adopted in 1998.108 
For example, it was not customary in the United States for sci-
entists to spend scarce research dollars on payments for photo-
copied articles for private research, as regularly occurs in Eu-
rope,109 notwithstanding the absence of any private use 
exception in the 1976 Act.  
Underlying unresolved conflicts concerning the theoretical 
groundings of fair use can, nonetheless, affect a court‘s willing-
ness to expand or contract the doctrine on a case-by-case ba-
sis.110 For example, much depends on whether fair use is seen 
as a mere technical adjustment allowing infringement of exclu-
sive rights in exceptional cases, or whether it covers areas of 
use from which authors were granted no such exclusivity to 
 
 106. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 107. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. 
Cl. 1973), aff ‘d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding fair 
use permitted where copying of medical journals is for scientific purposes). 
Professor Tushnet characterizes the pre-DMCA landscape as uncertain. Re-
becca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright 
Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000) (―After decades of 
litigation, it is still difficult to tell when and whether one can photocopy copy-
righted materials, even for scientific research.‖). 
 108. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see infra notes 242–45 
and accompanying text. 
 109. Thus scientists seem not to have encountered the difficulties that have 
otherwise constrained documentary film makers in the United States. See, 
e.g., Peter Jaszi & Patricia Aufderheide, Untold Stories: Collaborative Re-
search on Documentary Filmmakers‘ Free Speech and Fair Use, 46 CINEMA J. 
133, 133–39 (2007). 
 110. See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600, 1638–39 (1982) (discussing courts‘ varying opinions regarding the 
serving of public interest); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 797, 817–18 (2010) (discussing how technological fair use cases vary from 
other fair use cases); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
577 (1994) (―The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the 
statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.‖); cf. 
Kate O‘Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the 
Right of First Publication, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 388–89 (2001) (urging courts 
to abandon a dogged allegiance to 17 U.S.C. § 107‘s four-factor analysis, at 
least in ―hard cases‖). 
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begin with, in which case it can or should be seen as a form of 
―users‘ rights.‖111 
More recently, under the influence of law and economics 
theory, the extent to which fair use is justified by various forms 
of market-failure analysis has attracted considerable attention 
from courts and commentators.112 For example, at least one 
relatively recent case concerning photocopies for classroom 
use113 and another for use at a commercial scientific laborato-
ry114 seemed to presage a growing judicial resistance to fair 
use, even for research purposes, especially where novel licens-
ing strategies had emerged. In this vein, courts began to reason 
that yesterday‘s market failure—due, say, to the high transac-
tion costs of seeking and negotiating permissions to use in cer-
tain cases—might be cured by tomorrow‘s establishment of 
clearinghouses, standard-form contracts, and digitally regulat-
ed access controls, which facilitate pay-per-use mechanisms not 
conceivable in a less technologically sophisticated era.115 Fair 
use could then depend on the willingness of courts to envision 
public good overrides that apply irrespective of market failure. 
For a time, the influence of market-failure theory, coupled 
with a surge in the ―property rights‖ approach to intellectual 
property law generally, elicited growing scholarly criticism of 
an ―incredibly shrinking doctrine of fair use.‖116 Fortunately, 
 
 111. See Mary W. S. Wong, ―Transformative‖ User-Generated Content in 
Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 1075, 1096–97 (2009). See generally PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra 
note 51. 
 112. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 110 (focusing attention on the use of a 
market approach in fair use cases).  
 113. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 
1381, 1388–92 (6th Cir. 1996).  
 114. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931–32 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that there was a convenient rights clearance regime 
to handle the use in question). 
 115. See, e.g., id.; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Auto-
mated Rights Management on Copyright‘s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
557, 563–67 (1998); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COP-
YRIGHT SOC‘Y USA 133, 137 (2003) (suggesting pay-as-you-go schemes in a dig-
ital environment); see also June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Cop-
yright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 472–73 (2004) (stating that ―digital rights manage-
ment systems‖ are advancing and many previously privileged uses may no 
longer be considered fair uses); Lunney, supra note 96, at 815 (discussing the 
move from guild control to copyright as a fundamental transformation that is 
now endangered.); infra Part II.C.b.2.  
 116. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for 
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44–47 (2001); Gor-
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this period has lately given way to a series of more flexible de-
cisions favoring transformative uses of various kinds and espe-
cially those performed by search engines.117 On the surface, 
these recent decisions would seem more favorable to scientific 
research, subject to certain inherent constraints limiting the 
application of the fair use doctrine as a whole. In reality, new 
constraints arising from technological fencing measures under 
the DMCA118 can enable content providers to effectively shut 
down the fair use exception in the online environment, precise-
ly where it is of greatest use to computational science. These 
measures are discussed below.  
B. NEW BOUNDARIES IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
So far, we have seen that the conceptual approach to limi-
tations and exceptions affecting scientific research in domestic 
copyright laws differed considerably in the European Union 
and the United States. Later on, we shall evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, with specific re-
gard to their implications for science.119 Before doing so, how-
ever, we must take account of developments at the internation-
al level since 1994 that have greatly complicated the practical 
application of limitations and exceptions under either concep-
tual approach. 
As previously observed, a major turning point had already 
occurred in 1967, when the Berne Union countries accepted a 
package deal in which an author‘s exclusive right of reproduc-
tion was codified in Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention and 
simultaneously subjected to the ―three-step test‖ in Article 
9(2).120 Three decades later, history repeated itself when the 
drafters of the TRIPS Agreement attempted unsuccessfully to 
negotiate a set of designated limitations and exceptions to the 
exclusive rights of copyright, patent, and trademark laws that 
were about to be harmonized in a single convention for the first 
time. When, at the end of the day, no agreement could be 
reached on any of the listed proposals under consideration, the 
 
don, supra note 110; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Ap-
proach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 8–32 (1997).  
 117. See Sag, supra note 2, at 1636–51 (discussing relevant cases); supra 
notes 103–04 and accompanying text.  
 118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006).  
 119. See infra Part I.C.  
 120. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
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drafters made the unprecedented—and some would say mind-
less—decision to extend that same three-step test, initially 
adopted as an expedient in 1967, with some minor variations, 
to all the exclusive rights bestowed on authors, inventors, in-
dustrial designers, and trademark owners in the final version 
of the TRIPS Agreement as adopted in 1994.121 
The three-step test thus became a universal norm of world 
intellectual property law, binding on some 153 signatories to 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.122 
Its enforcement also became subject to the WTO tribunals and 
cross-sectoral remedies governed by the WTO‘s Understanding 
on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).123  
1. Normative Blindness at the World Trade Organization  
One major problem with the three-step formulation as em-
bodied in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement124 is that it re-
mains devoid of any intrinsic normative guidance. It thus fails 
to tell courts and administrators what, if any, user pursuits are 
particularly worthy, from a policy perspective, of affirmative re-
lief from the right holders‘ control under the exclusive rights 
that the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO members to provide.125  
 
 121. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 13 (copyrights), 30 (pa-
tents), 26 (industrial designs), & 17 (trademarks, which emerged as a two-step 
variant); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 5–27, 319–32 (1998); see also Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual 
Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or 
Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009). 
 122. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
( last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 123. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organ-
ization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; Panel Report, United 
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) 
[hereinafter US–Section 110(5) Panel Report]. 
 124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (obliging WTO members to 
―confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.‖). 
 125. See id., arts. 9.1 (incorporating exclusive rights of the Berne Conven-
tion 1971), 11 (imposing rental rights on computer programs and cinemato-
graphic works), 14 (imposing recognition of related rights for performers, pro-
ducers of phonograms (sound recordings) and Broadcasting Organizations), 16 
(mandating exclusive rights of trademark owners), 28 (mandating exclusive 
rights of patentees), & 26 (mandating exclusive rights of protected industrial 
designs and subjecting them to still another version of the three-step test). 
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So far, the only WTO panel to apply the three-step test of 
Article 13 dealt with a broad exemption from the public per-
formance rights for radio and television broadcasts of copy-
righted musical works in bars and restaurants under § 110(5) 
of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.126 After considering both the 
breadth of the exemption as codified and evidence of its poten-
tial substitution effects on live or recorded music covered by Ar-
ticle 11bis of the Berne Convention,127 the panel held that 
§ 110(5) was insufficiently ―limited‖ to satisfy the first prong of 
the three-step test set out in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.128  
Section 110(5) was accordingly inconsistent with foreign 
authors‘ exclusive public communication rights under Article 
11bis of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS 
Agreement via Article 9.1.129 While recognizing that ―normative 
considerations‖ should play a part at step three, and possibly at 
step two of any analysis under Article 13, the panel‘s reified vi-
sion of ―limited‖ exceptions under step one130 inhibited it from 
telling us what those considerations might be or how that nor-
mative impact should be weighed against rights holders‘  
interests.131 
 
 126. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123; see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 110(5) (2006). 
 127. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 11bis; TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating arts. 1–21 (minus art. 6bis) into the 
TRIPS Agreement of 1994).  
 128. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶¶ 6.133, 6.160; 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (―Members shall confine limitations 
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases . . . .‖).  
 129. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶¶ 6.133, 6.160, 
6.209–6.211; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.1; Berne Convention, 
supra note 20, art. 11bis (1)(i)–(iii). Note, however, that a compulsory license 
favoring foreign—but not necessarily U.S.—authors could have cured the vio-
lation by dint of Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention. National authors in 
the country of origin have no standing under the Berne Convention. See Berne 
Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 5. 
 130. The panel conflated the term ―certain special cases‖ in Article 13 on 
exceptions to copyright protection with the term ―limited exceptions‖ to patent 
protection in Article 30, without explanation, while reifying the concept in 
both cases. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.109; GERVAIS, 
supra note 121, at 89–91. 
 131. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶ 6.179–6.189 
(emphasizing that the beneficiary of an exception should not enter into compe-
tition with the rightholder); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copy-
right Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the ―Three-Step Test‖ for Copyright 
Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D‘AUTEUR [INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF AUTHOR‘S RIGHTS] 3, 20–25 (2001). 
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To be fair, the WTO panel in the Section 110(5) case found 
little normative guidance in the legislative history accompany-
ing the original three-step test adopted as Article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention at the Stockholm Conference in 1967.132 Ra-
ther, the experts who drafted that provision produced a single 
laconic paragraph of explanation, embodied in the Rapporteur‘s 
Statement at Stockholm. According to this source, the three-
step test can be read to mean that an objectively small taking 
of protected matter may be allowed for some purposes, a large 
taking for any purpose is strongly discouraged, while a medi-
um-sized taking for a good normative purpose might be cured 
by the payment of equitable compensation.133  
The WTO panel may indeed have made this normative 
blindness even worse when, reasoning from trade law, it as-
serted that no public purpose was necessary to trigger applica-
tion of the three-step test to any given dispute under Article 13 
of the TRIPS Agreement.134 However, the WTO panel‘s ap-
proach downplayed the fact that the TRIPS Agreement basical-
ly deals with private rights.135 Even though it constitutes a 
treaty among sovereign entities, private rights holders are, in 
effect, a class of third-party beneficiaries, rather like residents 
of foreign enclaves whose ethnic, linguistic, and educational 
rights were protected by certain bilateral and multilateral trea-
 
 132. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.73. 
 133. Compare id., with Senftleben, supra note 48 (a more complex interpre-
tation), and Mihály Ficsor, President, Hungarian Copyright Council, Paper 
Presentation at the Fordham Intellectual Property Conference (Apr. 15, 2009), 
available at http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/ 
MihalyFicsor_Three-step_Test.pdf (noting that the application of three-step 
test only recently became controversial). See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, su-
pra note 32, at 639–46 (discussing three-step test); Geiger, supra note 33 (dis-
cussing different ways to interpret copyright limitations).  
 134. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, at 33–34. In 
trade law, states are often tempted to couch would-be exceptions from the tar-
iff bindings under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
terms of vague public-interest justifications. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. The WTO tradition thus 
far is to focus on the literal fact of violation, which could only be rescued by 
reference to a WTO or GATT Member‘s reserved powers under article XX or to 
other specified safeguard measures. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190; Appellate Body Re-
port, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 8, 1998. 
 135. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl.¶ 4 (recognizing that intel-
lectual property rights are private rights). 
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ties in the past.136 Without a public-purpose justification for 
derogating from the private rights protected under TRIPS, lim-
itations in domestic laws—like those condemned in the Section 
110(5) case—could merely allow a state to take money from one 
private pocket and put it into another.137 
If the original three-step test embodied in Article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention was thus rather normatively blind, that 
blindness became even more opaque after its incorporation and 
expansion under TRIPS, Article 13.138 For example, there is no 
express obligation to take third-party interests into account 
under Article 13, as there is in the corresponding patent law 
formulation embodied in Article 30 of the same Agreement.139 
Moreover, the one WTO panel so far convened to consider that 
formulation in the patent context failed to take into considera-
tion any of the rather evident public health effects of its deci-
sion when evaluating step one of the test.140  
Because the formula as thus applied appears normatively 
blinkered, it tends to give undue positive weight to acquired 
rights and to codified exceptions recognized in existing legisla-
tion, such as the list set out in the EC InfoSoc Directive.141 This 
approach harbors a flawed methodology because such lists only 
tell us the results of past legislative compromises. They do not 
provide a sound normative foundation on which to build, case-
 
 136. See, e.g., Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 
1959 I.C.J. 209 (June 1959). 
 137. Cf. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative 
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Restraint on Congress, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1192 (criticizing such an approach). 
 138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating arts. 1–
21 of the Berne Convention, except for art. 6bis); Berne Convention (1971), su-
pra note 20, art. 9(2). 
 139. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 13 (―Members shall confine 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.‖), 30 (―Members may 
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, pro-
vided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploi-
tation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.‖ 
(emphasis added)). 
 140. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products, WT/DS114/R, Mar. 17, 2000; see also Robert Howse, The Canadian 
Generic Medicines Panel—A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 502 (2000) (emphasizing what the Panel should 
have considered). 
 141. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5. 
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by-case in the future, which could free domestic copyright laws 
from temporal rigidity. 
This rigidity is then magnified by the conventional view 
that, for any given use to qualify as privileged under the three-
step test, the decision maker must answer ―yes‖ to all three 
questions posed by that test.142 Until recently, this orthodox po-
sition went largely unquestioned,143 and modified versions of 
this same approach have been extended to patents, trade-
marks, and industrial designs. Fortunately, the Max Planck In-
stitute has launched a head-on challenge to this position, as we 
shall explore in our discussion of possible reforms below.144 
2. Potential Flexibility Under the WIPO Copyright Treaty  
With specific regard to copyright law, Article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement expressly extended the three-step test to all 
the exclusive pecuniary rights covered by the Berne Conven-
tion‘s 1971 text, as incorporated into TRIPS by virtue of Article 
9.1.145 Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement also conferred new 
exclusive rights on authors of computer programs and cine-
matographic works.146 On its face, Article 13 could thus be read 
as a potentially narrowing super-norm applicable to both the 
extant exceptions in the revised Berne Convention of 1971 and 
to all preexisting exceptions in the domestic copyright laws of 
Berne Union members, with perhaps due deference for so-
called acquired rights (acquis), that is, certain state practices 
 
 142. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 530–35. 
 143. See, e.g., Ficsor, supra note 133.  
 144. See infra notes 424–35 and accompanying text. 
 145. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating Articles 
1–21 of Berne Convention as set out in the 1971 text and the Appendix there-
to, except for Article 6bis, which deals with moral rights). Because moral 
rights under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention were expressly not incorpo-
rated into the TRIPS Agreement under Article 9, the three-step test does not 
apply to them at the international level. Whether the rights conferred on 
broadcasting organizations under Article 14.3 of TRIPS are also subject to the 
three-step test of Article 13 remains to be seen, as the relations between these 
provisions and the Rome Convention of 1961, supra note 79, are not entirely 
clear.  
 146. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 11 (providing rental rights sub-
ject to an optional waiver for cinematographic works in the absence of ―wide-
spread copying‖ to accommodate U.S. law). Article 14.2 also seems to provide 
an exclusive right of reproduction to producers of phonograms. However, Arti-
cle 14.6 allows WTO Members to invoke ―conditions, limitations, exceptions 
and reservations to the extent permitted by the Rome Convention‖ for produc-
ers of phonograms covered by article 14.2. How to reconcile Article 14.6 with 
Article 13 remains unclear. 
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known to the TRIPS drafters and never expressly challenged or 
rejected during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade  
Negotiations.147 
Two years later at the Diplomatic Conference that pro-
duced the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the United States 
and the European Union submitted a draft text that expressly 
attempted to codify this narrowing interpretation of the three-
step test, which the pending WIPO treaty was supposed to in-
corporate.148 However, after extensive debate and the vigorous 
intervention of the U.S. science agencies and their representa-
tives, a modified approach to the three-step test was enacted in 
Article 10 of the final text,149 along with an Agreed Statement 
unanimously adopted by the parties.150 
Article 10(1) of the WCT states expressly that contracting 
parties ―may‖ adopt limitations and exceptions to rights grant-
ed authors under the new treaty in conformity with the three-
step test;151 while Article 10(2) states that these same contract-
ing parties, when applying the Berne Convention, ―shall‖ con-
fine its limitations and exceptions to the three-step test.152 The 
Agreed Statement, negotiated with direct inputs from the Pres-
 
 147. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.65 (―We 
are not aware of any record in the Uruguay Round documentation of any 
country participating in the negotiations challenging or questioning the minor 
exceptions doctrine being part of the Berne acquis on which the TRIPS 
agreement was to be built.‖). 
 148. See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provi-
sions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, n.7.07, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_ 
dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf (―The purpose of [Article 7(2)] is to make it possible to exclude 
from the scope of the right of reproduction acts of reproduction that are not 
relevant in economic terms. By reference to Article 9(2) of the Berne Conven-
tion, the limitations are further confined to cases that pass the three-step test 
of that provision.‖). 
 149. WCT, supra note 42, art. 10. 
 150. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
Questions, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter WCT 
Agreed Statements], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ 
statements.html. 
 151. WCT, supra note 42, art. 10(1). 
 152. See id. art. 10(2). 
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idents of the U.S. National Academies and then Vice-President 
Gore‘s office,153 further declared,  
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting 
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital en-
vironment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which 
have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similar-
ly, these provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Par-
ties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in 
the digital network environment. 
It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends 
the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted 
by the Berne Convention.154 
These changes were made for the specific purpose of avoid-
ing posterior challenges to the fair use provisions of the U.S. 
Copyright Act of 1976 (as some scholars had previously feared 
could happen under the TRIPS Agreement)155, but whose valid-
ity had not otherwise been compromised during the negotia-
tions that led the United States to adhere to the Berne Conven-
tion in 1989.156  
The full implications of this complex set of provisions re-
main to be worked out at both the national and international 
levels.157 For example, these provisions could trump arguments 
that the three-step test can retroactively undo limitations and 
exceptions existing in national laws prior to the conclusion of 
the TRIPS Agreement. What cannot be denied is that any fu-
ture interpretation of the three-step test codified in Article 13 of 
the TRIPS Agreement must also reflect the posterior, more 
flexible gloss on that same test as adopted by essentially the 
same parties two years later, in Article 10 of the WCT and its 
Agreed Statement.158 
 
 153. Paul F. Uhlir & Jerome H. Reichman represented the National Acad-
emies in these negotiations. 
 154. WCT Agreed Statements, supra note 150. 
 155. Okediji, supra note 54, at 136 (expressing doubt as to whether the fair 
use provisions could withstand a TRIPS agreement attack).  
 156. See The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-568, § 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (―The amendments made by this Act, to-
gether with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act, satisfy 
the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention.‖). 
 157. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 544–48 (describing the ―open-
ended‖ three-step test as ―a flexible framework, within which national legisla-
tors . . . enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national limitations and satisfying 
domestic social, cultural and economic needs‖).  
 158. See, for example, Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 31: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty and in their con-
text and in the light of its object and purpose. . . . 
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By the same token, these cumulative legislative enact-
ments oblige the members of the WTO to take account of the 
three-step test whenever they adopt or enforce limitations and 
exceptions in their domestic copyright laws, under whatever 
conceptual approach they prefer.159 Failure to do so could result 
in adverse legal challenges at the WTO, with the risk of having 
to pay damages to states whose bargained-for trade expecta-
tions suffered harm by dint of any failure of any given excep-
tion to satisfy this test.160 
C. THE SHRINKING REALM OF SCIENTIFIC USERS‘ RIGHTS 
UNDER EITHER APPROACH 
Seventy years of practical experience with the teachings of 
the legal realists161 has demonstrated, at the very least, that 
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the in-
terpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpre-
tation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between parties. 
 159. See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 
7 (2008), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/copyright_20080 
506.pdf (noting that states view the three-step test ―as a constraint on the sov-
ereign discretion of nations to provide flexibilities in their laws‖); Reichman, 
supra note 121, at 1156 (emphasizing the need for countries to reconcile poten-
tial ―fair use‖ regimes with the three-step test). 
 160. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123. 
 161. See generally, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962) ( laying out a theory of legal realism); SOIA 
MENTSCHIKOFF & IRWIN P. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN 
LAW—ELEMENTS (1981). The ostensible benefits of establishing a closed list of 
designated exceptions available to European legislators contemplating copy-
right reform are rooted in the myths of the positivist legal tradition, which ap-
peal to practicing lawyers‘ ceaseless quest for legal certainty. The tenacity of 
this quest partly reflects the Continental approach to legal education and its 
historic indifference to the legal realist movement. See James R. Maxeiner, 
Some Realism about Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law, in 
THE RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 41, 41–49 (2010) (explaining 
the ―centrality of legal certainty to the thinking of continental jurists‖ in com-
parison to American legal realism). Paradoxically, some of the most influential 
leaders of that movement, including Llewellyn and Mentschikoff, were trans-
planted refugees from Europe, who made it their lives‘ work to challenge the 
shortcomings of both the civil and common law traditions. Cf. JACK DONNEL-
LY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15 (2000) (―Hans Morganthau, 
an American refugee from Nazi Germany, was one of the leading realists of 
the 1950s and 1960s and perhaps the purest as well as the most self-conscious 
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the quest for legal certainty162 cannot be separated from a clear 
analysis of both the underlying purposes of any given set of 
laws and the empirical experience accumulated over time from 
judicial efforts to implement those same laws in actual cases.163 
With specific regard to copyright law, history also teaches that 
changing factual conditions constantly elicit a need for creative 
new solutions that are inherently slow to materialize, and de-
stabilizing to boot, while the lobbying of special interests often 
remains indifferent to the larger public interest that was sup-
posedly to be advanced by any given set of enumerated excep-
tions. 
For example, even the most enlightened policymakers 
found themselves confronted by a rapidly changing world in 
which legal categories designed for the print media collapsed or 
converged in the digital online environment.164 Just when tra-
ditional scientific research methods were overtaken by the rise 
of computerized information technologies requiring unfettered 
access to and use of data and information, researchers discov-
ered that the old categories of exceptions inherited from the 
print media were so freighted with narrow, legalistic interpre-
tations that they could not readily be updated or accommodated 
to the challenges of modern science, even with the best of 
 
apostle of realism of his generation.‖) (quotation omitted)). 
 162. Legal realists sought a higher synthesis that blended the best features 
of both the civil and common law traditions, while avoiding their respective 
defects, as reflected, for example, in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, drafted by Llewellyn and Mentischikoff. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, 
DEATH OF CONTRACTS 55–85 (1974) (describing the messy state of contracts 
law before the reforms adopted in Article 2 of the UCC, which were deliberate-
ly designed to reform the general law of contracts). 
 163. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881) (―The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. . . . The law embodies 
the story of a nation‘s development through many centuries, and it cannot be 
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of math-
ematics.‖); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); Karl 
N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 68, 72–75 
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (―[Any law] needs constantly to be ex-
amined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both 
and of their relation to each other.‖). The Law and Economics Movement is it-
self a response to the challenge of the legal realists. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POS-
NER, OVERCOMING LAW 2–3 (1995). 
 164. Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative 
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257, 257–58 
(1996) (―[A]s the old ‗bottle‘ of print-based copyright law expands to cover new 
media and new uses, the transformative possibilities of these new uses in new 
media will occasionally pop the cork of existing legal categories.‖). 
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will.165 
1. Impeding Scientific Research Even in the Print Media 
In this Section, we first evaluate the existing approaches to 
limitations and exceptions affecting copyrighted scientific re-
search results as they have worked, or failed to work, in the 
print media for which they were originally designed. We then 
show how this fragile, predigital foundation was further un-
dermined by efforts to strictly regulate transmissions of copy-
righted works over the Internet, and by the database protection 
laws adopted in the European Union after 1996.166 
a. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Designated Exceptions 
Approach 
The InfoSoc Directive adopted by the European Commis-
sion in 2001 was ostensibly an attempt to reconcile the ―desig-
nated exceptions‖ approach of prior Continental copyright laws 
with the provisions of both the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 and 
the WCT of 1996.167 It was also supposed to harmonize the lim-
itations and exceptions found in all the copyright laws of Euro-
pean Union member states, as well as those of affiliated and 
would-be member countries.168 In reality critics complain that, 
with respect to harmonization, the Directive failed in its essen-
tial purpose,169 while its response to the WCT digital copyright 
 
 165. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 
315–327, 351; Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 109–18; 
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 324 (doubting the ability of legislators to 
accommodate the needs of the scientific research community with tweaks to 
an ―increasingly high-protectionist regime‖). 
 166. See infra text accompanying notes 230–41. 
 167. See Bernt Hugenholz, Why the Copyright Directive Is Unimportant, 
and Possibly Invalid, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 499, 499 (2000). 
 168. David Gee, A Copyright Balance? An Overview for Librarians of Cur-
rent UK Copyright Law, 35 INT‘L J. LEGAL INFO. 47, 50 (2007) (stating that the 
goal for the directive was to harmonize copyright law across the European Un-
ion); Veronica Syrtash, Supra-National Limitations on Copyright Exceptions: 
Canada‘s Ephemeral Exception and the ―Three-Step Test,‖ 19 INTELL. PROP. J. 
521, 549 (2006) (―The Copyright Directive introduced a regime of compulsory 
and permitted exceptions to the three exclusive rights provided for by member 
states.‖). 
 169. See Séverine Dussollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright 
Directive of 2001, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 51, 55 (questioning the useful-
ness of the Copyright Directive‘s ―private orderings model‖); Thomas Heide, 
The Berne Three-Step Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 105, 109 (1999) (concluding that the Copyright Directive 
leaves the three-step test ―largely straitjacketed and therefore incapable of re-
sponding to the need for balance between various interests‖); Hugenholz, su-
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provisions embodies a high-protectionist regime inconsistent 
with the balancing norms actually adopted in that treaty.170 
Whether or not these criticisms prove valid, the inadequacies of 
this Directive with respect to scientific research remain pain-
fully clear. 
For example, even though Article 5(3)(a) of the Directive 
adopts a soi disant exception for science at the regional level 
that does not appear in the Berne Convention,171 its tortured 
language may impose qualifiers that cut back upon the provi-
sions of that Convention, which largely leave science at the 
mercy of the three-step test. Moreover, the exception for science 
in Article 5(3) is not mandatory, whatever its meaning turns 
out to be.172  
If a European Union member country ignores Article 
5(3)(a) of the Directive, it remains bound by Articles 10(1) and 
10(2) of the Berne Convention, as revised in 1971, which make 
no mention of science whatsoever.173 Even with regard to quo-
tations or to other excerpts for teaching materials, Article 10(1) 
limits the former to ―fair practice . . . and [the] extent justified 
by the purpose,‖174 while Article 10(2) permits the latter only 
―to the extent justified by the purpose . . . by way of illustration 
in publications . . . for teaching, provided such utilization is 
compatible with fair practice.‖175 These provisions have been 
narrowly construed in the United Kingdom.176 while in major 
markets outside the European Union, such as Brazil, universi-
ty libraries reportedly ignore the analogous provision in the 
domestic copyright law altogether and deny students the possi-
 
pra note 167, at 499–502 (condemning the Directive as ―a total failure‖); Rich-
ard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in 
International Copyright Law, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 283 (2009) (not-
ing the shortcomings of the Copyright Directive). 
 170. See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A 
Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Techni-
cally Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 983–85 
(2007) (explaining that the Directive‘s lopsided anti-circumventionist rules 
prioritized owner rights over legitimate user interests).  
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 76–86. 
 172. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3). 
 173. See Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 10(2).  
 174. Id. art. 10(1). 
 175. Id. art. 10(2). 
 176. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, at 293 & n.847 (referring to the United 
Kingdom‘s ―fair dealing‖ approach as an example of specified, narrow limita-
tions on copyright). See generally ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, 
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT (2005).  
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bility of photocopying even short excerpts from scientific 
texts.177  
If, instead, a European Union member state decides to cod-
ify the permissible exception for science as set out in Article 
5(3)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive, would-be users of scientific 
works are immediately confronted with the inherent ambigui-
ties of the language in this provision that were identified earli-
er in this study.178 For example, do the words limiting use for 
purposes of illustration pertain to both teaching and research, 
or are they confined to teaching only? Even if the latter, more 
liberal interpretation were to prevail, research uses would re-
main subject to both the non-commercial purpose clause and to 
the prevailing judicial tendency to view all exceptions and limi-
tations as subordinate to the dominant purpose of copyright 
law, which in the European Union, is to protect the private in-
terests of authors and publishers.179 
This restrictive tendency is then reinforced by Article 5(5) 
of the InfoSoc Directive, which makes the three-step test ex-
pressly applicable to all the exceptions set out in Article 5.180 As 
noted, traditional European jurisprudence requires that all 
three steps must be applied cumulatively and all must be given 
an affirmative response if any given act is to avoid a claim of 
infringement.181 In sum, under the existing regime, nothing 
compels a European Union member state to favor scientific re-
search, and those policymakers willing to do so encounter a 
daunting battery of constraints,182 even without factoring in the 
effects of special interest lobbying. 
 
 177. Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil‘s Copyright Reform: Will Brazil Lead or Fol-
low? 19–20 (Jan. 2012) (Duke University School of Law, draft SJD thesis) (on 
file with the authors). 
 178. See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 179. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524–25. Contrast the accepted formula 
in U.S. law, which holds that securing income to authors is but a means to the 
promotion of knowledge in the public interest. Id.; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (―The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‗Science and useful Arts.‘‖ 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (―The object of copyright law is to promote the store of knowledge 
available to the public.‖).  
 180. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(5). 
 181. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., Westkamp, supra note 78, at 15–18 (stressing inability of 
three-step test to deal with multiple markets, which disfavors both private use 
and research uses in general). 
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At least one expert on the three-step test nonetheless con-
tends that both European courts and legislators could apply it 
in a more flexible, open-ended manner, somewhat comparable 
to fair use in the United States, despite the implicitly uncom-
promising approach of the InfoSoc Directive.183 To this same 
end, the review of the legislative history pertaining to Article 
9(2) of the Berne Convention by the Section 110(5) WTO tribu-
nal did uncover a potentially more flexible interpretation than 
that found in the decisions of many Continental courts.184 This 
approach, if subsequently upheld, might have the advantage of 
supporting greater use of liability rules to resolve hard cases in 
the print media, which would constitute a welcome addition in 
many sectors.185  
However, even liability rules, i.e., ―take and pay‖ rules,186 
do surprisingly little to support digitally integrated research 
methods, which ingest and mine massive amounts of data and 
information. Attempting to track such uses for purposes of cal-
culating royalty streams conjures up a vision of thickets of 
rights and boundless transaction costs that could swallow the 
most robust research budgets, even if some system of automatic 
micro-payments were to be devised.187  
If anything, the implicit duty to pay equitable compensa-
tion that could emerge from a more flexible judicial scrutiny of 
 
 183. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 538–40; see also Geller, supra note 50, at 
569–71 (arguing that neither the idea-expression dichotomy, nor constitution-
ality grounded constructions of limitations or exceptions, are subject to the 
three-step test). 
 184. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Geiger, supra note 33, at 524–33 (arguing for a limitation-friendly 
copyright regime supplemented with remuneration rules); Annette Kur and 
Jens Schovsbo, Expropriation or Fair Game for All? The Gradual Dismantling 
of the IP Exclusivity Paradigm, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A FAIR WORLD 
TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING TRIPS 408, 408–46 (Annette Kur 
& Marianne Levin eds. 2011) (defending the utility of liability rules in a copy-
right regime). 
 186. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging 
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1776–86 (2000) 
(explaining that liability rules entitle property owners to compensation for the 
use of their innovations and are hence distinguishable from exclusive or hy-
brid property rights, which entail injunctive remedies that can pose high costs 
for innovation). 
 187. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 2, at 1657–68, 1680–82 (stressing need for 
copy-reliant technologies to cover the entire Internet, for unwilling beneficiar-
ies to opt out, and tendencies of collective rights organizations to license po-
tential substitutes). However, it may make sense to retain a liability rule 
when whole, integral data sets or other data tools are used to develop down-
stream commercial applications. See infra text accompanying notes 429–44. 
 2012] COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE 1403 
 
the three-step test only reinforces the express mandate to pay 
equitable compensation for so-called private uses mandated by 
Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive, and vice versa.188 Taken 
together, Articles 5(2), 5(3), and 5(5) of the Directive cumula-
tively discourage, rather than enable, free access and reuse of 
published scientific information and data by the public research 
community, even though such research is normally funded by 
governments or other public entities and made available by re-
searchers to advance knowledge (and their reputational inter-
ests), but not for financial gain.189 
All the rigidity and uncertainty inherent in the provisions 
analyzed above are further compounded by the absence of any 
true fair use provision in the relevant international treaties,190 
in the InfoSoc Directive, or in the domestic copyright laws of 
the European Union.191 Besides enabling courts to infuse great-
er ―play in the joints‖ to facilitate scientific research, as ex-
plained above,192 an explicit fair use provision in international 
or regional instruments could induce both courts and legisla-
tures to give more weight to Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which expressly promote the public-interest goals 
of copyright law,193 and to the express provision favoring scien-
tific research and education in the preamble to the WCT itself.194 
Lacking any such fair use provision, some European courts 
concerned about excesses of copyright protection have recently 
felt obliged to invoke human rights, especially constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights to free speech, as counter-
weights.195 But such well-intentioned judicial ploys introduce 
 
 188. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, arts. 5(2), 5(3), 5(5); supra text 
accompanying notes 83–86.  
 189. See infra text accompanying notes 519–31. Arguably, there is no obvi-
ous or logical reason to treat such scientific research any differently from tra-
ditional and directly funded government publications that are, at least in the 
United States, statutorily foreclosed from copyright‘s reach. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 105 (2006). 
 190. Okediji, supra note 54, at 525–28, 538–40 (arguing that the current 
European Union copyright regime suffers from both uncertainty and rigidity). 
 191. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524–25. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 174–83.  
 193. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7 (objectives); id. art. 8 
(principles); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 981, 1028 (2009). 
 194. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl. 
 195. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 50 (discussing German judicial decisions 
that broadened the infringement analysis as well as the exception for quota-
tions to assure constitutionally protected freedom of expression); Peltz, supra 
note 169, at 282–83 (2009) (summarizing cases); cf. Lea Shaver, The Right to 
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significant uncertainty into an already complicated legal sce-
nario,196 and they could destabilize even well-settled principles 
of copyright law without directly addressing the needs of scien-
tific researchers as such. One virtue of the fair use provision in 
U.S. copyright law is precisely its ability to foster a penumbra 
in which public good uses of protected matter may occur within 
copyright law itself,197 while blunting the temptation to reach 
for more fundamental or constitutional justifications that could 
produce unintended destabilizing effects.198 
Given these premises, any limitations favoring scientific 
research that do manage to emerge from the InfoSoc Directive 
as applied by the domestic laws of European Union member 
states will likely remain unmanageable and unpredictable for 
the foreseeable future. Hence, recent proposals to reform the 
three-step test itself have attracted considerable attention from 
scholars concerned about the prospects for digitally integrated 
research methods, as will be discussed below.199  
Short of that, the ineluctable conclusion that emerges from 
this analysis is that researchers in general, and digitally em-
powered scientists in particular, will face the dismal prospects 
of choosing either to desist from pursuing promising research 
projects, with enormous opportunity costs, or to carry on in the 
knowledge that they are likely to infringe copyright laws at 
 
Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 169–84 (proposing a copyright re-
gime that promotes universal access and author interests, in light of a conflict 
between intellectual property rights and a human right of access to science 
and culture).  
 196. Ruth Okediji, The Limits of Development Strategies at the Intersection 
of Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
TRADE & DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 355, 367–73 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007). The major 
human rights declarations expressly acknowledge the rights of authors as 
human rights that need to be reconciled with other fundamental rights. See 
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 53–56 (2011) ( listing signif-
icant human rights declarations). 
 197. Okediji, supra note 196, at 355–84.  
 198. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (viewing the pro-
tection of free speech interests as embedded in the fair use doctrine). But see 
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 305–24 (2009) (asserting 
the need for recourse to fundamental rights in order to curb recent excesses of 
copyright protection); Shaver, supra note 195, at 169–83 (advocating greater 
reliance on the basic human right of access to science and culture in rebalanc-
ing international intellectual property rights).  
 199. See discussion infra Part II.D.1. 
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every turn.200 Needless to say, this choice becomes even starker 
when the European Union‘s database-protection laws are fac-
tored into the equation.201 
b. Limits of the Fair Use Approach  
At least in theory, the fair use exception enables courts to 
address fact patterns that legislators did not, or could not, have 
foreseen at the time any given copyright law was enacted. This 
property helps to keep needed responses to public interest pri-
orities up to date without recurring amendments to existing 
statutes. In this capacity, fair use buttresses both the idea-
expression principle (now codified in the TRIPS Agreement)202 
and constitutionally protected free speech in the United States, 
which in itself tends to favor access to published scientific re-
search as a purveyor of unprotected facts and discoveries.203 To 
this end, the preamble to § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 
1976 explicitly recognizes scientific research as a privileged 
subcategory within the general fair use framework.204 
 
 200. Cf. TEHRANIAN, supra note 27, at 5–14 (stressing the delegitimization 
of copyright law that results from analogous situations). 
 201. See infra Parts II.B.1.a&b. 
 202. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.2. 
 203. The well-known function of fair use to preserve a buffer zone between 
infringement and free speech in the United States has its limits, however, and 
the expansion of copyright law‘s length and strength in the past thirty years 
has elicited a growing challenge from First Amendment scholars. See, e.g., 
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 198, at 305–24; Eric Allen Engle, When Is Fair 
Use Fair?: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 15 
TRANSNAT‘L LAW. 187, 209 (2002) (describing tension between First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution and copyright law); Neil Weinstock Netanel, As-
serting Copyright‘s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 217 passim (1998) (arguing that ―copyright law serves fundamentally to 
underwrite a democratic culture‖); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copy-
right within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (―Copy-
right‘s speech encumbrance cuts a wide swath, chilling core political speech 
such as news reporting and political commentary, as well as church dissent, 
historical scholarship, cultural critique, artistic expression, and quotidian en-
tertainment.‖) (footnotes omitted)); Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge 
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 
1180 (1970). Unless more attention is given to users‘ needs, this trend could 
eventually boomerang against both publishers and authors who depend on 
copyright protection in far less sensitive areas than scientific research. 
 204. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (―[T]he fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . for purposes such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.‖). 
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i. Inherent Methodological Uncertainties 
Nevertheless, whenever any given scientific work becomes 
the subject of a litigated fair use enquiry, courts must move be-
yond the preamble and subject it to the four ―balancing sub-
tests‖ codified in § 107, as previously described.205 On the 
whole, the four-step test of U.S. fair use law accommodated 
conventional scientific research methods fairly well in the past, 
especially in view of the proresearch bias specified in the pre-
amble. With few exceptions, uses for scientific research were 
usually permitted,206 and this tradition played some of the role 
that a private use exception had performed in Europe.207  
To the extent that photocopying became a problem for the 
case-by-case approach of § 107, industry-wide rules governing 
library photocopying were negotiated and codified in § 108 of 
the Copyright Act of 1976.208 Under these provisions, neither 
students nor researchers are normally charged for library cop-
ies made for even large research projects (unlike the situation 
in the European Union), although charges will apply to copies 
made for classroom distribution, usually under blanket licenses 
from a collection society known as the Copyright Clearance 
Center.209  
Occasionally, the federal appellate courts have rendered 
decisions circumscribing the reach of fair use even with regard 
to conventional scientific research methods.210 But these cases 
usually turned on the inherently unstable line between com-
 
 205. See id. 
 206. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. 
Cl. 1973), aff ‘d without opinion by an equally divided court 420 U.S. 376 
(1975). For efforts to enact an international treaty governing worldwide library 
practices and needs, see INT‘L FED‘N OF LIBRARY ASS‘NS & INSTS., TREATY PRO-
PROSAL ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES (2011), 
available at http://www.ifla.org/files/hq/topics/exceptions-limitations/ 
documents/TLIB_v4.1.pdf. 
 207. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006). 
 209. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in 
Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 637 (2010) (describing the Copyright 
Clearance Center, which provides licenses allowing individuals to reproduce 
works that are listed with the CCC). 
 210. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1386–88 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that copy shop that sold coursepacks to uni-
versity students without paying fees or royalties was not fair use). See general-
ly U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDU-
CATORS AND LIBRARIANS (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ21.pdf (explaining the judicial doctrine of fair use and when it applies in a 
particular case). 
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mercial and noncommercial research purposes and on the grow-
ing ability of technological measures to overcome preexisting 
market failures.211 For example, researchers at a petroleum 
company were obliged to pay for additional copies of back-dated 
scientific articles available from a collection society, despite 
their subscription to the journal in question.212  
However, subsequent jurisprudence—especially at the fed-
eral appellate level—may correct questionable decisions. The 
very dependence of the fair use doctrine on unique sets of facts 
makes it relatively easy for later courts to ignore the appear-
ance of stare decisis by relying on subtle distinctions in the un-
derlying fact patterns.213 This adds to the overall flexibility of 
the U.S. approach. 
Critics of the fair use doctrine tend to emphasize the rela-
tive uncertainty likely to attend any new fact pattern214 and 
the high transaction costs arising from the need to litigate close 
cases.215 Both objections have some merit but are easily over-
stated.216 The fair use doctrine cannot intrinsically claim the 
kind of legal certainty apologists for the positivist approach 
demand, disregarding their failures to achieve it in practice.217 
Because fair use decisions are always fact-specific, attorneys 
can only base their predictions on general categories of fair use 
 
 211. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385–86; Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918–25 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 212. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 915, 931–32. 
 213. Compare, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–12 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(denying fair use for a sculptor who made a sculpture based on artist‘s photo-
graph, where the sculptor specified that the sculpture had to be ―just like the 
photo‖), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251–54 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding 
reproduction of photographic image by a painter as ―transformative,‖ because 
the painter had a new purpose in using the image which altered the original 
image‘s character, thus satisfying requirements for fair use). 
 214. See, e.g., David Nimmer, ―Fairest of Them All‖ and Other Fairy Tales 
of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003); see also BURRELL & 
COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 249–53 (citing authorities and stressing the risk 
of hostile judicial attitudes); Okediji, supra note 51, at 157 (discussing the 
problems associated with raising a fair use defense, such as a lack of financial 
resources for litigation). 
 215. See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2540–41.  
 216. See Beebe, supra note 35, at 575–76 (evaluating fair use win rates and 
litigation costs); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 715, 733–34 (2011) (discussing perceptions about the fair use 
doctrine); Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2540–41 (arguing that the fair use doc-
trine is more predictable than critics suggest). 
 217. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 527–28 (discussing the invalidi-
ty of counterarguments against the fair use doctrine that criticize its lack of 
legal certainty). 
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as established by the precedents.218 Yet, as scholars have 
shown, when cases are bundled within specified subject-matter 
categories, patterns of stability and predictability emerge.219 
Admittedly, any preexisting set of fair use precedents may 
be enhanced or narrowed by the judicial zeitgeist prevailing at 
the time. This observation holds particularly true for swings in 
the judicial pendulum from a more proproperty rights outlook 
to a more procompetition outlook, and back again, as routinely 
occurs in U.S. intellectual property jurisprudence.220 Care must 
accordingly be taken when predicting a future outcome on a 
past set of precedents to allow for shifts in the underlying 
trends, especially with regard to federal appellate and Supreme 
Court decisions.221 For example, some important older prece-
dents lost their relative weight in the late 1980s when the 
market failure approach temporarily squeezed other normative 
considerations out of the fair use equation.222 But, as we noted 
earlier, that trend itself has given way to the rebirth of a so-
called transformative use doctrine223 and its aggressive exten-
sion in recent decisions to search engines.224 
At least two commentators who dislike the uncertainty as-
 
 218. Beebe, supra note 35, at 575–81. 
 219. Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2541; see also Netanel, supra note 216, 
at 736–59 (discussing the patterns and probability of a favorable finding in 
fair use cases). See generally Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright 
as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010) (discussing the re-
lationship between copyright and creativity). 
 220. Cf. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization 
Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 107–22 (2007) (discussing shifts in judicial attitudes 
to patents). These shifts, when they occur, can invite a more than customary 
degree of forum shopping. 
 221. Cf. Gordon, supra note 110, at 1646–57 (providing case studies of two 
Supreme Court decisions affecting fair use). 
 222. Cf. id. (disavowing the judicial response to the fair use doctrine in sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions and discussing flaws in the Court‘s reasoning). 
 223. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 224. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that operator‘s display of thumbnail images of copyright 
owner‘s photographs was fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 
822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that search engine operator‘s use of owner‘s imag-
es as ―thumbnails‖ in its search engine qualified as fair use); see also Field v. 
Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding fair use in 
Google search engine‘s use of cached snapshots of websites). Contrast the situ-
ation in the European Union, where some member states, under the positivist 
approach, have declined to consider digital developments as a basis for a more 
flexible approach to the enumerated lists of exceptions contained in their copy-
right legislation. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 550–52 (explaining the Eu-
ropean Union approach to copyright limitations).  
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sociated with fair use have expressed appreciation for a ―public 
interest‖ criterion instead.225 Yet, that criterion harbors a con-
siderable degree of ambiguity all its own (given that copyright 
law itself expresses one facet of the public interest).226 Besides, 
as earlier noted, the federal appellate courts in the United 
States almost invariably invoke an uncodified public interest 
criterion when evaluating the express normative factors set out 
in § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.227 Where science is con-
cerned, moreover, both the public interest criterion and the 
normative criteria of § 107 should typically favor use and reuse 
of research results in close cases concerning research methods. 
A more troubling source of uncertainty arises from the ten-
dency of U.S.-style fair use decisions to operate under an all-or-
nothing premise that the challenged use must either infringe or 
not infringe, in which case noninfringing uses imply no corre-
sponding compensatory burden.228 This practice leads some 
courts to hand down vacillating decisions depending on how 
they evaluate the appearance of free riding in fact specific  
situations.229  
In this respect, the three-step test embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement has something to teach U.S. courts and policymak-
ers.230 As acknowledged by a WTO tribunal, the legislative his-
tory concerning this test may allow equitable compensation—a 
―take and pay‖ rule—to resolve hard cases where more than a 
 
 225. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 80–111, 249–74, 287–88. 
 226. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (―We have often rec-
ognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‗intended 
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a 
special reward,‘ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public 
good.‖ (citations omitted)); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasizing that copyright law 
itself promotes the public interest). 
 227. Sometimes this criterion can be carried very far. See, e.g., Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–56 (1984) (concluding 
that time-shifting of commercial television programs promoted the public in-
terest for fair use purposes, despite abundant evidence that most off-air repro-
ductions were not motivated by time-shifting needs); see also Gordon, supra 
note 110, at 1624–25 (stating that a defendant must prove the nature of the 
public interest served by his or her use). 
 228. See Reichman, ―Marching to a Three-Step Tune,‖ supra note 105; Orit 
Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in Copy-
right Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2011). 
 229. See Afori, supra note 228 at 5–99. 
 230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (―Members shall confine lim-
itations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests of the right holder.‖).  
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little was taken for a particularly valid public purpose.231 Unit-
ed States fair use law might benefit from this additional ele-
ment of flexibility in close cases, even as European Union law 
needs the flexibility of fair use, a topic to which we shall return 
below.232 
These very sources of uncertainty can, in turn, exert a re-
straining effect on both publishers and would-be users of copy-
righted works, depending on the facts at issue in any given 
case. While scientific entities must be wary of engaging in liti-
gation that could issue in an adverse precedent for future re-
search prospects, publishers must be equally wary of challenges 
to the status quo that may further abridge the scope of yester-
day‘s exclusive rights. This inherent burden of reciprocal uncer-
tainty tends to reduce transaction costs over time by discourag-
ing overly adventurous fair use challenges as potentially too 
costly for either side.233 
In this standoff, much fair use occurs by default, although 
a threat of future litigation acts sometimes as a sword of Dam-
ocles. If scientists are frequently wholesale infringers even with 
respect to conventional research methods, in the sense that 
they refuse to allow unreasonable or obsolete laws to obstruct 
customary or necessary research and teaching practices, rights 
holders have traditionally been reluctant to sue their sources of 
publication (often their customers as well) in cases where dam-
ages appeared modest at best.234 
Nevertheless, the high costs of litigation, combined with 
recent extraordinary statutory damages awards,235 may at 
times deter would-be users from pursuing even meritorious 
disputes that ought to enable courts to clarify the proper 
boundaries of a fair use exception.236 Users may thus find 
themselves unable to defend their legitimate rights unless 
 
 231. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 232. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing efforts for copyright reform in the 
European Union). 
 233. Accord Afori, supra note 228, at 9–10 (agreeing that uncertainties in 
the U.S. copyright approach can create disincentives to litigate). 
 234. We are grateful to Paul Uhlir for this insight. 
 235. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Direc-
tions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1196 (2010) (―[W]e are trou-
bled that statutory damage awards sometimes appear arbitrary or grossly ex-
cessive in comparison with a realistic assessment of actual damages 
incurred.‖); Michael Traynor & Katy Hutchinson, Some Open Questions about 
Intellectual Property Remedies,14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 453, 458–59, 459 
n.35 (2010) (summarizing damage awards in copyright infringement cases). 
 236. Afori, supra note 228, at 2–3. 
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some larger nonprofit entities can be found to finance the cam-
paign and absorb its potential costs if the cause is lost. The 
power of publishers‘ cease-and-desist letters in this regard adds 
to this potential in terrorem effect by warning that certain cas-
es will lead to high legal transaction costs regardless of the 
merits.237 At the moment, there is no expeditious, low-cost 
means of testing a fair use defense without incurring such liti-
gation costs, although several proposals to remedy this defect 
have been put forward.238 
ii. Outer Limits of the Case-by-Case Approach 
None of these considerations addresses the deeper prob-
lems that render the fair use doctrine of little use to practition-
ers of the digitally empowered, computerized research tech-
niques of primary concern in this Article. The systematic need 
that researchers, as users of automated knowledge discovery 
tools, have to survey vast or, indeed, unlimited amounts of lit-
erature and data in virtually every contemporary, large-scale 
scientific investigation, particularly in the life sciences, over-
whelms the boundaries set by the four-step test of § 107 and in-
creasingly makes a mockery of the very concept of fair use. 
Consider, for example, that the implicit purpose of the sub-
stantiality test set out in § 107(3) is to ensure that fair use re-
productions of a protected text will be quantitatively and quali-
tatively reasonable in relation to the work as a whole. In no 
area, not even parody,239 can this provision be interpreted to 
permit wholesale reproduction (as technically defined) of every 
relevant text in every relevant case, which routinely occurs in 
computational science or in any scientific research project 
where automated knowledge discovery tools are employed.240 
 
 237. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions 
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241–42 (1998) (arguing that 
preliminary injunctions should be available when there is a high probability of 
success on the merits). 
 238. Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic 
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 220 (2007) (proposing system to allow 
exploitation of existing work so long as user does ―not unreasonably commer-
cialize or in any way merchandize her work without the consent of the appro-
priated work‘s copyright owner‖).  
 239. But see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593–94 
(1994) (holding that entire song may be considered a parody under fair use); 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (holding that television show ―Saturday Night Live‖ parody of the song 
―I Love Sodom‖ to the tune of ―I Love New York‖ constituted fair use).  
 240. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the 
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By the same token, the market-harm test of § 107(4)241 becomes 
drained of precedential meaning if the scientific texts thus 
scrutinized were published to serve both the research needs of 
the scientific community and the commercial interests of  
publishers.  
Professor Matthew Sag‘s brilliant article on copy-reliant 
technologies242 sheds considerable light on this conflict of inter-
est. His efforts to reconcile the search engine cases with prior 
decisions concerning transformative uses of copyrighted works 
under § 107(1) leads him to posit that nonexpressive, nonsub-
stitutional uses, in conjunction with copy-reliant technologies, 
should normally qualify as fair uses across the board, especially 
if the technologies in question were geared to recognize and 
implement an opt-in clause.243 When this intriguing proposition 
is applied to digitally integrated scientific research methods, 
however, it reveals a number of key differentiating factors.  
For example, one must immediately confront the possibility 
that, from a rights holders‘ perspective at least, massive copy-
ing of published research articles to generate further research 
by means of automated knowledge discovery tools colorably 
represents both a substitutional and an expressive use of those 
same articles. Even if that were precisely what scientists qua 
authors most dearly desired in their relentless pursuit of repu-
tational benefits, gratis fair use on this scale is hardly con-
sistent with the aims of commercial science publishers.244 
If only scientific researchers were involved as both creators 
and users of their own published outputs, then Professor Sag‘s 
default formula for fair uses in regard to copy-reliant technolo-
gies could significantly improve the research community‘s 
technical legal position, especially if it were underpinned with 
an opt out, rather than an opt in default condition. Scientists 
inclined to opt out of such a voluntary pool would immediately 
incur countervailing peer pressure and perhaps risk jeopardiz-
 
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 536 (1981). 
 241. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (stating that a factor to be considered in de-
termining fair use is ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work‖). 
 242. See Sag, supra note 2. 
 243. See id. at 1675–82. 
 244. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Mabe, CEO, Int‘l Assoc. of Scientific, 
Technical & Med. Publishers, to Copyright Review, Dep‘t. of Jobs, Enterprise 
and Innovation, Dublin, Ireland (July 14, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from STM] 
(―Consultation on the Review of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000‖) 
(strongly opposing fair use).  
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ing future grants to boot. If, instead, scientists constitute the 
market for published scientific research, and if that published 
research cannot be freely and digitally perused without imper-
missible market harm to publishers, then automated research 
tools risk becoming instruments of massive and systematic in-
fringement, which no transformative use doctrine could excuse 
if publishers‘ customary interests are to be preserved. 
That, indeed, poses one of the fundamental questions 
raised by our present enquiry, namely, should scientific pub-
lishers‘ customary interests be preserved at the expense of sci-
entists‘ need for wholesale access to, and reuse of, the exploding 
universe of published scientific literature and data? That ques-
tion, in turn, raises ancillary questions about what added-value 
the scientific community obtains from its traditional reliance on 
external, for-profit publishers, and what the opportunity costs 
would be if the scientific communities were to break that tie to 
the publishing industry. These and related questions will be 
more directly addressed in the final Part of this Article.245 
For present purposes, what seems undeniable is that the 
case-by-case approach of the fair use doctrine is currently 
overwhelmed by the magnitude and scope of copying necessi-
tated by today‘s digitally empowered research techniques.246 A 
proper response to this challenge could require at least indus-
try-wide negotiations and settlements, like those between re-
search libraries and publishers that gave rise to § 108 of the 
1976 Act.247 At best, new institutional arrangements would re-
define (or eliminate) publishers‘ interests in order to satisfy the 
scientific community‘s need for open access to publicly funded 
research results in any form they were made available to the 
public.248 Between these two poles, some possible incremental 
legislative reforms are skeptically examined below. 
As matters stand, however, it is the publishers‘ lobby that 
has driven copyright law and policy with regard to science since 
the 1990s.249 Rather than supporting the needs of digitally in-
tegrated scientific research, publishers have managed to sur-
 
 245. See infra Part III.  
 246. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Pro-
cess of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60–62 (2006) (discussing contem-
porary copyright after the advent of new technologies). 
 247. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869–79 (1987). 
 248. See infra Part III.  
 249. See Armstrong, supra note 246, at 56–57.  
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round scientific information and data transmitted online with 
legally impenetrable electronic fences and with codified data-
base protection laws that threaten the very foundations of con-
temporary scientific methodology, as explained in the next two 
Sections. 
2. The Coup de Grâce: Digital Locks and Database Protection 
Laws 
A growing number of scientific journals are now published 
online, without distribution in print copies at all.250 Once digi-
tally transmitted online, researchers anywhere can, in princi-
ple, locate, analyze, and disaggregate any collection of scientific 
information and data that has been made available to the pub-
lic, subject only to the prevailing default rules of applicable in-
tellectual property laws and to the contractual restrictions that 
publishers or providers may otherwise impose. 
Even when a journal continues to be published in print 
copies, the articles it contains, along with the supporting data, 
may often be made available online for the convenience of later 
scientific researchers.251 Although, in principle, these develop-
ments greatly facilitate the traditional sharing norms of sci-
ence, researchers can legally convert analog contents to digital 
formats only if they remain within the confines of the limita-
tions and exceptions to the reproduction rights discussed above. 
Under the European Union‘s InfoSoc Directive, this process 
could be prohibitively expensive, as we have seen. Even under 
the U.S. fair use provision, such quantitatively large amounts 
of copying for research purposes could result in publishers‘ de-
mands for additional compensation, not to mention the costs 
associated with the copying itself.  
Regarding access to and use of information and data made 
directly available online, whether or not initially published in 
hard copies, researchers have discovered that virtually none of 
the proscience measures of copyright law that still survive in 
print media apply to works transmitted through telecommuni-
cation networks.252 The digital revolution that created such 
promising opportunities for scientific research also generated 
 
 250. See, e.g., Paul Uhlir, Designing the Digital Commons in Microbiolo-
gy—Moving from Restrictive Dissemination of Publicly Funded Knowledge to 
Open Knowledge Environments: A Case Study in Microbiology, in DESIGNING 
THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 12, at 77, 79. 
 251. See id. at 80 (providing empirical data and citing authorities). 
 252. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 383–84.  
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intense fears that publishers would become vulnerable to mas-
sive infringements online and to other threats of market fail-
ure.253 In response, publishers persuaded legislatures to recast 
and restructure copyright law in the online environment so as 
to preserve business models built around the print media.254 
These new laws make it difficult to trigger preexisting lim-
itations and exceptions in the online environment, including 
those favorable to science;255 and they enable publishers to em-
bed pay-per-use machinery among other restrictions into elec-
tronic fences surrounding online transmissions of scientific ar-
ticles.256 The most fundamental postulates of so-called users‘ 
rights, such as the idea-expression dichotomy or fair use in the 
United States, may thus be entirely overridden by a combina-
tion of technical protection measures (TPMs), statutory cut-
backs, and contractually imposed restrictions rooted in these 
same provisions.257 In the European Union, moreover, sui gene-
ris database protection laws, mandated by the European Com-
mission in 1996, further restricted access to the very facts and 
data that are the lifeblood of basic scientific research.258 
 
 253. See id. at 317–21 (discussing the effects of the digital revolution on 
copyright infringement). 
 254. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 369, 374–75 (1997). 
 255. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Licensing 
for Scientific Innovation, 13 INT‘L J. COMM. L. & POL‘Y 1, 12–24 (2009) (dis-
cussing the impediments to reuse of scientific work). 
 256. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2006) (providing for electronic fences and 
digital rights management systems); InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6 
(providing obligations of member states regarding circumvention of technolog-
ical measures); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 34–48 (1994) (discussing proposed changes to copyright 
law in the digital milieu and arguing the case for better protection of the pub-
lic interest); Samuelson, supra note 254, at 371–96 (discussing the goals of the 
United States at the WIPO conference and the positions that technology com-
panies took in objecting to treaty draft provisions). 
 257. See generally Reichman et al., supra note 170 (discussing safe harbors 
from copyright liability and anticircumvention rules for Internet service pro-
viders along with rules prohibiting circumvention of Technical Protection 
Measures (TPMs) used by copyright owners to argue that Congress did not ad-
equately balance interests when establishing rules for TPMs). For the view 
that these measures replace a copyright system designed to serve the public 
interest with a ―mere guild monopoly‖ like that of the Stationers‘ Company of 
London in the period 1556–1694, see Lunney, supra note 96, at 814–20. 
 258. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7; J.H. Reichman & Paul 
F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and 
Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 802–20 
(1999) (exploring the damaging impact that the sui generis regime will likely 
have on scientific research); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
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a. Virtual Elimination of Limitations and Exceptions Favoring 
Science in the Online Environment 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 (WCT),259 which es-
tablished new rules governing digital transmissions of copy-
righted works, did not mandate the radical change of the legal 
infrastructure just described. On the contrary, the WCT re-
flects a relatively balanced compromise that resulted from the 
negotiations of stakeholder coalitions with fairly equal bargain-
ing power on both the publishers and users‘ sides.260 The pre-
amble itself thus recognizes ―the need to maintain a balance be-
tween the rights of authors and the larger public interest, 
particularly education, research and access to information.‖261  
However, the WCT said nothing about how states should 
implement the anticircumvention norms that defend electronic 
fences surrounding works transmitted online so as to preserve 
public interest privileges and immunities. When the treaty was 
translated into the domestic laws of the United States and Eu-
ropean Union, powerful publisher interests persuaded the re-
spective legislatures largely to ignore or override the safeguard 
provisions otherwise available.262 
In the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(DMCA),263 for example, the U.S. Congress conditioned the abil-
ity of third-party users to invoke public interest measures, such 
as the idea-expression dichotomy or fair use, on their having 
first gained lawful access to the work being transmitted 
 
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 52, 113–24 (1997) (explaining the 
implications of a sui generis regime for scientific research). 
 259. WCT, supra note 42. 
 260. The users‘ coalition was largely organized and managed by Professor 
Peter Jaszi, American University School of Law, Washington, D.C. See Reich-
man & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 810–28 (explaining the negotiations and pro-
posals to resolve database protection issues). 
 261. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.¶ 5. Similarly, the agreed statement to Ar-
ticle 10 permits contracting parties ―to carry forward and appropriately extend 
into the digital environment‖ existing limitations and exceptions in their na-
tional laws and ―to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate 
in the digital network environment.‖ WCT Agreed Statements, supra note 150 
(concerning Article 10). Finally, the very Article 11 that imposed ―obligations 
concerning technological [protection] measures‖ (TPMs), also expressly de-
clared that such TPMs were not meant to ―restrict acts in respect of [authors‘] 
works, which are . . . permitted by law.‖ WCT, supra note 42, art. 11. 
 262. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 983–85, 1059 (explaining that 
efforts to implement a balancing of interests in the United States and Europe-
an Union copyright laws have been unsuccessful). 
 263. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998). 
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online.264 Yet, the moment a would-be user seeks to gain lawful 
access to the copyrighted work transmitted online, he or she 
will normally encounter one-sided electronic contracts of adhe-
sion that strip away most or all of the public interest user 
rights nominally available from the domestic copyright law.265 
The DMCA thus arguably created a new exclusive ―right of ac-
cess‖ subject to virtually no preexisting privileges or immuni-
ties of interest to scientific users whatsoever.266 
A similar state of affairs (with different nuances in differ-
ent jurisdictions) arises in the European Union. Article 6 of the 
InfoSoc Directive of 2001 expressly enables domestic legislators 
to authorize Technical Protection Measures (TPMs) that curtail 
or override the preexisting limitations and exceptions otherwise 
available in the hard copy format.267 Article 6(4) of the same 
Directive then piously admonishes member states ―to ensure 
 
 264. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital 
Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49, 
67–74 (2006) (discussing fair use and the DMCA). See generally Dan L. Burk 
& Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001) (evaluating legal and institutional infrastruc-
tures that could support a rights management system). 
 265. In effect, once the user is forced through an electronic gateway, the 
contract of adhesion becomes a privately legislated intellectual property right. 
See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual 
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of In-
formation, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 897–914 (1999) (discussing adhesion con-
tracts for digital technologies); see also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Mis-
use, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1099–102 (2003) (explaining how copyright 
holders can use technological control systems to prevent access to digital con-
tent); Nima Darouian, Accessing Truth: Marketplaces of Ideas in the Infor-
mation Age, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 1, 26–46 (2010) (discussing 
adhesion contracts and virtual marketplaces). 
 266. Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The 
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y 
USA 113, 125 (2003); see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and 
the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Re-
vised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519–20 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA 
antidevice provisions are overbroad, unclear, and need to be revised). Howev-
er, some recent cases have looked askance at this result, and Professors 
Reichman, Dinwoodie and Samuelson have demonstrated how these recent 
precedents could lead courts to a more balanced solution in the future. See 
generally Reichman et al., supra note 170 (discussing several recent cases that 
have challenged the boundaries of copyright protection for digital works). 
 267. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6. See generally Guido West-
kamp, Code, Copying, Competition: The Subversive Force of Para-Copyright 
and the Need for an Unfair Competition Based Reassessment of DRM Laws 
after INFOPAQ, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y USA 601, 627–43 (2011) (analyzing 
the aggregate effects of InfoSoc Directive, arts. 2, 5(1)–5(5), after the European 
Court of Justice‘s decision in Infopaq Int‘l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening). 
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that right holders make available to the beneficiary of an ex-
ception or limitation provided for in national law . . . the means 
of benefiting from that exception or limitation.‖268 In practice, 
however, the Directive provides member states with no legal 
basis for implementing the thrust of Article 6(4), and national 
legislation concerning TPMs so far tends to largely ignore Arti-
cle 6(4) altogether, with a few exceptions.269  
As a result, technological fencing devices, coupled with 
electronic contracts, known respectively as TPMs and Digital 
Rights Management tools (DRMs), enable publishers to auto-
matically protect both data and information delivered through 
online networks without gaps in enforcement and without any 
traditional exceptions for science or other public interest pur-
poses.270 When these technological fences and electronic con-
tracts are further supported by anti-circumvention measures 
that forbid decryption or other means of cutting through such 
fences,271 the publisher‘s control becomes virtually absolute. 
Database protection laws enacted in the European Union can 
then make this absolute control virtually perpetual to boot. 
b. Exclusive Rights in Noncopyrightable Collections of Data  
Compilations of facts and data receive relatively thin pro-
tection from the copyright laws of both the United States and 
the European Union.272 Under these laws, only a creative selec-
tion and arrangement of facts or data qualifies as eligible sub-
ject matter, and the disparate facts remain available for use by 
third-party compilers,273 at least in principle, if not always in 
 
 268. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6(4). 
 269. For an exception, see, for example, Copyright and Related Rights Reg-
ulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498, art. 24, §§ 296(2), 296 ZD (2) (U.K.). For a more 
detailed discussion of ways to implement art. 6(4), see generally Reichman et 
al., supra note 170. 
 270. Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 982–87; Westkamp, supra note 
267, at 675–77. 
 271. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2006). 
 272. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) 
(applying ―thin‖ protection doctrine of functional works cases to factual compi-
lations in general). For statutory support in the United States, see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (defining compilations); id., § 103 (defining subject matter of eligible 
compilations). For the European Union, see Database Directive, supra note 22, 
Part I § 13 (dealing with harmonization of copyright rules applicable to eligi-
ble compilations of data). 
 273. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text; see also Key Publ‘ns, 
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ‘g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512–14 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing the test for infringement of original works and compilations). 
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practice.274 In a remarkable further development, the U.S. gov-
ernment managed to codify both the idea-expression dichotomy 
and the principle of limited protection for factual compilations, 
of crucial importance to science, in the TRIPS Agreement275 
and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.276 Global copyright law thus, 
in effect, encourages states to protect so-called factual works 
against little more than wholesale duplication of an otherwise 
creatively organized compilation of facts or data, but not the 
underlying facts or data as such. 
In 1996, however, when promulgating its Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Databases,277 the European Commission 
took the unprecedented step of enacting a law that established 
exclusive rights in the very data that copyright laws had left 
freely available in the public domain.278 Ostensibly motivated 
by the Commission‘s stated goal of increasing the European 
Union‘s share of the global market for directories and compila-
tions in general,279 which so far has proved unattainable,280 this 
sui generis regime introduced radical new restrictions on access 
to and use of compilations of data that were previously un-
known to any intellectual property paradigm. 
 
 274. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 275. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.2, 10.2. 
 276. WCT, supra note 42, arts. 3, 5. However, there is remarkably no men-
tion of this same doctrine in the European Union‘s Infosoc Directive of 2001, 
notwithstanding the fact that the idea-expression doctrine has now been em-
bodied at the multilateral level in both article 9.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
in article 10 of the WCT. For this and other reasons, some commentators ex-
press reservations about over-reliance on this doctrine as a buttress to limita-
tions and exceptions under the best of circumstances. See, e.g., BURRELL & 
COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 20–25. 
 277. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 1–11. 
 278. See id. 
 279. A more realistic motivation arose from the backing of the world‘s larg-
est publisher of scientific journals, with headquarters in the Netherlands, 
which spearheaded ultimately unsuccessful efforts to enact a similar law in 
the United States. Maria Canellopoulou-Bottis, A Different Kind of War: In-
ternet Databases and Legal Protection or How the Strict Intellectual Property 
Laws of the West Threaten the Developing Countries‘ Information Commons, 2 
INT‘L J. INFO. ETHICS 1, 10 n.22 (2004), available at http://www.i-r-i-e.net/ 
inhalt/002/ijie_002_07_canellopoulou.pdf (referring to Reed Elsevier‘s lobbying 
for database protection). 
 280. COMM‘N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST EVALUATION OF DI-
RECTIVE 96/9/EC ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (2005) [hereinaf-
ter FIRST EVALUATION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf; see also Elad Harison, Who 
Owns Enterprise Information? Data Ownership Rights in Europe and the U.S., 
47 INFO. & MGMT. 102, 102 (2010) (stating that the United States continues to 
dominate the database market). 
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For example, no element of originality or creativity is re-
quired to qualify for this form of protection.281 Instead, the da-
tabase laws are triggered by a ―substantial investment‖ in ob-
taining, verifying, or presenting any given collection of facts 
and data; and unlike copyright or patent laws, the exclusive 
rights to extract or reuse the data in question protect that in-
vestment as such.282 Despite its anomalously low threshold of 
eligibility, this regime arises automatically, as if it were part of 
the copyright infrastructure. It thus poses a direct threat to 
digitally integrated scientific research by endowing compilers of 
noncopyrightable collections of data with exclusive rights to ex-
tract and reuse the disparate data that their sweat-of-the-brow 
investment made available to the public.283 
These exclusive rights to data are potentially stronger and 
more rigid than those of copyright law.284 Formally, independ-
ent creation remains a perfect defense,285 as it would under 
copyright law.286 Realistically, however, independent genera-
tion of costly accumulations of scientific data is economically 
unfeasible, even when conceptually possible.287 The Directive 
 
 281. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7(1). 
 282. Id.; see, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2007) (―The Directive essentially does two things: it 
confirms the application of copyright to compilations of data and creates a 
non-copyright, sui generis right in databases to protect the investment of the 
database maker.‖). 
 283. Database Directive, supra note 22. For the rejection of sweat-of-the- 
brow protection of factual works in U.S. copyright law after a period of exper-
imentation in that regard by some federal appellate courts, especially the Sev-
enth Circuit, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, No ―Sweat‖? Copyright and Oth-
er Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).  
 284. See J. H. Reichman, Mondialisation et Propriété Intellectuelle: Data-
base Protection in a Global Economy, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
ECONOMIQUE [INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMIC LAW] 455, 455–503 
(2002) [hereinafter Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy] (dis-
cussing the evolution of intellectual property legislation and the issues relat-
ing to database protection and legislation). Until these laws were adopted, on-
ly the conduct-based liability rules of trade secrecy law were able to protect 
investment in know-how applied to industry. See J.H. Reichman, How Trade 
Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semicommons of Innovative Know-How, in 
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 185, 186–87 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss 
& Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011). 
 285. Database Directive, supra note 22, § 15 (stating that independent cre-
ation of a database is sufficient for protection). 
 286. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.2.2 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that ―con-
veying evidence‖ of independent creation constitutes a perfect defense to an 
action for copyright infringement). 
 287. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 807 n.80, 814–15. 
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does allow a ―small‖ amount of data to be taken without conse-
quence, but courts have ensured that ―small‖ means very small, 
and the Directive expressly prohibits repeated extractions of 
even small amounts of data from the same collection.288 
Permissible exceptions to the database regime are paradox-
ically truncated when compared with those of copyright law.289 
With specific regard to the use of protected data for scientific 
research, the Directive allows states to adopt an exception 
couched in the same ambiguous language as that of the InfoSoc 
Directive of 2001, namely, ―for the sole purpose of illustration 
for teaching or scientific research.‖290 As in the InfoSoc Di-
rective, this exception is not mandatory, and major countries 
such as France and Italy have ignored it.291 Even when coun-
tries adopt this exception, it seems to enable only extractions 
for purposes of illustration, but not for reutilization of scientific 
data or information in other collections, which is the normal 
scientific practice.292 
Once obtained, database protection nominally expires after 
fifteen years.293 However, if the compilers make another sub-
stantial investment, say, by adding or updating new data to the 
preexisting collection, their efforts will renew the protection of 
the entire database for another fifteen-year period.294 
In this respect, the sui generis database protection laws 
paradoxically provide stronger protection for derivative compi-
 
 288. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 6, 7(5), 8; British 
Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2001 E.W.C.A Civ 1268, ¶¶ 29–
48, 2001 WL 825162 (July 31, 2001) (finding that copying various pieces of in-
formation relating to British horseracing industry constituted extraction of a 
substantial part of the database, in addition to repeated extraction of insub-
stantial parts), aff ‘d Case C-203/02, 2004 E.C.R I-10415, ¶87. 
 289. See, e.g., Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of 
the Database Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93, 141–44, 150–53 (2006). 
 290. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 6(2)(b); see supra notes 65–83 
and accompanying text. 
 291. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 803–04; Raquel Xalabarder, 
Copyright Exceptions for Teaching Purposes in Europe (Internet Interdiscipli-
nary Inst., Working Paper WP04-004, 2004), available at http://www.uoc.edu/ 
in3/dt/eng/20418/20418.pdf. 
 292. See, e.g., ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 129–33 (2008) (arguing that the exception is overly 
narrow and therefore over-protects database makers); see also Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 258, at 79. 
 293. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 10(1). 
 294. Id. art. 10(3); see also Wesley L. Austin, A Thoughtful and Practical 
Analysis of Database Protection under Copyright Law, and a Critique of Sui 
Generis Protection, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 3,¶ 67 (1997).  
 1422 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1362 
 
lations than for derivative works obtained under traditional 
copyright laws. In the latter case, an original and creative de-
rivative work receives copyright protection only for the eligible 
new matter added to the preexisting matter.295 In the case of 
the data protection laws, where no originality at all is required 
for eligibility, any qualifying additional investment may renew 
the protection of the collection as a whole.296 Perpetual protec-
tion thus becomes an attainable goal for the first time in the 
history of intellectual property laws (disregarding, of course, 
trademark laws, which operate on fundamentally different 
principles).297 
In a series of recent decisions, the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) has subsequently introduced an elusive subject-
matter distinction between substantial investment for purposes 
of obtaining data that are created (presumably ineligible), and 
expenditures for purposes of obtaining data that are collected 
(i.e., developed and maintained in databases as such) and 
which presumably qualify for protection.298 In other words, ―on-
ly resources used to collect data that [are] already in existence‖ 
will qualify for database protection, but not ―data compilations 
that are generated quasi ‗automatically‘ as by-products of other 
activities.‖299 To the extent that scientific databases are charac-
terized as ―created‖ under this slippery distinction, it might 
 
 295. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); see, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223–
38 (1990) (finding that copyright protection extends only to the original con-
tent added to the derivative work); Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll Inc., 43 
F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).  
 296. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 10(3). 
 297. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 86 (―[A]ny publisher 
who continues to make a substantial investment in updating, improving, or 
expanding an existing database can look forward to perpetual protection.‖). 
 298. See Case C-46/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 E.C.R. 
I-10365, ¶49 (referred from Finland); Case C-338/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. 
Svenska Spel AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-10497, ¶27 (referred from Sweden); Case C-
203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-
10415, ¶¶50–56 (referred from the United Kingdom); Case C-444/02, Fictures 
Mktg. Ltd. v. Organismos prognostikon anonon Podosfairou AE, 2004 E.C.R. I-
10549, ¶27 (referred from Greece). 
 299. Ritch, supra note 37, at 127 (citing Directmedia Publ‘g GmbH v. Al-
bert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg [2009] 1 C.M.L.R. 7 (ECJ 4th Chamber)); 
see also Mark J. Davison & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, Horse 
Races and Spin-Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 E.I.P.R. 
113, 114 (2005) (stating that European Court of Justice discounts investments 
in collecting data that are indivisibly linked to their creation); Estelle Der-
claye, Databases Sui Generis Right: Should We Adopt the Spin Off Theory?, 26 
E.I.P.R. 402, 408–13 (2004) (finding that the database right should only pro-
tect investments that are directly attributable to producing a database). 
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conceivably reduce the total number of databases, particularly 
sole-source databases, eligible for protection.300 Courts could, 
for example, exclude some collections of raw scientific data on 
these grounds.301  
However, some commentators believe most scientific data 
are better characterized as collected and, therefore, automati-
cally eligible for protection.302 Even when scientific data are 
viewed as created, whatever this turns out to mean, entities 
seeking protection could always spend more money on verifica-
tion or on improving the conditions of access to and posterior 
maintenance of the collection, which might have some scientific 
value even if undertaken for secondary motives. In other words, 
there is reason to believe that most collections of scientific data 
and information could be made to fit within these judicially 
contrived eligibility requirements by one means or another. If 
so, any collection of scientific data or information that did qual-
ify would obtain broad and virtually endless protection against 
value-adding components of a future collection that made un-
authorized use of an existing one.303  
How the Database Directive actually affects science in any 
given country will then depend on a number of uncertain vari-
ables. In the United States, where the scientific community 
vigorously opposed enactment of database protection bills mod-
eled on the European Union Directive,304 only copyright law 
applies to compilations of data, although that law, as shown 
earlier, is much less science friendly today than in the past.305 
In European Union member states and affiliates, however, the 
sui generis database protection laws remain firmly in place de-
 
 300. For the dangers of protecting sole source databases under this regime 
see, for example, Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 113–37. 
 301. See DERCLAYE, supra note 292, at 87–99 (arguing that there is no sub-
stantial investment in collecting, verifying or presenting raw scientific data 
such as event data, timetables, telephone subscriber data and the like). 
 302. See, e.g., Davison & Hugenholtz, supra note 299, at 115–18 (arguing 
that when a large mass of collected data has been created, there are signifi-
cant costs associated with presentation and verification which may meet the 
requirements of the Directive); see also Ritch, supra note 37, at 127. 
 303. Cf. DERCLAYE, supra note 292, at 255–67 (supporting the database 
protection regime generally, but strongly criticizing its treatment of science). 
 304. See Mark Davison, Database Protection: Lessons From Europe, Con-
gress, and WIPO, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 829, 853 (2007) (―In the United 
States, the lack of database protection and, in particular, its defeat in the 
Senate in 1998 was the direct product of the input of preexisting, institutional-
ized, funded, and Congressionally recognized scientific and educational lobby 
groups such as the National Research Council.‖). 
 305. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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spite serious criticism from within the European Union it-
self.306 The European Commission has also made strenuous ef-
forts to extend similar database regimes to developing and 
Least-Developed Countries through a series of regional and bi-
lateral free trade agreements.307 
The sui generis database protection laws in the European 
Union thus turn the relatively benign approach of traditional 
copyright law upside down. They not only protect the very ag-
gregates of facts and data that international copyright law ex-
pressly left in the public domain, they confer potentially 
stronger and longer protection on these unoriginal compilations 
than copyright laws afford original works of authorship.308  
Analogies drawn from the historical rhetoric promoting au-
thors‘ rights, whatever one‘s view of them, were thus perversely 
applied to an investment-based scheme of protection governing 
the most fundamental building blocks of knowledge.309 What 
the sui generis database laws actually codified instead was a 
scheme of powerful exclusive property rights that protect infi-
nitely expansible collections of data from extraction and reuse, 
with a built-in propensity to favor the emergence of sole-source 
providers over time.310 This regime conflicts head on with cus-
tomary scientific research practices that long antedated the 
digital universe and the accelerated research opportunities it 
makes possible.311 
 
 306. See FIRST EVALUATION, supra note 280, at 11–27 ( listing numerous 
criticisms of the Directive and proposals for change). 
 307. See Denise Rosemary Nicholson, Intellectual Property: Benefit or Bur-
den for Africa?, 32 INT‘L FED. LIBR. J. 310, 316 (2006), available at http://ifl 
.sagepub.com/content/32/4/310.full.pdf (―[T]he United States and European 
Union [free trade] Agreements contain a TRIPS-Plus Chapter, which far ex-
ceeds all current international obligations for all types of intellectual property.‖). 
 308. See Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 
284, at 463–67; see also Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 802–06. 
 309. Disregarding the impact of a powerful lobby, among other factors, see 
Craig R. Whitney, European Union‘s Commission Is Revamped After a Scan-
dal; A ‗New Era‘ Is Promised, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A6. The Commis-
sion responsible for elaborating the Database Directive completely failed to 
recognize or observe the systemic limits of the copyright paradigm. Cf. Denico-
la, supra note 240, at 518–41 (examining the scope of copyright protection 
available to writings and exploring the divergent and inconsistently applied 
rationales used to define property rights in factual works). 
 310. As correctly predicted by the German government, whose provision to 
allow compulsory licenses against sole-source providers was deleted, behind 
closed doors, by the Council of Ministers at the last moment, and without the 
approval of the European Parliament. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 
258, at 86.  
 311. See David, supra note 25, at 19–33 (discussing the history and eco-
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Nor should one suppose that the social costs of this dismal 
experiment, which cannot be repealed despite sweeping criti-
cism from the Commission‘s own officially appointed reviewers, 
are confined to the some fifty-five countries that have adopted 
similar regimes at the behest of the European Communities.312 
Consider, instead, that because science is a global public 
good,313 search engines and other digitally empowered research 
tools must transcend national borders in order to access all 
publicly available sources of data and information relevant to 
any given project. Standing in their way are all the formidable 
legal barriers rooted in the territorial copyright and database 
protection laws described above, which threaten to choke the 
transnational flow of upstream scientific data and information 
that would otherwise be capable of digital integration on a 
global scale.314 
II.  EMPOWERING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH ON A GLOBAL SCALE   
The foregoing analysis of the existing intellectual property 
framework portrays a set of rules and policies that are diamet-
rically opposed to the needs of scientific researchers in a uni-
verse of discourse where automated knowledge discovery tools 
must freely explore the entire range of thematically relevant, 
digitally distributed literature and data.315 Consider, for exam-
ple, that the Wellcome Trust found that eighty-seven percent of 
 
nomic logic of ―open science‖); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 799–820 
(discussing the potential impact of the database protection laws on science and 
technology); Paul A. David, The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellec-
tual Property Rights Threaten Global ―Open Science‖ 1–8 (Stanford Dept. of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 00-006, 2000), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ 
wpa/wuwpdc/0502012.html. 
 312. See FIRST EVALUATION, supra note 280, at 11–27 ( listing numerous 
criticisms of the Directive): see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 19 (―The 
aim was to ensure the EU got a foothold in th[e] growing [database] sector at 
an early stage. The European Commission[‘s] . . . evaluation of the Directive in 
2006 . . . found that EU database creation had declined since introduction of 
the Directive, whilst it had continued to rise in the US, undermining the ra-
tionale for the right in the first place. The EU Database Directive remains un-
changed.‖). 
 313. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 24, at 65–115. 
 314. Paul Geller warns that the ―interesting choice-of-law issues‖ are ―[i]n 
practice, a mess—likely to intimidate house counsel for any research institu-
tion. Here we approach the bottom line, the chilling effect of the lack of a 
clear-cut exception with as global an application as possible . . . .‖ Letter from 
Paul Geller to Jerome Reichman (Oct. 30, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 315. See supra Introduction Section A. 
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the material housed in the United Kingdom‘s main medical re-
search database (UK Pub Med Central) was unavailable for le-
gal text and data mining.316  
By the same token, a major independent study undertaken 
for the British Government reports that existing copyright laws 
make it virtually impossible to text mine about one thousand 
journal articles from the first half of the twentieth century that 
describe malaria in indigenous peoples and soldiers, as well as 
details of therapeutic measures available at that period.317 Be-
cause of rights clearing requirements that appear out of all 
proportion to any benefit the rights holders could want, ―even if 
they could be found,‖ researchers cannot digitally index or text 
mine sources that offer potentially significant insights for the 
development of methods for preventing and treating malaria 
today.318 
A. AUTOMATED KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY TOOLS AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF MASSIVE INFRINGEMENT 
Wittingly or unwittingly, these laws force scientific re-
searchers to choose between ignoring an unmanageable and 
unreasonable set of legal constraints, in the interest of pursu-
ing science as a public good, or foregoing research opportunities 
in order to avoid thickets of rights, burdensome transaction 
costs, and the fear of stirring up potential law suits down the 
line. The end result puts both science and the larger public in-
terest in a no-win situation, at a time when the resources 
available to fund scientific research are shrinking. 
If the relevant intellectual property laws were strictly en-
forced, and the scientific community continued to respect them, 
scarce public resources earmarked for basic research would be 
siphoned off to intermediaries from scientists seeking access to 
and use of their own published research results. In that event, 
the public pays twice for the same output, plus a surcharge for 
mushrooming transaction costs, while the ―incipient transna-
tional system of innovation,‖ established by the TRIPS Agree-
ment in 1996,319 is progressively deprived of essential 
knowledge assets. Less innovation, not more, is the predictable 
result over time. 
 
 316. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 47. 
 317. Id. at 46. 
 318. See Hogarth Chambers, The Hargreaves Review—Another Mixed Bag, 
33 E.I.P.R. 599, 600 (2011) (criticizing United Kingdom‘s copyright exceptions). 
 319. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 342.  
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Conversely, if intellectual property laws are ignored by re-
searchers determined to carry on with their work irrespective 
of unreasonable legal constraints, automated knowledge dis-
covery tools will have become transformed into engines of mas-
sive infringement.320 It is hard to see how systematic disregard 
of intellectual property laws, coupled with growing contempt 
for the legislative process that fosters them,321 will benefit au-
thors, artists, and other creators in the long run, especially 
when those condemned to outlaw status are not free-riders on 
costly musical and cinematic productions, but publicly funded 
scientific researchers in pursuit of greater knowledge and ap-
plications that benefit humanity as a whole. 
While the pressing need to reform the laws that have pro-
duced such anomalous results has not escaped notice,322 efforts 
in this regard are confronted with a conflict between the inter-
ests of scientists, on the one hand, and those of publishers on 
the other. Scientists are authors whose primary interests in 
publication are the rewards of attribution and integrity—the 
so-called reputation benefits—that the moral rights of copy-
right laws, together with the norms of science itself, strive to 
protect.323 These reputational benefits then serve to attract the 
kind of financing and status rewards attendant on academic 
success.324 Given a conflict between the needs of scientific re-
 
 320. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
937–38 (2005) (stressing extent to which peer-to-peer music sharing schemes 
had become instruments of ―massive infringement‖). 
 321. ―Much of the data needed to develop empirical evidence on copy-
right . . . is privately held. It enters the public domain chiefly in the form of 
‗evidence‘ supporting the arguments of lobbyists (‗lobbyonomists‘) rather than 
as independently verified research conclusions.‖ HARGREAVES, supra note 26, 
at 18. 
 322. See, e.g., id. at 11–27 (criticizing the InfoSoc Directive); Hilty, Copy-
right Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 315–21 (citing problems 
with European copyright law); Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 
2, at 109–38 (discussing the reaction of the scientific community to copyright 
over-protection).  
 323. In the United States, this is true at least in theory, if not in practice. 
For doubts about the appropriate level of moral rights enforcement in U.S. 
copyright law, see, for example, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Con-
text, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 874 (2007) (―Sound reasons may support confining 
the application of moral rights to a smaller category of works than are covered 
by copyright law.‖).  
 324. Scientists do have an interest in not sharing either research results or 
data until they can obtain these reputational benefits via publication. See Da-
vis & Connolly, supra note 17 (finding that there is some reluctance among 
researches to use a repository if it could possibly jeopardize one‘s publication 
success); Jordan, supra note 17, at 82–85 (noting the importance of publication 
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search and the dictates of copyright and database laws, one can 
expect scientists normally to opt for the goals of research be-
cause their pecuniary interests lie elsewhere, and are, indeed, 
dependent upon the reputation benefits just described.325 
In contrast, science publishers are the main pecuniary 
beneficiaries of the current state of the law, which they have 
lobbied hard to obtain, and they would resist any reforms likely 
to be put on the table.326 This fact of life makes it logical to ask 
why the scientific community continues to rely and depend on 
publishing intermediaries in the first place. Disregarding the 
historical origins of such reliance, one feels compelled to ask 
whether the benefits of such reliance still outweigh the costs in 
today‘s digitally integrated, totally computerized research envi-
ronment. No sensible scheme of reform can be devised without 
addressing these questions, and no specific proposals will make 
sense unless they are weighed against alternative options that 
result from such an enquiry.  
B. THE LIMITS OF INCREMENTAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM TO 
ALLEVIATE OBSTACLES TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
To the extent that publishers retain their traditional role 
as intermediaries, any efforts to reform applicable intellectual 
property laws must reconcile the needs of science with the 
needs of commercial publishers to turn a profit.327 This factor 
greatly complicates the prospects for reform because the exist-
ing copyright and database laws so favor the interests of pub-
lishers over those of scientists that merely incremental or 
piecemeal reforms rooted in traditional exceptions and limita-
 
and priority for scientists). 
 325. See Jordan, supra note 17, at 82–85. This is often not the case with 
patents, where deeper conflicts of interest arise. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, 
supra note 220, at 107–22 (discussing shifts in attitudes towards patents). 
 326. See Statement by the Am. Chem. Soc‘y, to the Comm. on the Impact of 
Copyright Policy on Innovation in the Digital Era 5–6 (Oct. 15, 2010), available 
at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/index.htm (oppos-
ing sweeping policy changes that undermine peer reviewed publications); Let-
ter from STM, supra note 244 (opposing proposals for a fair use exception); see 
also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 42 (―[C]opyright exceptions for education-
al purposes and for research are intended to promote knowledge, skills and 
innovation in the economy, without unduly undermining the incentive for edu-
cational and academic publishers to create the works that students, teachers 
and researchers need.‖). 
 327. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial 
Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 142–44 (comparing au-
thor incentives to capital incentives). 
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tions are unlikely to give the research community what it 
needs.  
A more promising approach might emerge if the scientific 
and publishing communities were to negotiate an industry-
wide settlement that accommodated the research needs of one 
without sacrificing the commercial needs of the other. Argua-
bly, one such example was the negotiated settlement between 
publishers and the library community with regard to photocop-
ying, which replaced the case-by-case fair use approach in the 
United States with § 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act.328 Howev-
er, librarians have found this settlement unsuited to the digital 
age, and they are demanding widespread reforms requiring leg-
islative enactments of limitations and exceptions that publish-
ers strongly oppose.329 The extraordinary powers that publish-
ers have obtained under the DMCA in the United States and 
the InfoSoc Directive in the European Union make an industry-
wide settlement favorable to science far more difficult now than 
it might have been prior to the 1990s.  
In the remainder of this Article, we discuss possible solu-
tions to the problems that intellectual property laws have cre-
ated for digitally integrated scientific research from two very 
different angles. First, we consider the kinds of legal reforms 
that would be needed if commercial publishers continued to act 
as intermediaries between producers and users of scientific in-
formation and data, as they do today, without regard to the 
likelihood that such reforms would ever be enacted.  
We then reconsider the role of publishers as such and ask 
whether, from a cost-benefit perspective, it should be signifi-
cantly modified or abandoned altogether. In that Section, we 
 
 328. See supra notes 91–96. 
 329. See, e.g., INT‘L FED‘N OF LIBRARY ASS‘NS & INSTS., supra note 206, at 
4–5 (suggesting reforms to the current copyright regime); Fair Use: Its Effects 
on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Prudence S. Adler, on behalf of the Library 
Copyright Alliance), available at http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/ 
copyright/LCANov05.pdf (arguing for fair use and stating that it safeguards 
the collective interest in the flow of information); Statement of Principles on 
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations for Libraries and Archives by Electronic 
Information for Libraries, International Federation of Library Associations 
and Institutions, and Library Copyright Alliance for WIPO Standing Comm. 
on Copyright and Related Rights (May 25–29, 2009), available at http://www 
.ifla.org/files/clm/statements/statement-of-principles-sccr20.pdf (urging WIPO 
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights to support immediate 
reform of copyright exceptions and limitations). 
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examine alternative strategies that the scientific community 
itself could embrace in a concerted effort to manage its own up-
stream knowledge assets in ways that might avoid, or at least 
attenuate, the obstacles to digitally empowered scientific re-
search currently flowing from a flawed intellectual property  
regime. 
1. Possible Reforms of Domestic Copyright Laws 
To the extent that the fruits of basic scientific research 
continue to stimulate economic growth in advanced industrial 
economies,330 improving the environment for digitally integrat-
ed scientific research will enhance the prospects for future in-
novation. In the words of an authoritative report to the British 
Prime Minister in 2011: 
Innovation may be blocked and growth hampered when unduly rigid 
applications of copyright law enables rights holders to block potential-
ly important new technologies. . . . Research scientists, including 
medical researchers, are today being hampered from using computer-
ized search and analysis techniques on data and text because copy-
right law can forbid or restrict such usage. . . . In these circumstances, 
copyright in its current form represents a barrier to innovation and 
economic opportunity.331 
This, along with other studies recently undertaken, could even-
tually lead to proposals for incremental legislative reforms that 
would move in the right direction. 
For example, officials of the European Commission recent-
ly undertook an enquiry into the ways that limitations and ex-
ceptions in copyright laws might be improved with specific re-
gard to scientific research.332 As a result, the European Union 
 
 330. See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 129–51 (analyzing the 
effects of and experience with U.S. university patenting before and after the 
Bayh-Dole Act); David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD 
Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 116–18 (2005) (discussing how aca-
demic research influences industrial innovation); Bhaven N. Sampat, Changes 
in University Patent Quality after the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21 
INT‘L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1371 (2003) (examining the growth of university pa-
tenting and licensing); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Re-
search in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. 
POL‘Y 772, 781–82 (2006) [hereinafter Sampat, Patenting and US Academic 
Research) (same). 
 331. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 43. 
 332. See COMM‘N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON COP-
YRIGHT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 3 (2008), available at http://ec.europa 
.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/greenpaper_en.pdf [herein-
after EC Green Paper] (aiming to foster a debate on how knowledge for re-
search, science and education can best be disseminated in the online  
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might conceivably decide to revise the InfoSoc Directive. Alter-
natively, it might wait for an overall codification of European 
Union copyright law, as contemplated in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (FEU).333 
In the United States, a group of scholars has been consid-
ering the need to update existing limitations and exceptions 
with a view to a prospective revision of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.334 The National Academies of Science has just commis-
sioned a study of the impact of copyright laws on scientific re-
search.335 A thorough-going study of this same topic as it affects 
developing countries is also under way within the ambit of the 
WIPO Development Agenda.336 
These and other similar initiatives might conceivably re-
store a better balance between public and private interests 
than currently exists under the global copyright regime as 
strengthened since the 1990s. To this end, the next Section of 
this Article outlines a set of incremental reforms that could at 
least attenuate the obstacles to digital research that were iden-
tified above. 
However, we remain skeptical that proposals for incremen-
tal reform, even in the unlikely event of legislative enactment, 
would adequately address the roots of the problem. As we view 
the matter, the head on conflict between e-science and copy-
right law depicted above cannot be resolved without fundamen-
tal legal and institutional reforms designed to prevent both 
copyright and database protection laws from reaching into the 
domain of basic scientific research in the first instance.  
 
environment).  
 333. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 118 (consol-
idated version), Sept. 5, 2008, O.J. C115/96 [hereinafter F.E.U.] (―[T]he Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council . . . shall establish measures for the creation 
of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intel-
lectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of central-
ised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements.‖). 
 334. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Direc-
tions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181–82 (2010) (presenting 
conclusions of the Copyright Principles working group). 
 335. See Committee on the Impact of Copyright Policy on Innovation in the 
Digital Era, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES‘ BOARD ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyright 
policy/index.htm ( last visited Apr. 18, 2012) (creating a committee to evaluate 
and propose how to expand and improve research on the impacts of copyright 
policy, particularly on innovation in the digital environment). 
 336. See WIPO, COMM. ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2010), avail-
able at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3.doc.  
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a. Improving the Information Society Directive in the 
European Union 
Any serious reform effort in the European Union should 
start with a codification of the idea-expression principle, a sub-
ject-matter exclusion of fundamental importance for scientific 
research.337 Most scientific literature conveys ideas and facts, 
not expression. Although the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT 
both embodied this exclusion in international copyright law,338 
the drafters of the InfoSoc Directive conveniently ignored it in 
2001,339 perhaps on the technical ground that it was not a limi-
tation on, or exception to, authors‘ exclusive rights as such. All 
European Union member states should have to embody this 
principle in their domestic copyright laws.  
Turning to the express exception for scientific research 
that the InfoSoc Directive introduced in Article 5(3)(a),340 the 
first step in any incremental set of reforms would be to make 
this exception also mandatory and binding on all member 
states.341 Absent such a measure, countries such as the United 
Kingdom might simply ignore this provision and continue to re-
ly on older exceptions allowing quotations for certain purpos-
es,342 copies made for libraries and educational establish-
ments,343 as well as the new provision subjecting ―private use‖ 
to fair compensation.344 The byzantine snares emanating from 
domestic law implementations of such narrow provisions are 
exemplified in a recent survey of the relevant U.K. laws.345 
Second, the express exception for science in Article 5(3)(a), 
once made mandatory, must be rid of its inherent ambiguity.346 
 
 337. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (―In no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.‖). 
 338. See WCT, supra note 42, art. 2; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 
9.2 (―Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, proce-
dures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.‖). 
 339. See supra notes 72–90.  
 340. See supra notes 77–83. 
 341. Accord HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 51. 
 342. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2)(b). 
 343. See id. art. 5(2)(c). 
 344. See id. art. 5(3)(d). 
 345. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 15–163; see also HAR-
GREAVES, supra note 26, at 11–52. 
 346. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a); see supra notes 77–83 
and accompanying text. 
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Like the relatively more transparent phrase used in the Rome 
Convention of 1961, for example, the revised provision could di-
rectly permit ―use solely for the purposes of teaching or scien-
tific research‖347 and thus remove any reference to the confus-
ing term for ―purpose[s] of illustration.‖348 
Third, any mandatory exception for scientific research 
must then be cloaked in some substantive content that pro-
motes flexibility within an inherently proscience framework 
and deflects narrowing legalistic interpretation in advance. In 
particular, the revised provision should eliminate the current 
language that limits scientific use ―to the extent justified by the 
non-commercial purpose to be achieved.‖349 This language is 
unworkable in practice because, as we have noted earlier, vir-
tually all scientific research conducted at today‘s universities 
and other public research entities can be perceived as abetting 
commercial ends that financially benefit their sponsors.350 
To achieve even these minimalist proscience ends without 
departing from existing legislative models, the European 
Commission should also consider embedding a mandatory ex-
ception for science within a broader fair use framework, like 
that adopted in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.351 Re-
cent European scholarship endorses this approach,352 although 
opposition to it is strongly entrenched in business circles.353 
However, United States fair use law retains potential defects of 
its own that could limit its effectiveness if used to regulate digi-
 
 347. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations art. 15.1(d)., Oct. 26, 1961, 
496 U.N.T.S. 43.  
 348. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a). 
 349. Id. 
 350. See, e.g., supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. But see HAR-
GREAVES, supra note 26, at 49 (recommending extension of private copying ex-
ception to the use of analytics and data mining tools, but only for ―non-
commercial‖ research). 
 351. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 352. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 526 (stating that fair use ―rais-
es the fundamental question of appropriate balancing tools . . . Flexible rights 
necessitate flexible limitations . . . . [Given] new technological develop-
ments . . . broad exclusive rights are likely to absorb and restrict new possibili-
ties of use . . . . [F]lexible fair use factors ensure a fast reaction . . . [and] allow 
the courts to reestablish a proper balance between freedom and protec-
tion‖(emphasis added)). 
 353. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 44 (―Most responses to the 
Review from established UK businesses were implacably hostile to adoption of 
a US fair use defence in the UK on the grounds . . . that it would 
bring . . . massive legal uncertainty.‖). 
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tal research in the European context. Accordingly, suggestions 
to improve the fair use approach in the United States high-
lighted below should also be considered for possible application 
in the European Union context.  
b. Improving the Fair Use Approach 
We previously pointed out that the fair use approach in the 
United States, while more flexible than the designated excep-
tions approach in the European Union, could not readily cope 
with either quantitative or qualitative amounts of copyrighted 
matter that digitally driven scientific research would have to 
process. Similarly, application of the market-harm test in such 
cases might be difficult if publishers successfully insisted that 
such uses constituted the natural market for their proprietary 
outputs.354  
Here, we note a further possible snag in the transformative 
use doctrine described earlier, which the federal appellate 
courts have recently expanded as a tool for equating public 
good uses of protected works with presumptively fair uses.355 
Tensions arise because the very concept of transformative use 
partakes of the definition of a derivative work,356 and U.S. cop-
yright law gives strong protection to derivative works.357 Today, 
 
 354. See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.  
 355. A growing number of cases, building on this doctrine, have begun to 
expand a fair use exception that had shrunk during the 1980s and 1990s. See, 
e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that operator‘s display of thumbnail images of copyright owner‘s pho-
tographs was fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 811 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that operator‘s use of owner‘s images as ―thumbnails‖ in its 
search engine was fair use); see also Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 
630, 642–45 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding fair use for archival copies of student pa-
pers stored in digital form to help detect and prevent plagiarism). See general-
ly Netanel, supra note 216, at 759–68 (providing illustrative cases of the legal 
development of fair use). 
 356. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―A ‗derivative work‘ is a work based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship, is a ‗derivative work‘.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 357. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works 
Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10–20 (1984) (examin-
ing rights in derivative works); Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright 
Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 165, 168–99 
(2008) (discussing the evolution of derivative rights in the United States); Paul 
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPY-
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indeed, some U.S. courts have begun to distinguish transforma-
tive markets from transformative uses, which captures the ex-
quisite ambiguity of the underlying concept and could begin to 
wrap so-called transformative uses in the numbing foil of mar-
ket-failure analysis once again.358 
In the leading Supreme Court decision on fair use, Justice 
Souter dropped a footnote identifying this very conflict.359 He 
suggested that a judicially imposed license allowing a trans-
formative use with equitable compensation to the derivative 
right holder could resolve the dilemma in close cases.360 To 
date, no U.S. court has taken the hint, which is why U.S. fair 
use decisions often vacillate between all-or-nothing outcomes in 
a path that sometimes defies logic or rationalization.361 Per-
haps the recent pertinent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,362 will finally focus the 
copyright courts‘ attention on the possibility of using a liability 
rule, in place of an injunction, in appropriate cases.363 
 
RIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 209, 211–15 (1983) (same). 
 358. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 
614–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing ―transformative markets‖); Castle Rock 
Entm‘t, Inc. v. Carol Publ‘g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(―[C]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets, 
which they would not ‗in general develop or license others to develop,‘ by actu-
ally developing or licensing others to develop those markets. Thus, by develop-
ing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other 
transformative uses of its own creative work, a copyright owner plainly cannot 
prevent others from entering those fair use markets.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 359. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) 
(discussing the fact that the goal of copyright law is ―to stimulate the creation 
and publication of edifying matter‖ and this interest is not always best served 
by automatically granting an injunction in ―parody, news reporting, educa-
tional or other transformative uses‖; thus 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) gives courts dis-
cretion in granting injunctions, because ―there may be a strong public interest 
in the publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright owner‘s interest 
may be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringe-
ment is found‖ (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding ―special cir-
cumstances‖ that would cause ―great injustice‖ to defendants and ―public inju-
ry‖ were injunction to issue), aff ‘d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 
(1990). 
 360. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. 
 361. Compare, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., Inc., 482 F. 
Supp. 741, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff ‘d, 632 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), with 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 453–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff ‘d and mod-
ified by 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding copyright violation where infring-
er did not comment on original work itself ), and Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature 
Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same). 
 362. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 363. See David Carson, Copyright Office Gen. Counsel, Remarks at the 
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On this issue, the three-step test familiar from European 
law (and now mandatory under international law) may have a 
valuable lesson to teach U.S. courts. In cases where normative 
considerations sounding in the larger public interest favor a 
given use, but the amount of the taking appears relatively large 
with some negative impact on the potential market for the cop-
yrighted work, the legislative history of the three-step test 
would support allowing that use in return for equitable com-
pensation from the proceeds of the otherwise unauthorized use, 
if any, to the authors whose support of the public interest had 
thus been co-opted.364 Should the European Union decide to 
adopt a modified fair use provision along these lines,365 it might 
move world copyright law toward some new synthesis that 
could combine the normative wisdom of U.S. fair use law with 
the practical wisdom of those reticent drafters of the gloss on 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.366 
 
Fordham Intellectual Property Law Institute: Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy (Apr. 8–9, 2010) (on file with authors), (program available at 
http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/2010Conference 
Program.pdf) (stating that eBay‘s extension to copyright law was ―likely‖); see 
also Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 535 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (applying eBay rationale to copyright cases). In Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2010), a copyright infringement action, the Second 
Circuit announced a standard for injunctive relief that had been approved by 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The three-judge panel 
in Salinger held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a copy-
right case must show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that ―he is 
likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction‖; (3) that 
―remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury‖; (4) that the balance of hardships tips in his favor; and (5) that 
―the ‗public interest would not be disserved‘ by the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction.‖ Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77–80 (citations omitted). Although the pan-
el in Salinger explicitly limited its holding ―to preliminary injunctions in the 
context of copyright cases,‖ it also saw ―no reason that eBay would not apply 
with equal force to an injunction in any type of case.‖ Id. at 78 n.7. Moreover, 
U.S. copyright law can impose statutory damages or lost profits for infringe-
ment, a possibility that must be factored into the equation in some cases. See 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (providing for statutory damages). The outcome de-
pends on how one views the court‘s equitable powers, and also on whether or 
not the court deems an infringement to have occurred in the first place. 
 364. Accord GERVAIS, supra note 121, at 71–79 (discussing the legislative 
history of Article 9 of the Berne Convention); see also supra notes 129–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 365. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 541–44 for an argument in support 
of such a solution. ―Fair use in the EC . . . would not necessarily mean use free 
of charge.‖ Id. at 551. 
 366. Any such synthesis would also have to take account of the privacy in-
terests recognized in the European Union‘s traditional exceptions for private 
use. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5.2(b) (requiring compensation 
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The trouble even with this sort of adjustment is that it 
would probably not meet the needs of twenty-first century com-
putational science, however beneficial it might be in other are-
as of literary and artistic endeavor. Because U.S. fair use cases 
remain so fact specific, the four normative criteria set out in 
§ 107 of the Copyright Act could play out differently when test-
ed before different judicial panels. In particular, the amount of 
material taken for digital research and, increasingly, included 
in new research results could always make some courts fearful 
of undermining the derivative work right, as mentioned above, 
even though strong derivative work rights make economic 
sense only in the entertainment sector. 
Much would depend on the federal courts‘ continued will-
ingness to defend the transformative uses of science in the 
name of an overriding public interest. Even then, some deci-
sions—though often criticized—introduce into U.S. fair use law 
the same untenable distinction between so-called commercial 
and noncommercial scientific research367 that European Union 
law has codified in its basic exception to the reproduction right 
favoring science.368 Because we believe that U.S. fair use law 
will have to take the internationally mandated three-step test 
more fully into account as time goes on369 (at least where for-
eign authors‘ rights are at stake),370 this element alone could 
add an additional reason to fear a chilling effect on scientific 
research stemming from the uncertain application of the fair 
use doctrine to digital and computational science.371 
To obviate this uncertainty in U.S. law, economist Paul 
David has proposed codifying an ―automatic fair use exception‖ 
 
for private use); see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 48–49 (recommending 
limited private copying exception that corresponds to ―what consumers are al-
ready doing,‖ but recognizing that private copying exceptions in European Un-
ion member states usually carry levies on copying equipment). 
 367. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 889–91 
(2d Cir. 1994) (addressing distinction between commercial and non-
commercial uses), order amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 368. See supra text accompanying notes 195–99 (discussing exceptions for 
science in InfoSoc Directive). 
 369. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 370. See supra note 195. 
 371. See Stodden, supra note 255 at 20–24 (discussing the effects of lesser 
copyright protections for scientific research); Senftleben, supra note 48, at 
522–25 (stressing tendency of three-step test to narrow preexisting exceptions 
in European courts, but not usually to broaden them). 
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for these purposes.372 That exception could operate in tandem 
with voluntary contractual waivers, like those of the Creative 
Commons and Science Commons initiatives,373 discussed below. 
By the same token, the Hargreaves Review favors a new excep-
tion in the United Kingdom‘s copyright law allowing uses ena-
bled by technology that do not directly trade on the underlying 
creative and expressive purpose of the work.374 Reportedly, the 
U.K. government is favorable to this proposal.375 Some clear-
inghouse arrangements might nonetheless become necessary for 
purposes of guaranteeing reputational benefits through proper 
attribution.376  
A codified automatic fair use provision for e-science, or at 
least a strong normative guideline to the same effect, would not 
impede the publishers‘ ability to price discriminate their initial 
subscriptions in keeping with the subscribers‘ capacities to 
pay.377 Both print publishers (whose numbers are decreas-
ing)378 and online publishers (discussed below)379 could legiti-
mately extract more revenue from commercial entities than 
from public science institutes under this approach. An auto-
matic fair use provision might also further encourage commer-
cial publishers to accept open access subsidies from science 
 
 372. See David, supra note 25, at 29 (discussing automatic fair use excep-
tion); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Limits to Database Protection: Fair Use 
and Scientific Research Exemption, 35 RES. POL‘Y 854 passim (2006) (compar-
ing European Union copyright law with U.S. copyright law in the area of shar-
ing scientific research); Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–25 (arguing for less 
stringent regulation of copyrights in the scientific arena). 
 373. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, (Jan. 17, 2012, 5:43 PM) 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses (describing licensing scheme); Science, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, (Jan. 17, 2012, 5:46 PM) http://creativecommons.org/ 
science (stating that Creative Commons licensing should be extended to scien-
tific and technical research); see also Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–24 (pro-
posing a more comprehensive form of private ordering for computational sci-
ence, known as the Reproducible Research Standard). 
 374. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 4; see also CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ IN-
TELLECTUELLE arts. L.134-1-134.9, (Fr.) (creating a public database dedicated 
to out-of-print books that is accessible at no charge). 
 375. See Chambers, supra note 318, at 600 (noting, however, that the Eu-
ropean Commission‘s Intellectual Property Strategy ignores any such move). 
 376. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 46–48 (discussing issues with data 
mining to determine authors of orphan works). 
 377. See John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Dis-
crimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1818–20 (2009) 
(discussing price discrimination in the context of copyright law). 
 378. For evidence concerning the rise of online and open access publishing 
in the field of microbiology, see Uhlir, supra note 250, at 77–87. 
 379. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 2012] COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE 1439 
 
funders, a trend we discuss below.380 
However, even an enlightened fair use approach raises ob-
stacles rooted in print media models that ought to simply be-
come irrelevant to the conduct of online, worldwide scientific 
research. In this context, for example, it makes little sense to 
focus on ―reasonable‖ uses of published scientific articles,381 or 
to attempt to track revenue streams from upstream uses of 
published scientific information and data by researchers who 
exploit automated knowledge discovery tools.382 On the contra-
ry, we believe intellectual property laws should not permit pub-
lishers to further control uses or reuses of their authors‘ scien-
tific research results for purposes of further research at all. 
2. What E-Science Really Needs from Any Legislative Reform 
We doubt that the foregoing proposals to incrementally re-
form existing measures bearing on scientific research could be 
enacted in an uncompromising format that would provide digi-
tal science with the user-friendly regime it needs to flourish. 
Any such proposals could easily become entangled in the coils 
of more intricate, legalistic provisions largely derived from ex-
perience in the entertainment sectors. Precisely because these 
so-called reforms would be deemed science friendly in name, 
they could mire modern science ever more deeply in the need to 
make unpalatable choices between obeying complex, inherently 
obsolete provisions or ignoring them altogether. 
a. A Tailor-Made Exemption for Scientific Research 
The only workable solution is to adopt a broad and uncom-
promising exemption for scientific uses that requires no gloss, 
no fine print, and no elaborately contrived exceptions to a 
 
 380. See infra notes 459–65 and accompanying text. 
 381. Cf., e.g., BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 288–93 (proposing 
to make the designated exceptions under U.K. law more favorable to science).  
 382. See Sag, supra note 2, at 1648–49 (calculating Google‘s transaction 
costs, in the absence of fair use, in millions or even billions of dollars, depend-
ing on coverage and strategic behavior of copyright proprietors). However, 
some exceptions to this general proposition become more feasible when re-
searchers make use of data tools or whole data libraries for specific down-
stream applications. For arguments that ―compensatory liability rules‖ may 
legitimately be applied in such cases see JEROME H. REICHMAN ET AL., GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COM-
MONS: GOVERNING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED GENETIC RESOURCES, DATA AND 
LITERATURE (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE 
MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS] (Part III); Ritch, supra note 37, at 183–84; 
see also discussion infra Part II.D.1. 
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grudgingly acknowledged ―exception‖ for scientific research. To 
this end, the Max Planck Institute‘s response to the European 
Commission‘s Green Paper in 2008383 proposed that such a 
broad and general provision, allowing use and reuse of pub-
lished research materials for virtually any scientific purpose, 
should expressly legitimize storage, archiving, data extraction, 
linking, and the like.384 
While endorsing this proposal, which makes a good start, 
we think even more may be needed. In particular, scientists 
must be free to subject any published article (and, as we shall 
see later, any article made publicly available online)385 to data 
mining procedures and data manipulation by automated 
knowledge discovery tools, including virtual scientific experi-
mentation, without any constraint other than attribution under 
the norms of science.386 The same exemption must apply to the 
public release of selectively chosen material in any scientific 
paper or report. Such a regime should be applied directly, and 
in harmonized express terms, in the copyright laws of every 
European Union member state, without any allowance for the 
sort of off-setting, detailed provisions that are currently 
thought necessary for ―a workable system . . . of users‘ 
rights,‖387 which in practice usually means an unreasonable 
system of publishers‘ constraints on science.  
Such a broad exemption should expressly clarify its appli-
cation to so-called derivative works, a concept that has virtual-
ly no meaning in upstream scientific research as currently 
practiced. So long as prior research results are incorporated in-
to new scientific work with clear and appropriate attribution, 
there is no need for permission, which, in effect, operates as a 
de facto prior restraint on scientific speech.388 Nor should any 
 
 383. See RETO M. HILTY ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION–GREEN PAPER: 
COPYRIGHT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY–COMMENTS BY THE MAX PLANCK 
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW (2008), 
available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf1/comments_on_the_green_paper1.pdf 
[hereinafter MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER]. 
 384. See id.; see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 48 (―The Government 
should introduce a UK exception in the interim under the non-commercial re-
search heading to allow use of analytics for non-commercial use . . . as well as 
promoting at EU level an exception to support text mining and data analytics 
for commercial use.‖). 
 385. See infra notes 459–65 and accompanying text. 
 386. See, for example, Stodden, supra note 255 passim for a discussion re-
garding attribution and its problems. 
 387. BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 276. 
 388. One who applies a scientific theory or finding to some new phenome-
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commercial/noncommercial distinction be embedded in the  
copyright law‘s broad research exemption, for the primary rea-
son stated earlier, that basic scientific research results are 
properly to be treated as a public, not a private good, regardless 
of their origin.389 
Effort should then be made to persuade the United States 
and other WTO members to adopt a similar provision, over and 
above any existing fair use provisions. Pending the formulation 
of a truly transnational science funding entity in the European 
Union, the Commission‘s own science funding division should 
help to enforce such a broad scientific research exemption, as 
well as any other proscience provisions that may exist in the 
domestic copyright laws. The developing countries should also 
throw their weight behind a strong exemption for scientific re-
search, in keeping with the WIPO Development Agenda.390  
b. Breaking the Digital Locks 
No provision exempting scientific research from the exclu-
sive rights of copyright law, as proposed above, could fully 
achieve its purpose unless complementary legislative action 
were taken to ensure its effectiveness in the online environ-
ment. Here we encounter the blocking effects of technical pro-
tection measures (TPMs) as implemented in the domestic 
laws,391 whose drafters ignored the proscience mandate ex-
pressed in the preamble to the WCT itself,392 as well as other 
balancing provisions set out in that treaty.393  
If rights holders who make scientific works available 
through digital networks can simply enclose those works be-
hind technological fences and then abolish all user-friendly 
provisions by contract, little would be gained by clarifying the 
idea-expression dichotomy or the scope for private and fair us-
es, or by enacting broad exceptions for scientific research and 
teaching as advocated above. The imposition of private intellec-
 
non is not a derivative author, even though his or her work necessarily applies 
and draws on prior work. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing importance of idea-expression principle for science). 
 389. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 390. See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR WIPO, WIPO (2007), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ (advocating a strong copyright 
exception for scientific research). 
 391. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text. 
 392. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl. 
 393. See supra notes 137–50 and accompanying text. 
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tual property rights by such technological means394 also raises 
profound conflicts with constitutional law in the United 
States395 and with fundamental rights in Europe.396  
In effect, publishers of digitally transmitted scientific arti-
cles online have the same legal entitlements as owners of mu-
sic, films, and other cultural assets under the framework estab-
lished by the DMCA in the United States and by parallel 
legislation in the European Union.397 These provisions give 
publishers the best of two worlds. On the one hand, if Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) transmit copyrighted scientific articles 
without permission, publishers may force them to remove the 
offending publications under a set of provisions known as the 
―notice and take down‖ regime.398 
Scientific researchers, on the other hand, like users of cul-
tural goods from the mundane to the sublime, enjoy virtually 
no analogous powers to oblige online publishers to respect any 
of the privileges and immunities that are supposed to defend 
their interests.399 On the contrary, copyright laws protecting 
digital transmissions give publishers virtually absolute control 
over use and dissemination, as reinforced by their ability to 
impose licensing terms and conditions backed up by the impen-
etrable electronic fencing discussed earlier.400  
Science publishers, who thus combine private law tools 
with the exclusive rights of intellectual property laws, can op-
erate as unregulated ISPs under no obligation to respect the 
sharing norms of science and with a direct financial interest in 
 
 394. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 884–914 (discussing the 
protection of copyright owners‘ rights through a combination of technological 
means and adhesion contracts). 
 395. See, e.g., LANGE & POWELL, supra note 198, at 108 (stating that the 
conflict between intellectual property regimes and constitutional rights is ―a 
conflict in multiple dimensions, in which interests in property are pitted 
against freedom of expression‖); Netanel, supra note 203, at 30–36 (discussing 
developments in First Amendment law as they pertain to copyright law).  
 396. See, e.g., Natali Helberger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, No Place Like 
Home for Making a Copy: Private Copying in European Copyright Law and 
Consumer Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1083 (2007) (discussing fun-
damental rights to be considered in shaping European consumer policy); see 
also HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 196, at 259–83 (―Article 10 of the 
ECHR . . . provides the principle framework for balancing copyright and the 
right to freedom of information in European human rights jurisprudence.‖). 
 397. See supra notes 86–110 and accompanying text. 
 398. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(3) (2006) (outlining ―Elements of  
notification‖). 
 399. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 400. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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deciding whether or not collaborative research and innovation 
will occur, and under what terms and conditions. Yet, there is 
simply no policy justification for subsuming the needs of sci-
ence, with its far different economic and social considerations, 
and far larger impact on human life, to the current undiscrimi-
nating framework of copyright and database protection laws.  
Some courts in both jurisdictions have begun to push back 
against these controversial digital locks,401 and numerous pro-
posals have been made for legislative or administrative solu-
tions to pry them open.402 For example, some have suggested a 
system of ―electronic locks and keys,‖ which, however, could 
trigger costly and burdensome administrative procedures that 
could indirectly exert a chilling effect on users‘ freedom to build 
on preexisting scientific and technological data and infor-
mation.403 Professor Dan Burk has proposed a doctrine of ―an-
ticircumvention misuse‖ to deal with this same problem,404 
while Professors Reichman and Franklin would impose ―a fair 
and reasonable terms,‖ standard on all non-negotiable re-
strictions on access to and uses of computerized information 
goods.405 Still other proposals, while not without merit, would 
 
 401. See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware, Eng‘g & Consult-
ing, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lexmark Int‘l. Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Sky-
link Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Senftleben, supra 
note 48, at 545–46 for examples of German cases that show how the European 
Union has dealt with this issue. 
 402. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Access Controls, Rights Protection, and 
Circumvention: Interpreting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Preserve 
Noninfringing Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 209, 214 (2008) (―There have been 
legislative bills and academic proposals to amend the anti-circumvention pro-
visions in order to accommodate noninfringing use of technologically-protected 
works.‖); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregat-
ing Fair Use from the DMCA‘s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
111, 113 (2005) (proposing an administrative complaint mechanism to address 
DMCA restrictions on fair use); Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticir-
cumvention‘s Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549, 1610–16 
(2009) (suggesting two legislative changes); see also Dan Burk, Anticircumven-
tion Misuse, supra note 265, at 1102–10 (proposing a new doctrine of ―anticir-
cumvention misuse‖ to deal with the problem). 
 403. Reichman, supra note 121, at 1159 (noting that a reverse notice and 
takedown system would be ―less costly and burdensome‖ than a system of 
―electronic locks and keys‖ (citations omitted)); see also Lunney, supra note 96, 
at 845–69 (discussing methods by which to address copyright issues without 
foisting unnecessary costs on the public for administration of those laws).  
 404. Burk, supra note 265, at 1132–40. 
 405. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 930 (―All mass-market 
contracts, non-negotiable access contracts, and contracts imposing non-
negotiable restrictions on uses of computerized information goods must be 
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generally entail a considerable amount of political and legislative 
momentum and, unless carefully implemented, could in some 
cases complicate rather than simply avoid existing obstacles.406 
Legislatures enacting appropriate exceptions for scientific 
research, like the one proposed above, should also simultane-
ously implement the proviso set out in Article 11 of the WCT, 
which expressly exempts ―acts . . . which are . . . permitted by 
law‖ from the obligation of signatories to ―provide adequate le-
gal protection and effective legal remedies against the circum-
vention of effective technological measures.‖407 For example, 
the copyright revision bill now languishing in Brazil initially 
took a major step forward by prohibiting content providers from 
using TPMs to defeat privileged uses or to impede access to 
public domain matter.408 Whether these and other provisions 
that seek to expand the copyright misuse doctrine409 will sur-
vive the legislative process in that country remains to be seen, 
as are the means of implementing them in practice, which fu-
ture regulations would have to specify. 
Meanwhile, one relatively expedient suggestion is the ―re-
verse notice and takedown‖ regime put forward by Professors 
Reichman, Dinwoodie, and Samuelson.410 Under their proposal, 
bona fide public interest users could avoid passing through a 
content provider‘s electronic gateway and, instead, send a re-
quest or ―flaming arrow‖ over the electronic fence to catch the 
 
made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard for the 
public interest in education, science, research, technological innovation, free-
dom of speech, and the preservation of competition.‖); see also Darouian, supra 
note 265, at 36–40 (endorsing this standard). 
 406. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 96, at 851–58 (discussing possibility of 
levies with clear entitlement to private copying, among other proposals); see 
also Westkamp, supra note 78, at 45–50 (discussing legislative barriers to ef-
fective lawmaking in this area). 
 407. WCT, supra note 42, at 71, art. 11. 
 408. Law No. 9610 of 19 February 1998, on Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights, Consolidated with the Bill in Public Consultation since 14 June 2010, 
available at http://www.vgrass.de/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Brazilian_ 
Copyright_Bill_Consolidated_June_2010.pdf ( last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (Eng-
lish translation); see also Pedro Paranaguá, A Comprehensive Framework for 
Copyright Protection and Access to Knowledge: From a Brazilian Perspective 
and Beyond, in HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MANAGE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MAXIMIZE ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 103, 106–07 (Xuan Li 
& Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) (discussing the Brazilian National Copyright 
Forum). 
 409. See generally Burk, supra note 265. 
 410. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–39 (discussing the con-
tours of the proposed ―reverse notice and takedown regime‖). 
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copyright proprietors‘ attention.411 This notice would signal 
that the user intended to obtain specified matter held by the 
proprietor in an online repository for purposes allowed under 
specified limitations and exceptions.412 It would give proprie-
tors a period—say fourteen days—in which to accede to the re-
quest or deny it on specified grounds that it was willing to de-
fend in court or an administrative proceeding.413  
In the latter event, both sides would know that a judicial 
test of the validity of the request under relevant exceptions 
would be the likely outcome, and the copyright authorities 
could establish an expedited judicial or administrative proce-
dure for this purpose.414 Once the legitimacy of the request was 
established, the relevant authority or court could enable third 
parties, if necessary, to disarm or decrypt the TPMs in order to 
extract the desired scientific material for the specified research 
purposes.415 Publishers who needlessly barred the initial re-
quest and thereby necessitated a judicial inquiry should bear at 
least the transaction costs and might be made subject to addi-
tional penalties for abuse of TPMs.416 
While a ―reverse notice and takedown‖ regime might entail 
palpable transaction costs at the outset, it would likely give rise 
to a jurisprudence of exceptions to TPMs that would, over time, 
facilitate use of the method.417 Besides, to the extent that a 
broad exemption for scientific research purposes were enacted 
along the lines indicated above, requests for access to and use 
of technically protected data and information should normally 
elicit an automatic positive response.418  
 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1351–52 
(2004) (discussing how changing procedures for enforcing copyrights would af-
fect behavior of those infringing them). 
 415. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–34. 
 416. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–56 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (requiring publishers who send notice and takedown requests 
under DMCA § 512 to evaluate fair use considerations in advance); Burk, su-
pra note 265, at 1127–32; see also Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 
929–32 (discussing a ―public interest unconscionability‖ doctrine in contract 
law). 
 417. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–38 (arguing that a new 
reverse notice and takedown regime should develop through case law, rather 
than through administrative rulings).  
 418. At the same time, publishers would retain a measure of control over 
how the process was implemented. First, they must decide whether or not to 
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Recent case law in the United States has made judicial re-
sort to a reverse notice and takedown procedure more feasible 
even without enabling legislation.419 However, given the mas-
sive amounts of literature and data processed by automated 
knowledge discovery tools, even the reverse notice and 
takedown regime—backed by supporting judicial decisions—
could break down unless published scientific works in general 
were governed by some globally effective ―digital copyright ex-
change,‖ like that recommended in the Hargreaves Review.420 
Even then, much would depend on the willingness of science 
funding agencies to insist that science publishers either re-
frained from surrounding scientific works transmitted online 
with TPMs and DRMs or that they made such works automati-
cally accessible to scientists seeking access to them through 
approved portals for research purposes.  
In sum, absent some procedure like the reverse notice and 
take down regime for freeing up unprotectable scientific infor-
mation, the TPMs become a means of inducing massive abuses 
of the copyright law,421 much as peer-to-peer file sharing can 
 
risk a decision on the merits of a specific request, with probable precedential 
value, as occurs routinely under U.S. fair use practice today. Second, if pub-
lishers acquiesced in a valid request to avoid litigation, they would remain in a 
position to acknowledge the precise uses for which the material had been re-
quested and to monitor the actual uses to which it was put. Hence, users must 
adhere to a good faith implementation of their own proposals and be prepared 
to negotiate if they needed to go farther. See id. at 1032–37. 
 419. For example, two antilockout cases have provided various legal bases 
for overcoming TPMs that deny access to unprotected matter. See Storage 
Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng‘g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). But see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., 629 F.3d 
928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (sympathizing with the policy underlying these deci-
sions, but rejecting their legal reasoning), as amended on denial of reh‘g, Nos. 
09-15832, 09-16044, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3427 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). One 
recent district court case has obliged proprietors to take fair use factors into 
account before sending a request for notice and take down under the existing 
regime regulating safe harbors and the secondary liability of ISPs. See Lenz, 
572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–56.  
 420. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 28–35 (proposing a digital copyright 
exchange); see also Joel Smith & Rachel Montagnon, The Hargreaves Review—
A ―Digital Opportunity,‖ 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 596, 597 (2011) (stress-
ing need for ―digital copyright exchange‖ to facilitate cross-sectoral and cross-
border licensing, plus codes of practice for collection societies). 
 421. See Burk, supra note 265, at 1100; Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 
1023 (arguing how people can design TPMs in order to ―opt out of those parts 
of the copyright system they dislike‖). Such an approach, if upheld at the ap-
pellate level, further supports the impropriety of denying fair use by technical 
means when it is proprietors who must respond to the needs of scientists. 
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become an instrument for inducing massive infringements of 
exclusive rights.422 A reverse notice and take down regime 
would at least enable scientific researchers to avoid access con-
trols and any resulting electronic contracts that imposed waiv-
ers of statutory limitations and exceptions or other harsh re-
strictions on use and reuse of privileged information and data. 
This feature should make it particularly attractive to the Euro-
pean Commission in that it would finally provide them with a 
practical means of fulfilling the obligation that Article 6(4) of 
the InfoSoc Directive already imposes on member states to en-
sure the availability of the specified exceptions set out in Arti-
cle 5 when implementing the Directive itself.423 
c. Disciplining Contractual Overrides  
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that no set of limi-
tations and exceptions enacted by enlightened legislators can 
achieve the goal of strengthening scientific research so long as 
the proprietors of scientific publications can contractually over-
ride them, whether in print media or in the online environ-
ment. For this reason, the Max Planck Institute rightly propos-
es that both new and existing exceptions favoring scientific 
research must be made peremptory, mandatory, and nonwai-
vable.424 
 
 422. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 918–20 (2005) (holding a peer-to-peer platform liable for copyright 
infringements of its users). To ensure its success both in the United States and 
the European Union, legislative endorsement of the reverse notice and 
takedown proposal would, ultimately, be desirable. Such an enactment should 
also establish an administrative or judicial authority to break through the 
technological fence once the relevant authority sided with a public-interest us-
er against a recalcitrant rights holder. In that event, the legislation must im-
munize the public-interest user from liability for breaking through the fence to 
extract privileged matter if the rights holder refused to open the lock or ig-
nored an injunction to do so. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1023 (ar-
guing that there is ―no incentive for copyright owners or TPM vendors to fine-
tune TPMs to enable non-infringing uses‖). 
 423. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1039–40 (discussing how a re-
verse notice and takedown would be consonant with Article 6(4) of the Euro-
pean Union InfoSoc Directive). Nevertheless, paragraph 4 of art. 6(4) would 
require an amendment or at least some clarifying interpretation to this end. 
See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6(4)¶ 4. 
 424. Accord HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 51 (―Applying contracts in this 
way means a rights holder can rewrite the limits the law has set on the extent 
of the right conferred by copyright. It creates the risk that should Government 
decide that UK law will permit private copying or text mining, these permis-
sions could be denied by contract.‖); see also MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC 
GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 11–16 (proposing various exceptions to gov-
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Short of this logical proposal, other important, if less effi-
cacious measures, remain available. For example, Professor 
Burk‘s principle of anticircumvention misuse mentioned earlier 
could be adopted on both sides of the Atlantic to limit private 
interference with specified public good uses of copyrighted 
works.425 To the same end, Professors Reichman and Franklin‘s 
proposals for a ―public interest unconscionability‖ standard for 
non-negotiable contracts could be employed to give courts more 
common law tools for alleviating conflicts between private or-
dering and the goals of federal copyright and related laws.426 
There is reason to believe such a tool would fit well within 
certain existing European approaches to consumer protection 
and contract laws in general.427 Professor Hilty also stresses the 
possibility of invoking European competition law, with its con-
cept of abuse of a dominant position, when proprietors leverage 
their power in the market for scientific articles to inhibit use and 
reuse of scientific contents by downstream investigators.428  
What matters is that legislatures concerned with promot-
ing scientific research should take a forthright position against 
contractual overrides of lawful and permitted uses while also 
clarifying scientific research as a peremptory example of a law-
ful and permitted use. In reality, however, there is no reason to 
expect any such enlightened approach in the immediate future. 
On the contrary, newly proposed measures on enforcement, in 
 
ern scientific use).  
 425. See Burk, supra note 265, at 1132–40. 
 426. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 929–32; see also Daroui-
an, supra note 265. 
 427. Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract 
Law, 21 PENN ST. INT‘L L. REV. 569, 575 (2003) (noting ―the trend towards 
higher standards of EC consumer protection‖). 
 428. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 315 
(calling the European Union Directive ―designed one-sidedly to protect the en-
tertainment industry . . . thwarting the efforts to make Europe the leading 
centre for research‖). Prospective development of a competition-based limit to 
the abuse of TPMs and to contractual limits on use and reuse of uncopyrighta-
ble data remains one area where the international regime established by the 
TRIPS Agreement remains relatively unburdened by the strictures of the 
three-step test or other rigid limitations to national discretion concerning the 
design of an appropriate copyright system. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, 
art. 40; ESTELLE DERCLAYE, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO WHAT THE CONDI-
TIONS OF ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION OF COPYRIGHT SHOULD BE 6 (2003), 
available at http://www.serci.org/2003/derclaye.pdf (noting ―that a dominant 
position or even a monopoly is (or rather: can be) a natural consequence of the 
grant of a copyright‖); Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Markets for Copyrighted 
Works, 34 J. CORP. L. 1059 passim (2009) (arguing that reframing copyright 
law as a species of competition law would benefit the public interest). 
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their present form,429 could actually strengthen the proprietors‘ 
ability to impose privately legislated intellectual property 
rights430 on the scientific research community.  
c. Aligning Database Protection Laws with Broad Exceptions 
for Science in Copyright Law 
Any legislative reform of domestic copyright laws that ig-
nored the database protection laws in the European Union 
would inadvertently allow the latter to surround the former 
with a net that would block access to and use of the very facts 
and data that the copyright paradigm ostensibly left free.431 It 
would also impede transnational efforts to pool large collections 
of scientific data by automatically subjecting contributions from 
providers in the European Union to a strong regime of exclu-
 
 429. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Measures and Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, COM (2003) 0046 final (Jan. 30, 2003), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003PC0046: 
EN:NOT (proposing to protect countries from the ―growing phenomenon‖ of 
counterfeiting and piracy issues); see also Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 3, 2010, opened for signature Mar. 1, 2011, available at http://www 
.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417 [hereinafter ACTA]; Charles R. McManis, The 
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1235–39 (2009) (discussing the ACTA controversy); 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT–SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479 (summarizing discussions of anti-
counterfeiting agreements among different countries). 
 430. See ACTA, supra note 429; Steven Seidenberg, Tough Measures: ACTA 
May Replace Global IP Treaties with an International Regime More Favorable 
to IP Owners, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 1, 2010, at 24, available at 2010 WLNR 
16875706 (noting that ―ACTA would impose a tougher international stance 
against anyone seeking to circumvent technological protections on copyrighted 
works‖); Am. Univ. Washington Coll. of Law, Text of Urgent ACTA Commu-
nique, PIJIP (June 23, 2010) http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-
communique (finding that ACTA has ―grave consequences for the global econ-
omy‖); cf. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 913 (writing that ―the pow-
er to impose privately legislated rights . . . becomes a power to determine the 
competitive boundaries of the underlying intellectual property rights them-
selves‖). 
 431. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 1, 3; Reichman & Samu-
elson, supra note 258, at 52–53 (noting the ―breakdown‖ of the patent-
copyright dichotomy towards the end of the twentieth century). The infor-
mation economy most likely to emerge from an unrestricted exclusive right in 
data would then ―resemble models already familiar from the Middle Ages, 
when goods flowing down the Rhine River or goods moving from Milan to Gen-
oa were subject to dozens, if not hundreds of gatekeepers demanding tribute.‖ 
Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 284, at 484; 
see also HELLER, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the practices of German ―rob-
ber barons‖ in the Middle Ages and subsequent damage to free trade).  
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sive property rights not applicable to other contributors.432 For 
these and other reasons, neither science nor culture433 could 
fully attain the payoffs that digital technologies make possible 
without ancillary adjustments of the Database Directive. 
When the Max Planck Institute called for a broad exemp-
tion from the exclusive rights of the European Union‘s domestic 
copyright laws for published scientific information and data, it 
logically demanded that the Commission should also insert 
similar language into the Database Directive as well.434 In ef-
fectuating any such alignment, the Institute insists that the 
exceptions for science in both copyright laws and database pro-
tection laws should be preemptory, mandatory, and immune 
from both contractual overrides and TPMs.435  
As was the case with copyright law, a broad exemption 
that clearly allowed extraction and reutilization of non-
copyrightable data for scientific research must expressly em-
power the use of automated knowledge discovery tools for this 
same purpose.436 Such language should ensure the rights of sci-
entists to aggregate data and information in a research com-
mons, to conduct data mining and similar techniques, and to 
extract data embedded in scientific articles for use in further 
research.437  
To the extent that the production of scientific data remains 
largely government-funded, no exclusive property rights should 
normally attach, even to downstream commercial uses of such 
 
 432. See, e.g., John Wilbanks, Public Domain, Copyright Licenses and the 
Freedom to Integrate Science, 7 J. SCI. COMM. 1, 4 (2008) (discussing legal tools 
necessary to develop open data sharing). Waivers become necessary to achieve 
the research goals of the pool, which would hinge on the lowest common de-
nominator set of default intellectual property rules. Id. at 5.  
 433. For the adverse effects of digital copyright on new forms of cultural 
expression, see Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade versus Culture in the Digital Envi-
ronment: An Old Conflict in Need of a New Definition, 12 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 17, 
57 (2009) (―Since these [traditional copyright law] models are often too rigid to 
allow full realization of the possibilities of the digital mode of content produc-
tion and distribution or render them illegal, obstructing the ‗creative play‘, 
[sic] some new hybrid models for the protection of authors‘ rights have 
emerged.‖); Senftleben, supra note 48, at 521 (arguing that current EC copy-
right law is likely to frustrate cultural development); Wong, supra note 111, at 
1084–97 (describing conflicts between copyright law and new forms of creative 
expression in digital media).  
 434. See MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 
14–15. 
 435. Id.  
 436. See supra notes 385–87 and accompanying text. 
 437. See id.  
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data.438 However, commercial uses of large semi-autonomous 
data sets as functional tools, such as microarrays or diagnostic 
tools,439 could become suitable candidates for equitable com-
pensation under nonexclusive licenses.440 In such cases, a com-
pensatory liability regime—i.e., a take-and-pay rule described 
earlier—might provide a workable incentive without the block-
ing effects that patents tend to impose on research tools in gen-
eral.441  
Still other measures are necessary to attenuate the delete-
rious effects that the European Commission‘s Database Di-
rective has imposed on all scientific, educational, and cultural 
pursuits that depend on ready access to published facts, data, 
and information. For example, compulsory licenses should be-
come available when the database is the sole source for the da-
ta in question.442 The Directive as approved by the Council of 
Ministers was stripped of such a provision at the last minute, 
and the importance of restoring a comparable provision is clear 
from hindsight.443 The potentially unlimited duration of data-
base protection also remains an untenable assault on basic 
principles of intellectual property law. Provision for the en-
trance of older data into the public domain after a specified pe-
riod of expiry should be a governmental priority even as new 
 
 438. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 326 (demonstrating why 
the scientific community should be able to access government-funded research 
via the research commons); So et al., supra note 1, at 2078 (arguing in favor of 
government-funded research managed in the interest of the public).  
 439. See, e.g., Stodden, supra note 255, at 13 (citing authorities). 
 440. Accord Ritch, supra note 37, at 148. 
 441. In such a case, there would be no general distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial research or any prior restraint on access, use, or 
reuse of published scientific information and data for scientific research pur-
poses. Nor would there be a ―compulsory license,‖ in the traditional sense, (i.e., 
an ex post modification of an author‘s anticipated ex ante exclusive rights). On 
the contrary, such a ―compensatory liability rule‖ should be conceived as an ex 
ante entitlement to compensation for specified commercial uses, accompanied 
by an equally clear ex ante third party entitlement to make such uses subject 
to a duty to pay reasonable compensation for them. See Reichman, supra note 
186, at 1791–93 (discussing a compensatory liability regime); see also Mark 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (contrasting differences between ex ante and ex post 
theories). 
 442. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 338; see also DERCLAYE, supra 
note 292, at 280 (arguing such licenses should apply in the case of users not 
falling within specified exceptions).  
 443. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 
56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 147 (2004) (describing some techniques of over-
propertization by various European Union member states).  
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data added to the collection attracts new protection rights.444 
C. ADJUSTING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO 
ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF SCIENCE  
The prevailing international minimum standards of intel-
lectual property protection are not necessarily in conflict with 
the proposals set out above. First, the standards themselves are 
broad and open to interpretation, as will be shown in more de-
tail below, while both Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
Article 14(1) of the WCT contain crucial deference provisions 
that deliberately leave room to maneuver when states make a 
good faith effort to conform these standards to national needs 
and policy.445 Second, the flexibility built into the TRIPS and 
WCT standards applies in two directions. Although tightening 
the exclusive rights with more restrictive conditions is always 
an option,446 it remains equally possible to flesh out the limita-
tions and exceptions, along with other balancing features, in a 
manner more favorable to the provision of public goods than 
has been the case in some OECD countries and in many devel-
oping countries as well.447 
 
 444. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 90; Reichman & Uhlir, 
supra note 2, at 412 (providing an example of the problems behind extracting 
underlying data from a protected database even after the expiration of a nom-
inally expired patent).  
 445. See WCT, supra note 42, art. 14(1) (―Contracting Parties undertake to 
adopt, in accordance with their legal systems, the measures necessary to en-
sure the application of this Treaty.‖); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 
1.1 (―Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of imple-
menting the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal systems and 
practice.‖). See generally J.H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement After U.S. v. India, 4 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 585 (1998) (noting aware-
ness of WTO Appellate Body of this deference provision). The WTO gave sig-
nificant weight to this deference norm in the WTO‘s most recent TRIPS deci-
sion bearing on copyright law in China. See Panel Report, China–Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
WT/DS362/R (09-0240) (Jan. 26, 2009) (showing the United States and China 
disputing the meaning of Article 1.1); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
20, arts. 7 (objectives), 8 (principles); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Princi-
ples of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 193, at 1008–18 (discussing TRIPS 
article 8). 
 446. See, e.g., Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTA‘s: Recent 
Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 
215–37 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (discussing the possibil-
ity of TRIPS-plus provisions affecting many different areas of IP law). 
 447. Okediji, supra note 196, at 350 (remarking on TRIPS setting ―im-
portant limits on the scope of copyright protection . . . in some cases for the 
first time in history‖); see also WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA PROPOSAL, supra 
note 390 (pledging ―to ensure that development considerations form an inte-
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For these and other reasons, we remain confident that the 
positive law mandates of the treaties do not negate the pro-
posals for reform outlined above, so much as a lack of political 
will and an absence of the kind of collective action needed to 
stimulate it. In what follows, nonetheless, we devote particular 
attention to the three-step test itself, which some consider the 
biggest obstacle of all to reform. 
1. Reinterpreting the Three-Step Test 
At least one expert believes that the three-step test already 
allows more open-ended assessments of both existing and fu-
ture limitations and exceptions, in the manner of U.S.-style fair 
use decisions, than many courts and commentators suppose.448 
On this view, the extension of the three-step test to all of copy-
right law would actually provide a tool—if properly worked—
that could help to deal with fact-specific cases, without neces-
sarily undermining the force of general exceptions for research 
and education.449 Support for this view exists in a number of 
recent decisions by German Courts,450 in the Agreed Statement 
to Article 10 of the WCT,451 and in the willingness of one WTO 
panel to read the TRIPS Agreement in light of subsequent de-
velopments under Article 10 of the WCT itself.452 Unfortunate-
ly, the EC‘s InfoSoc Directive ignored these openings and delib-
erately used the three-step test to further confine even 
 
gral part of WIPO‘s work‖); HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 7 (not-
ing the reconsideration of balancing principles within the framework of inter-
national copyright); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 35 (observing the 
possibility of governments acting as ―defenders and promoters of a transna-
tional system of innovation in which properly balanced intellectual property 
rights were not ends in themselves, but rather the means of generating more 
scientiﬁc and technical inputs into a healthy competitive environment‖). 
 448. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 543 (observing that ―the three-step 
test sets forth open-ended factors‖); see also Geller, supra note 50, at 571 (ar-
guing that neither the idea-expression distinction nor constitutionally rooted 
exceptions favoring free speech and other uses ought to be subject to the three-
step test). 
 449. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 545–52 (analyzing the three-step test 
in the context of fair use).  
 450. See Geller, German Approach, supra note 50, at 563 (describing the 
methodology by which German judges analyze infringement cases); id. at 535–
40 (discussing German cases in detail). But see Senftleben, supra note 48, at 
530–34 (discussing rigidity of the Netherlands and French courts).  
 451. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 452. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.67 (outlining 
the position of the United States regarding Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty).  
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preexisting limitations and exceptions in the copyright laws of 
member states,453 an outcome Professor Senftleben has deemed 
―a worst case scenario.‖454 
More promising in this regard are recent proposals from 
the Max Planck Institute for judges applying the three-step 
test, which could induce them to undertake a more normative 
analysis than in the past.455 That type of analysis is something 
European positivist courts are unaccustomed to doing,456 alt-
hough under a fair use provision, as codified in U.S. copyright 
law in 1976, for example, courts must routinely perform this 
very task.457 
The Max Planck proposals deliberately build on the pre-
amble to the WCT, which recognizes ―the need to maintain a 
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public in-
terest, particularly education, research, and access to infor-
mation . . . .‖458 In that vein, the proposal would:  
 Mandate that courts applying the three-step test falling 
under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement in copyright 
cases take into account the interests of third parties, in-
cluding individual and collective interests of the general 
public, and not just the interests of rights owners;459 
 Avoid prioritizing any one step, or requiring an affirma-
tive answer to all steps, but would instead require a judi-
cial balancing of the different prongs, as occurs under 
 
 453. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 454. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 528–29. 
 455. See Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of 
the ―Three-Step Test‖ in Copyright Law, 39 INT‘L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COM-
PETITION L. 707, 708 (2008) [hereinafter Max Planck Declaration on the 
Three-Step Test].  
 456. And should not do, according to some. See, e.g., Ficsor, supra note 133. 
 457. One should recall that the relevant WTO Panels do insist that the test 
has normative content, but without so far specifying its nature, and indirectly 
limiting its impact. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 
123,¶ 6.184 (describing the EC‘s emphasis on potential impact of an exception 
versus the actual market effects); cf. Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection 
of Pharmaceutical Products,¶ 7.54, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000), (writing that 
the panel believes the word normal used in Article 30 ―can be understood to 
refer either to an empirical conclusion about what is common within a rele-
vant community, or to a normative standard of entitlement‖).  
 458. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.  
 459. Such a provision was expressly inserted into Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement with regard to patents. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 
30 (extending the three-step test to patent law for the first time while adding 
the words ―taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties‖).  
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U.S. fair use law;460 
 Give particular weight to unauthorized uses that are un-
derpinned by fundamental rights461 and other ―common 
interests,‖ notably ―in scientific progress and cultural or 
economic development;‖462 
 Seek to promote competition, especially in secondary 
markets, by a correct balancing of interests, but without 
making the three-step test a proxy for competition law; 
 Expressly recognize that adequate compensation may be 
less than market pricing where other public concerns are 
at stake, including third-party interests or the general 
public interest.463 
The Max Planck Institute‘s carefully considered reforms 
would introduce a healthy dose of legal realism into the tradi-
tional positivism surrounding European copyright jurispru-
dence. They would counter the prevailing notion in Continental 
copyright law, which favors narrowly confined exceptions in 
deference to the authorial interest.464 They would also curb the 
 
 460. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (discussing fair use). But see Ficsor, supra 
note 133 (arguing that the legislative history of the Berne Convention prohib-
its this approach, even though the three-step test itself has now been recodi-
fied with significant variations in both art. 30 (patents) and art. 17 (trade-
marks) of the TRIPS Agreement). It is not clear why the legislative history of 
the experimental ―package deal‖ that gave us article 9 of the Berne Conven-
tion in 1967 should operate as a deadweight bar to a judicially more enlight-
ened approach to the revised three-step test as now applied, with significant 
variations, to all four of international intellectual property law‘s major subject-
matter categories. Otherwise, we are obliged to assume that only authors‘ 
rights remain somehow immune from the need ―to take into account the inter-
ests of third parties‖ at the international level. 
 461. Cf. HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 31 (noting fundamen-
tal rights must be balanced with other IP rights); LANGE & POWELL, supra 
note 198, at 171–72 (stressing the First Amendment); see also HELFER & AUS-
TIN, supra note 196, at 221–33 (examining interface between fundamental 
rights and intellectual property rights in both American and international 
contexts). But see Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for 
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 994 (2007) (arguing that if 
authors‘ interests are fundamental rights, government regulation of those 
rights should be narrow). 
 462. Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455, at 
712; cf. Chon, supra note 164, at 275–76. 
 463. See Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455, 
at 712; Shaver, supra note 195, at 183–84 (calling for a reexamination of the 
consistency between IP policies and the greater public interest in science). 
 464. However, at least one authority questions the ability of courts adjudi-
cating private law disputes to tinker with international public law mandates. 
Email from Paul Geller to Jerome Reichman (Oct. 9, 2011, 12:08 EST) (on file 
with the authors); see also Ficsor, supra note 133. 
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European Commission‘s tendency to fall back upon a market 
failure rationale for limitations and exceptions,465 a tendency 
from which U.S. courts have increasingly retreated in recent 
important decisions bearing on fair use.466  
2. Leveraging the WIPO Development Agenda 
The outlook for these proposals could depend in part on the 
continued spread of the fair use doctrine beyond the United 
States,467 and on the extent to which the developing countries 
affirmatively responded to them within the ambit of the WIPO 
Development Agenda.468 This Agenda has already mandated 
formal scrutiny of limitations and exceptions under the prevail-
ing copyright conventions, with a view to clarifying the extent 
to which they insufficiently promote access to knowledge in de-
veloping countries. The WIPO Development Agenda has also 
spawned a major normative reexamination of limitations and 
exceptions, prepared by Professors Hugenholtz and Okediji, to 
this same end.469  
 
 465. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 167–87. 
 466. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Dr. 
Ficsor claims one could interpret the three-step test to yield the flexibility that 
the Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test seeks to attain, albeit by 
more traditional means. See Ficsor, supra note 133. 
 467. See, e.g., Lei No. 9.610, de 19 de Fevereiro de 1998, DÍARIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U], (art. 46 (viii)) de 20.2.1998 (Braz.) ( listing transformative and 
incidental uses among non-violations of copyright); Copyright Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-42, § 29 (Can.) (―[f ]air dealing‖); Copyright and Related Rights Act 
2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 50(2), (Ir.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/text.jsp?file_id=128034 (―[f ]air dealing‖); Copyright Act, 5768-2007 2199 
LSI 34, § 19 (2007) (Isr.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp? 
file_id=132095 (allowing use for, among other things, research by an educa-
tional institution); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 185 (Phil.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129343 (noting that fair use for 
reporting, teaching and other educational uses is not copyright infringement). 
But see HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 5 (declining to follow this trend). 
 468. See Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft) art. 1-1, May 9, 2005, 
available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf ( last visited Jan. 
23, 2012) (providing that the objectives of the treaty ―are to protect and en-
hance [expand] access to knowledge, and to facilitate the transfer of technolo-
gy to developing countries‖); HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 8 
(finding the goal of the WIPO Development Agenda is to bridge knowledge and 
technology gaps between nations with differing economic conditions); WIPO 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA PROPOSAL, supra note 390 (underscoring the im-
portance of development considerations). 
 469. See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 30–34 (reexamining 
limitations and exceptions in the context of human rights, competition law, 
and consumer law); see also SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. ORG., SCOPING STUDY ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS AND THE 
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If influential WIPO members lent it their support, these in-
itiatives could at least produce a soft-law declaration of norma-
tive content that might turn the three-step test into a pathway 
towards a proper users‘ rights formulation.470 A soft-law in-
strument adopted at WIPO could become particularly influen-
tial if it endorsed or incorporated the Max Planck Institute‘s 
own ―Declaration on the Three-Step Test.‖471 If, moreover, a re-
gional group of, say, Latin American, Asian, or African coun-
tries decided to implement proposals emerging from these de-
liberations in their domestic laws,472 as Brazil had begun to do 
at the time of writing,473 it could trigger a broader movement 
 
PUBLIC DOMAIN 12–13 (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ 
mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_1.pdf (discussing the role of the pub-
lic domain as a ―repository of traditional knowledge‖). 
 470. HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 49 (discussing the idea 
―that a joint initiative between the WIPO and WTO could be an ideal and ap-
propriate expression of a soft-law modality with real impact for collective ac-
tion on an international instrument on L&E‘s‖). In this connection, we would 
particularly welcome recognition from the WIPO process that government use 
of copyrights for, say, science and educational purposes, trumps all other legal 
or normative considerations. See Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: 
A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, 5 U. OTTAWA 
L. & TECH. J. 1, 22 (2008) (Can.) (contending that ―[c]opyright rights should 
not prevent governmental use in the public interest‖). 
 471. See Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455, 
at 711–13 (reformulating practical applications of the three-step test). 
 472. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Is-
lands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual 
Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 1, 2–4 
(2009) (noting that the Andean Tribunal of Justice, an international court in 
South America, has helped solidify appropriate IP laws); see also ACCESS TO 
KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT (C. Armstrong et al. eds., 
2010); Karen J. Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The 
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice 19–23 (Duke Law Faculty Schol-
arship Paper 2458, 2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_ 
scholarship/2458. 
 473. Current Brazilian law already implements a provision on ―transform-
ative and incidental uses‖ while novel pending proposals could more aggres-
sively expand this provision within the context of the three-step test. See Pa-
ranaguá, supra note 177, at 29–42. However, the current Brazilian 
Government may retreat from the positions staked out by its predecessor. 
Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil‘s Copyright Reform–an update, PEDRO PARANAGUÁ 
(Apr. 19, 2011), http://pedroparanagua.net/2011/04/19/brazils-copyright-reform-
an 
-update/ (stating ―[t]he whole work and progress [on copyright reform] of the 
past 8 years undertaken under Lula‘s government is at risk‖); Pedro Parana-
guá, Inside Views: Brazil‘s Copyright Reform: Schizophrenia?, IP-WATCH (Feb. 
8, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/02/08/inside-views 
-brazils-copyright-reform-schizophrenia/ (questioning the viability of some pend-
ing reforms). 
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for codification of users‘ rights at the international level.474 
III.  ENABLING E-SCIENCE TO MANAGE ITS OWN 
UPSTREAM RESEARCH ASSETS   
So far, our focus on measures to make copyright and relat-
ed laws more science friendly has operated on the premise that 
publishers would continue to play their traditional role in the 
process of disseminating research results. This very premise, 
however, makes it unlikely that the legislative or judicial re-
forms outlined above are implementable within the OECD 
countries in the near future, despite growing attention to the 
conflict between intellectual property laws and the needs of sci-
ence in a digital age.475  
The lobbying power of publishers has never been greater. 
Concerns about protecting the interests of the entertainment 
and cultural industries continue to elicit stronger intellectual 
property laws at both the national and international levels, 
with little or no regard for their potentially deleterious effects 
on scientific research or the provision of other public goods.476 
Whether reform efforts underway in some emerging economies 
may create a countervailing trend is impossible to predict,477 
 
 474. See generally Reichman, supra note 121 (noting the possibility of intel-
lectual property institutions benefitting countries at varying levels of economic 
development if developing countries lead, rather than follow, on the path to 
reform). 
 475. But see HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 43 (demanding relief for sci-
ence as a fillip to economic growth); NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE COM-
MITTEE ON THE IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT POLICY ON INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL 
ERA, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/index.htm (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2012) (stating the goal of the Board is ―to expand and improve 
research on the impacts of copyright policy, particularly on innovation in the 
digital environment‖). 
 476. See supra notes 428–30, 446 (citing EC‘s Enforcement Directive, AC-
TA, SOPA, and FTAs). However, SOPA has stalled for the moment, and there 
are also some other exceptions to this trend. In the EC, for example, see Ritch, 
supra note 37, at 66–77. In the United States, sponsors of the Sabo Bill would 
have placed all published articles resulting from publicly funded research re-
sults in the public domain, but this proposal has never moved forward. H.R. 
2613, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). 
 477. Cf. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case 
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India‘s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1571 (2009); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and 
Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual 
Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking 1–3 (Inst. for Int‘l Law and 
Justice, Working Paper 2009/5, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-53, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785 (discussing the role of develop-
ing nations in the larger context of developing intellectual property law); see 
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but the benefits of such a trend—if it emerges—would likely 
play out over a lengthy period, and might not extend, at best, 
beyond certain regional alignments. 
Science policy will, accordingly, have to evolve defensive 
measures of its own in order to neutralize interference from the 
default rules of copyright, contract, and database protection 
laws as they stand. Scientists, in short, will increasingly have 
to manage their own upstream research assets as global public 
goods, sheltering them within a reinvigorated sharing ethos, in 
the interests of a more productive downstream innovation sys-
tem otherwise driven by the incentives of industrial property 
laws.478 
As will be seen below, the scientific community, led by 
many dedicated and visionary individuals and institutions, has 
already taken steps to widen the choice of open distribution 
outlets for scientific literature and data. These promising initi-
atives nonetheless remain hampered by the community‘s con-
tinued reliance on publishing intermediaries. In this Part, we 
first reevaluate the role that these intermediaries should play 
under existing institutional constraints. We then ask if better 
solutions are not likely to emerge from a change of paradigm, in 
which the outsourced intermediaries are either downgraded or 
abandoned altogether, open access modes of dissemination were 
to take their place and the knowledge production and scholarly 
communication functions were increasingly to be absorbed into 
digitally integrated thematic research environments.479  
A. REASSESSING THE ROLE OF PUBLISHING INTERMEDIARIES 
Until recently, the customary practice of the scientific 
community was to rely almost entirely on external publishing 
 
also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intel-
lectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1212 (2009) (remarking on emerging nations discover-
ing different interest balancing methodologies than those in the developed 
world); Reichman, supra note 121, at 1118–19 (noting the pressures develop-
ing countries face to mimic the legislation of other OECD countries and the 
possibilities for exerting new leadership). 
 478. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2. 
For applications to patented research inputs, see Lee, supra note 110, at 901 
(arguing that upstream patents on research tools in the biomedical arena may 
adversely affect downstream productivity).  
 479. Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Data 
Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1601 (2011) (suggesting latency analysis and other design techniques be im-
plemented to support the information commons). 
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intermediaries, even though the bulk of published scientific re-
search would have been government-funded.480 In conformity 
with this practice, authors of scientific articles normally assign 
their copyrights to publishers, who are either commercial enti-
ties or learned societies and other not-for-profit scientific organ-
izations.481 As a result, it was publishers, rather than authors, 
that initially determined the conditions for access to these 
same articles and for reuse of the information and data they 
contain.482 At the same time, authors benefit from the peer-
review mechanisms many of these publishers manage, which 
makes them reluctant to publish outside traditional, well-
established or high impact outlets, when they have the choice. 
1. Costs and Benefits of the Traditional Approach 
Historically, the logic behind this custom was the need to 
defray high front-end publishing costs and to perform laborious 
tasks, such as typesetting and formatting, as well as the physi-
cal distribution of printed copies.483 A second factor was the 
willingness of many scientific subcommunities to entrust 
learned societies with the publication task, which in turn be-
came a primary source of revenue for the societies whether they 
actually performed the publishing service, or, increasingly in 
recent years, outsourced it to a commercial publisher in return 
for a share of the proceeds. Over time, the possibilities for profit 
 
 480. See, e.g., JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR 
OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 2 (2006) (reporting that NIH 
itself funds some 60,000 scientific papers per year); Contreras, supra note 479, 
at 1652 (reporting that some ―50,000 different scientific journals [were] in 
print at the end of 2003, many of which are published by commercial entities 
that charge significant subscription fees‖). 
 481. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–55 (reporting that the 
three largest publishers of scientific journals—Reed Elsevier (about 1800 ti-
tles), Taylor and Francis (about 1000 titles) and Springer Verlag (about 500 
titles) together control about sixty percent of scientific research content). 
 482. See, e.g., Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, 
at 326; Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 123–24. Professor 
Hilty, among others, stresses that for-profit publishers tend to impose greater 
restrictions on access and use than authors or the scientific community more 
generally would deem desirable, given that the latter receives motivation 
through reputation benefits that may accrue from unhindered diffusion. See 
supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 483. See Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 120–21 (dis-
cussing the decline of such high-end tasks with the rise of personal computer 
programs). However, university presses absorbed these or similar functions 
with respect to specialized books subject to market failure in the normal book 
trade. Eugene Volokh, The Future of Books Related to the Law?, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 823, 838–40 (2010) (discussing markets and academic book publishing).  
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have enticed commercial publishers to buy out the learned soci-
eties, although some commercial publishers do make continu-
ing payments.484 
Lately, scholars have challenged such logic,485 and some 
have argued that the value added by such intermediaries has 
reached diminishing returns.486 The once costly front-end pub-
lishing function has increasingly been reduced to desktop pub-
lishing and automated formatting,487 while the peer-review 
function, of great importance to the integrity of science, is per-
formed gratis by scientists who themselves gain power, reputa-
tion, and advanced access to new developments from their vol-
untary labor.488 This built-in quid pro quo within the scientific 
community has perpetuated the dominance of the proprietary 
intermediaries, along with the practice of negotiating the sale 
(now licensing) of subscriptions directly to libraries without in-
puts from users. Meanwhile, the supervisory or editorial role of 
 
 484. See Toby Miller, ―Drowning in Information and Starving For 
Knowledge‖: 21st Century Scholarly Publishing, 1 INT‘L J. COMM, 123, 125 
(2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/121/56 
(―Since that time, the development of digital technologies has seen for-profit 
[science] publishers proliferate, as the cost of entering the industry has dimin-
ished, and prices have continued to outstrip inflation . . . .‖); Interview by Re-
search Information Staff with Rene Olivieri, CEO, Blackwell Publ‘g (Jan./Feb. 
2005) available at http://www.researchinformation.info/features/feature.php? 
feature_id=92 (stating that ―[t]hree quarters of the top 200 and two-thirds of 
the top 500 ISI-ranked titles are owned by societies or other non-profit organi-
sations. The majority of these titles are self-published, but between a quarter 
and a third are contracted out to another publisher‖). 
 485. Among the many excellent analyses, too numerous to cite, see, for ex-
ample, WILLINSKY, supra note 480; Nancy Kranich, Countering Enclosure: Re-
claiming the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 
10, at 85, 98 (noting the popularity of papers posted on open access databases 
versus those not available on such databases); Peter Suber, Creating an Intel-
lectual Commons through Open Access, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra, 
at 171, 185–86 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) (noting the cancel-
lation of expensive databases by libraries at Harvard, Cornell, Duke, and Uni-
versity of California in favor of open access platforms); see also Contreras, su-
pra note 479, at 1652–55 (citing authorities). 
 486. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 
326–27.  
 487. See, e.g., id. at 325–26 (noting that Internet-based web sources did 
away with the need to produce tangible goods). 
 488. Even this traditional form of peer review is now under attack. Cf. Lin-
da Hooper-Bui, A Gulf Science Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at A21. 
Note, however, that some journals pay scientists to conduct peer reviews of 
articles. The Economic Case for Open Access in Academic Publishing, FREE 
ACAD. RES. ASS‘N (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.faraweek.org/?p=6 (―If a journal 
is highly selective, it must pay for peer review of many articles for each article it 
accepts.‖). 
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the learned societies, with some exceptions, has diminished 
over time, although the dependence of such societies on income 
from publishing seems ironically to have increased.489  
This web of traditional practices and interests carries into 
the digital age, even though digital networks offer repeated op-
portunities to break with the limits of the print model and 
make whole new dimensions of publishing possible. What really 
changes in the online environment are not the basic principles 
of scientific collaboration,490 so much as the burdens and role of 
publishing intermediaries in the sciences, who increasingly 
may never publish a physical print copy at all.  
This growing tendency to rely on online distribution in the 
sciences has undermined prior balancing effects of the first sale 
principle under traditional copyright law.491 For example, there 
are fewer printed copies extractable from initial revenues and 
then freely redistributed, and the subscription price per journal 
may rise prohibitively.492 Even when printed copy distribution 
continues, the role of publishing intermediaries‘ in the online 
environment changes radically, as they add less value to the 
authors‘ own research results493 and become online service pro-
 
 489. Exceptions occur if the learned society maintains its own editorial 
subsidiary, as occurs with the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA). In Latin America, and probably most other developing countries, sci-
entific journals are still published at universities. Universities in OECD coun-
tries have themselves massively entered the book publishing trade to over-
come market failure attributable to commercial presses, while oddly 
remaining aloof from the publication of scientific journals, with rare excep-
tions. See GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, 
supra note 382 (Part III). 
 490. See, e.g., David, supra note 25, at 21 (describing the various ethos and 
norms within various academic fields); Stodden, supra note 255, at 33 (finding 
―public safeguards should also enable digital telecommunications networks to 
link the providers of scientiﬁc and technical inputs in an endless research 
commons‖). 
 491. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digi-
tal Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 577–78 (2003) (discussing first-sale doctrine 
and the effect of technology). 
 492. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–53 (discussing the cancel-
lation of subscriptions by academic libraries due to rising costs); see also NAT‘L 
ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., ENSURING THE INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, AND STEW-
ARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 78 (2009) (observing rise in 
subscription prices for scientific, medical, and technical journals). 
 493. See, e.g., Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 123 
(questioning the added value of electronic-only data compiled and formatted 
by the researchers themselves); Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, 
supra note 2, at 326–27 (indicating a lack of added value within the electronic 
data management framework); MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, 
supra note 383, at 5–6 (categorizing the divergent roles and interests of inter-
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viders whose primary contribution to authors is convenience.494  
Notwithstanding these changed conditions, the rules of 
copyright law have simultaneously been extended to the digital 
environment, and the protections available have been greatly 
strengthened, as demonstrated earlier, in order to make the 
online environment safe for the transmission of printed text. 
Because scientific publishing has drifted along with this tide, 
the full possibilities of digitally manipulating research results 
for new scientific discoveries are hamstrung by the layers of pro-
tection inherited from these legal and institutional develop-
ments, and there is a pressing need to avoid the resulting harm 
to science.495  
The open access movement is a major response to this chal-
lenge. Today, an ever-growing number of scientific journals are 
published online, on a fully or partially open access basis,496 
although these are not yet always the most prestigious journals 
in their respective fields.497 To the extent that the learned soci-
 
mediaries). 
 494. This characterization, among others, is of course hotly contested by 
publishers who see themselves as indispensable pillars of the scientific en-
deavor that add considerable value to its research outputs, whereas less rigor-
ous ―open access‖ methods enable less deserving articles to be published. See 
John Ochs, Am. Chem. Soc‘y, ACS Submission to the National Academies‘ 
Committee on the Impact of Copyright Policy on Innovation in the Digital Era, 
Address Before the Board on Science, Technology and Policy 2–4 (Oct. 15, 
2010) available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/ 
PGA_066845; see also Letter from STM, supra note 243 (extolling large 
amounts STM publishers invest in digital technologies to benefit researchers). 
In reality, not only have publishers sought to configure the online environ-
ment on the model of print media, they have also tried to subordinate the new 
class of intermediaries that digital technology has generated, the Internet Sys-
tem Providers (ISPs), to their own ends, adding yet another layer of potential 
barriers and transaction costs to the diffusion of research results. See, e.g., 
Okediji, supra note 51, at 116 (calling for meaningful fair use standards); 
Okediji, supra note 196, at 349–50 (describing the process by which owners 
used new technological advances to stake claims to previously noncopyrighted 
material). 
 495. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26 at 46–47; Kranich, supra note 
485. 
 496. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–57; Lucie Guibault, Own-
ing the Right to Open Up Access to Scientific Publications, in OPEN CONTENT 
LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 137, 137–67 (Lucie Guibault & Chris-
tina Angelopoulos eds., 2011). For empirical evidence in one major field, see 
Uhlir, supra note 250, at 79–80 (summarizing evidence about microbiology 
journals from GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COM-
MONS, supra note 382). 
 497. Many of these journals are relatively new, while the ISI index (which 
counts only citations) does not begin tracking impact until a journal has been 
published for a five-year period. Moreover, some open access journals have 
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eties themselves resist the drive for greater use of open access 
modalities, their dependence on royalty streams from commer-
cial publishers for scholarly pursuits and other activities may 
explain their reluctance to change more than the economics of 
publishing itself. 
While the outsourcing of scientific journals to commercial 
publishers may still make sense, despite an array of other op-
tions, there is a growing trend to subsidize the open access for-
mat, even in an otherwise commercial context, as part of the 
publicly funded research process. The funding agencies, foun-
dations, and universities that support specific research projects 
may thus provide supplementary funds to pay the commercial 
publisher a set fee in lieu of royalties or other compensation.498 
In such cases, the funders may—and increasingly will—set 
open access terms as the quid pro quo of the subsidy itself.499 
Commercial publishers are increasingly disposed to allow this 
option, and science funders have begun aggressively to insist on 
it in some disciplines,500 although the sustainability of this ap-
proach obviously depends on the continued availability of fi-
nancial resources for this purpose.  
The point is that desktop-publishing techniques and online 
transmission have made it technically (if not culturally) feasi-
ble to redefine the role of existing intermediaries who benefit 
from research-hostile intellectual property laws and practices. 
By the same token, once publicly funded research results are 
 
achieved high impact in recent years. For pressures by the Harvard faculty 
advisory council to ―move prestige to open access [journals]‖ in order to offset 
soaring subscription prices, see Faculty Advisory Council, Faculty Advisory 
Council Memorandum on Journal Pricing, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Apr. 17, 
2012, http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid=icb 
.tabgroup143448. 
 498. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1655–57. 
 499. Raym Crow, Developing an Institutionally-Funded Publishing Chan-
nel: Context and Considerations for Key Issues, ECOMMONS@CORNELL 10–11 
(July 1, 2004), http://hdl.handle.net/1813/178; Research Funders‘ Open Access 
Policies, SHERPA, http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/juliet/index.php ( last visited July 
29, 2011) (showing a number of research funders whose guidelines require 
open access to funded research). 
 500. See Robert Terry & Robert Kiley, Open Access to the Research Litera-
ture: A Funder‘s Perspective, in OPEN ACCESS: KEY STRATEGIC, TECHNICAL 
AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 101, 101–03 (Neil Jacobs ed., 2006); Open Access Pol-
icy, WELLCOME TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Policy-and 
-position-statements/WTD002766.htm ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012); Policy on 
Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIH-
Funded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891-01 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-022.html; see also 
Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–55. 
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made available to the scientific community, with due respect 
for attribution, it becomes logical to ask why scientists qua us-
ers should ever pay scientists qua authors, irrespective of what 
the default rules of copyright and database laws provide to the 
contrary.501  
2. Redefining the Role of Publishing Intermediaries under 
Current Institutional Constraints 
Given the diminished costs incurred by today‘s intermedi-
aries in the online environment, and the shrinking amount of 
added value they actually contribute under modern condi-
tions,502 one must logically ask what entitlements they should 
be allowed to claim for secondary uses of published scientific 
research results in either the print media or the online envi-
ronment, and how such claims should be implemented when 
recognized. At bottom, what science publishers provide in the 
online environment are measures to maintain quality assur-
ance and control, marketing and distribution, plus certain 
technical services that the research community could provide 
for itself, yet typically does not in rich countries, perhaps be-
cause of inertia. The reputational benefits that are of primary 
importance for authors accrue from the peer-review function 
that is largely provided gratis by other reputable scientists. 
The intermediaries‘ utility stems from maintaining and updat-
ing electronic collections, possibly also from electronic indexing 
of these collections, and possibly from the provision of other 
technical services needed to make embedded data and infor-
mation available upon request.503 
 
 501. As noted earlier, the scientists‘ incentives flow almost exclusively from 
reputational benefits. See Davis & Connolly, supra note 17 (noting research-
ers‘ reluctance to release results before publication); Jordan, supra note 17 
(noting the importance of publication and priority for scientists). 
 502. As providers of digital services, publishing intermediaries increasingly 
resemble the Red Hat Corporation, which provides services to users of Linux 
Software but does not control the rights to Linux. Robert Young, Giving it 
Away: How Red Hat Software Stumbled Across a New Economic Model and 
Helped Improve an Industry, 4(3) J. ELEC. PUB. (Mar. 1999), available at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jep;view=text;rgn=main;idno= 
3336451.0004.304; see also BITS OF POWER, supra note 36, at 111–13. Howev-
er, the science publishers insist that they actually contribute more services 
than are identified in the text and at considerably greater investment costs 
than are recognized in the text. See, e.g., Letter from STM, supra note 244. 
The question is whether these investments actually benefit research science or 
merely ensure greater profits to publishers under restrictive copyright laws.  
 503. See Young, supra note 502; Letter from STM, supra note 244. But cf. 
BITS OF POWER, supra note 36, at 111–13 (discussing the ways in which the 
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Although science publishers must necessarily charge for 
these services, funding agencies should, and increasingly do, 
ensure that government-funded research results remain freely 
available in public or private repositories, so that to defray the-
se costs, users could perform the needed technical services on 
their own.504 Such a policy also serves to attenuate the prob-
lems of sole-source providers, who monopolize public science 
and can pose serious challenges for digitally integrated scien-
tific research.505 
Recognizing that publishers must charge for their technical 
services need not extend to endowing them with exclusive 
rights to downstream uses or reuses of the scientific product 
they make available. On the contrary, the proprietary re-
strictions that such rights enable intermediaries to impose in 
the name of authors‘ rights, without any palpable authorial 
contribution, should be swept away as inconsistent with both 
the needs of science and the principles of sound exceptions to 
copyright and database laws as expounded above.  
Because publishers of scientific journals depend, in the 
first instance, on contractual relationships with the learned so-
cieties (or other sponsors of academic journals), these regulato-
ry adjustments can be achieved by contract, without need of 
legislation.506 For example, institutional mandates can restrict 
the transfer of copyrights in publicly funded research results 
 
price imposed by private intermediaries for these services is ―countercultural‖ 
to scientific communities in which ―exchange is not monetized but depends on 
social norms specifying expected and well-understood levels of contribution‖). 
 504. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26; Stodden, supra note 255 (discussing 
NSF Guidelines, Creative Commons and Science Commons licensing and pro-
posing a new standard contractual template of her own); Michael W. Carroll, 
Complying with the National Institutes of Health Public Access Policy: Copy-
right Considerations and Options, SPARC/SCIENCE COMMONS/A-RL White 
Paper (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.arl.org/sparc/bm~doc/NIH_ 
Copyright_v1.pdf; US Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Quick Facts About The 
NIH Public Access Policy, PUB. ACCESS NIH (Mar. 2009), http://publicaccess 
.nih.gov/Public_Access_Brochure.pdf. 
 505. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 
258, at 799–812. 
 506. For example, universities and publishers have negotiated six to twelve 
month embargo periods giving the latter a term of exclusivity before articles 
are deposited in open access repositories. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, 
at 1616, 1654 ( labeling this practice as ―knowledge latency‖). For a recent 
analysis, see Jorge L. Contreras, Wait for it . . . Commons, Copyright, and the 
Private (Re)ordering of Scientific Publishing 37–38 (Working Paper, Mar. 4, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2015885 (proposing that scientific authors grant publishers a 1-year license to 
recoup costs and make a profit). 
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and require that such results be made available in appropriate 
repositories. Until this transformation of the current publish-
ing model occurs, however, funders of scientific research—
whether government agencies, foundations, or academic insti-
tutions—should insist on open access publishing conditions as 
part of the grant-making process.507 
So long as the subscription model is preserved, intermedi-
aries whose services are deemed of value to the relevant scien-
tific communities should thus be required to allow scientists to 
make any and all needed research uses of published scientific 
articles, including full digital empowerment for uses of auto-
mated knowledge discovery tools, computational tools, and the 
like, without need for express permission, in exchange for fixed 
compensatory charges built into the online subscription price. 
That price could be tiered to reflect the for-profit nature of a 
subscribing entity, but it should never be calculated on a pay-
per-article basis or the like.  
Intermediaries would then be recognized for what they are, 
i.e., information brokers, and permissible charges would be ne-
gotiated on a reasonableness basis, one for example resembling 
the virtual-market criteria proposed by the Max Planck Insti-
tute.508 In this context, however, we stress that the ―market‖ for 
published scientific articles is already an artificial construct to 
begin with, built more on captured products than on verifiably 
value-adding services,509 and increasingly sustained by com-
promise embargo periods following publication before some ar-
ticles are deposited in open access repositories.510 
Under such a contractually reconstructed regime,511 scien-
tists should have a right to use digitally provided content for 
any research purpose, including both personal use and redistri-
bution, subject to the above-mentioned negotiated-service 
charges to cover the costs of delivery and maintenance. Dis-
putes over the reasonableness of costs should not bar access to 
the use of these resources, but would have to be settled offline 
 
 507. See infra Section IV.B.  
 508. See MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 
10–11; see also Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 
315, 331–35 (elaborating the need for a response to the ―prohibitive conditions 
of access and use‖ created by intermediaries). 
 509. See Uhlir, supra note 250; see also Reichman & Uhlir, Database Pro-
tection, supra note 258 at 796–869 (discussing the commodification of data and 
fears of its effects on science). 
 510. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1616, 1654. 
 511. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2. 
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by mediation, arbitration or, as a last resort, litigation.512 Re-
sort to collection societies could then be avoided precisely be-
cause there would be no need to monitor actual use for payment 
purposes.  
Only the actual costs of the intermediaries‘ brokerage ser-
vices would need to be taken into account, along with a negoti-
ated surcharge for profit.513 All parties should understand that 
outer limits on the aggregate online service charges necessarily 
follow from the fact that taxpayers largely support the entire en-
terprise; from the need to conserve scarce resources for scientific 
investigation; and from the implicit threat that, if intermediaries 
refuse to cooperate, the funders themselves could support alter-
native arrangements, like those discussed below, including some 
institutionally organized not-for-profit providers.514  
In fact, the movement to implement open access scholarly 
journals has rapidly expanded in the past decade, with over 
7500 journals currently operating on this basis.515 Under this 
approach, authors, research funders, and institutions (or some 
combination thereof) cover the costs of publication. Absent such 
an approach, care must be taken to avoid fostering sole-source 
 
 512. In practice, these prices could perhaps be set via negotiations between 
funding agencies, scientific subcommunities, and intermediaries, with a base-
line open access proviso.  
 513. Any such negotiations must take into account the ways in which open 
access publishing itself is funded, including author pays, research funder pays 
or institution pays models. See, e.g., INT‘L COUNCIL FOR SCI.: COMMITTEE ON 
DATA FOR SCI. AND TECH., http://www.codata.org ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012); 
Sponsoring Consortium for Open Access Publishing in Particle Physics, 
SCOAP3, http://scoap3.org ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012); Jet Propulsion Lab.: 
Cal. Inst. of Tech., SCI FLO NETWORK, http://sciflo.jpl.nasa.gov/SciFloWiki/ 
FrontPage ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012). 
 514. See infra Parts IV.B & C. For-profit intermediaries may require some 
protection from copyright law and unfair competition law in order to prohibit 
wholesale duplication of an existing proprietary compilation. But such 
measures should not impede good-faith competitors from accessing public re-
positories and starting up comparable endeavors of their own, especially if 
these endeavors add new value to preexisting information. That, indeed, is the 
true thrust of the ―thin copyright‖ doctrine. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In that event, the negotiations under the con-
tractual setup would presumably determine whose services were of value at 
what prices to the relevant subcommunities. In our opinion, however, reliance 
on not-for-profit intermediaries is always the preferable option. In that event, 
the negotiations under the contractual set up would presumably determine 
whose services were of value at what prices to the relevant subcommunities. 
 515. For a browsable directory of such journals, see DIRECTORY OF OPEN 
ACCESS JOURNALS, http://www.doaj.org ( last visited Jan. 3, 2012); see also 
NAT‘L FED‘N OF ADVANCED INFO. SERVICES, http://www.nfais.org ( last visited 
Jan. 25, 2012). 
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monopolies over unsubstitutable scientific materials that can 
never realistically be regenerated or otherwise readily obtained 
from public repositories.516  
B. FUNDERS‘ ABILITY TO CONTRACTUALLY REGULATE ACCESS, 
USE, AND REUSE OF SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE AND DATA 
Implicit in the foregoing analysis is the premise that most 
published scientific research results, at least in OECD coun-
tries, will have been funded largely by governments or nonprof-
it foundations. These entities have the power to impose condi-
tions on use and reuse of the research results they fund, at 
least with respect to literature and data.517  
For example, governments can dedicate government-
generated work to the public domain, as occurs in the United 
States.518 Funding agencies can mandate the deposit of publica-
tions in open access journals or, at least, in open access reposi-
tories,519 as is happening ever more frequently in both the 
United States and the European Union. They can even impose 
analogs to fair use and to other codified limitations and excep-
tions by contract,520 which both publishers and individual sci-
 
 516. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 
353; MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 14–16. 
See generally BITS OF POWER, supra note 36 (discussing the impact that 
strengthened protection of private databases could have on the public-good us-
es of scientific data). 
 517. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1641–57 (examining steps tak-
en by the NIH and Department of Energy to ensure that the output of the 
Human Genome Project was released to the public); Reichman & Uhlir, supra 
note 2, at 331–51 (discussing the formal and informal means by which institu-
tions can shape the use of government-funded data). Patented research results 
would, of course, be subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006 
& Supp. III 2009). Given the likely pushback from publishers and learned so-
cieties, however, the extent to which funding agencies would fully exercise this 
power remains to be seen. 
 518. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
For similar efforts underway in the European Union, see Miriam Bitton, Im-
plementing the Public Sector Information Directive, 34 E.I.P.R. 75, 75–86 
(2012). 
 519. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 504, at 2–3 (discussing NIH‘s mandatory 
policy of public accessibility); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 331 (same); 
Stodden, supra note 255, at 9 (same); see also Lee, supra note 110, at 963–65 
(comparing the freedom of states to regulate the public accessibility of patents 
as opposed to that of the NIH and the California Institute for Regenerative 
Medicine). 
 520. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 504, at 10–16 (discussing Science Com-
mons licenses); Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–25 (proposing a Reproducible 
Research Standard to ensure attribution and facilitate the sharing of scientific 
works). 
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entists, as grantees, have to respect, especially if they wished to 
qualify for future grants. Funders can also support or reinforce 
self-archiving practices, and they increasingly provide for the 
costs of open access publishing in their grants.521 
Besides building open access provisions into their research 
grants, funding agencies can support the formation of digitally 
integrated research commons to serve the needs of diverse 
thematic communities.522 Universities can lend their own 
weight to all these initiatives,523 and many have established 
open repositories for their employees‘ scholarly works. Individ-
ual scientists can adopt existing Creative Commons and Sci-
ence Commons licenses when publishing their works.524 Inno-
vative proposals that go even farther, such as Victoria 
Stodden‘s proposed Reproducible Research Standard, should 
also be tested and perfected.525 
The common feature of these and other initiatives is that 
relevant information is made openly and freely available in dig-
ital format and online. Through many of these initiatives, ma-
terial is made available either under suitably reduced proprie-
tary terms and conditions set out in permissive licenses526 (e.g., 
the GNU licenses for open source software,527 or Creative 
Commons licenses528 for open access journals or for some works 
in open repositories), or it will have entered the public do-
main.529 Under other mechanisms, such as the delayed open 
 
 521. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 250, at 1653–54, 1656. 
 522. See Uhlir, supra note 250. For examples, see GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES 
FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382. 
 523. See, e.g., Stodden, supra note 255, at 48–49; Faculty Advisory Council, 
supra note 497 (describing efforts by Harvard to reduce subscription costs). 
 524. See Mia Garlick, A Review of Creative Commons and Science Com-
mons, 40(5) EDUCAUSE REV., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 78–79; see also Niva Elkin-
Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFOR-
MATION LAW 325, 329–31 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 525. See Stodden, supra note 255, at 36–42; see also Guibault, supra note 
496; Contreras, supra note 506 (proposing 1-year license for publishers‘ sub-
scription). 
 526. For an overview of such permissive licensing approaches spanning all 
information types, see Lawrence Liang, Guide to Open Content Licenses 
(2004), http://www.theartgalleryofknoxville.com/ocl_v1.2.pdf. 
 527. See GNU, http://www.gnu.org/ ( last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 528. See supra notes 345, 492 and accompanying text. 
 529. See generally BOYLE, supra note 3 (illustrating several ways in which 
works enter the public domain). Apart from overt decisions to abandon copy-
right protection, information enters the public domain when it meets the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) the information is not copyrightable, such as factual 
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availability option, the works retain full copyright protection, 
but eventually become freely and openly accessible, at least on 
a read-only basis.530 
Taken together, these activities are part of the emerging 
broader movement in support of both formal and informal peer 
production and dissemination of publicly funded scientific (and 
other) information in a globally distributed, voluntary, and 
open networked environment:531  
[They] are based on principles that reflect the cooperative ethos that 
traditionally has imbued much of [the] academic and government (ci-
vilian) research agencies; their norms and governance mechanisms 
may be characterized as those of ―public scientific information com-
mons,‖ rather than of a market system based upon proprietary data 
and information.532 
How far these open access initiatives can be carried re-
mains to be seen. The potential unwillingness of intermediaries 
or grantees to accept such contractual templates, in addition to 
intrinsic constraints on funders‘ abilities to defray the costs of 
such institutional arrangements over time, effectively limit the 
regulatory powers of funders to achieve these objectives.533 
With respect to grantees, a requirement to publish only in open 
access journals or only under Creative Commons or Science 
 
compilations or data sets that lack creativity and originality in their selection 
and arrangement; (2) the information is produced by a government that does 
not apply copyright to its own works (e.g., the U.S. federal government); or (3) 
the statutory period of intellectual property protection has expired, which in 
many jurisdictions now is the life of the author plus 70 years. 
 530. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1653–54. 
 531. BENKLER, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing the role this movement has 
played in creating ―new opportunities for how we make and exchange infor-
mation, knowledge, and culture‖); Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Frame-
work for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, 
supra note 10, at 41, 41–82; Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons 
in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 669–74 (2010). 
 532. Paul A. David & Paul F. Uhlir, Creating the Information Commons for 
e-Science: Toward Institutional Policies and Guidelines for Action, CODATA 
NEWSLETTER 91 (Int‘l Council for Sci., Paris, France), July 2005, at 1; see also 
BENKLER, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that this broader movement has ―in-
creased the role of nonmarket and nonproprietary production‖). For govern-
ance issues, see GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COM-
MONS, supra note 382 (Part IV). 
 533. See Terry & Kiley, supra note 500, at 106–08 (arguing that open ac-
cess initiatives are sustainable). The extent to which funders actions with re-
gard to copyrighted literature (and data) might or might not be limited by the 
Bayh-Dole Act depends on how broadly one interprets that Act. Cf Arti K. Rai 
& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 293 (2003) (discussing the limits the Bayh-
Dole Act imposes on funders‘ ability to oversee the use of patents by grantees). 
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Commons licenses534 could hinder publication in some high 
prestige, peer-reviewed journals and breed resistance from 
leading members of the relevant scientific communities. 
Whether funding agencies, and the research community itself, 
can persuade these journals to become more open remains to be 
seen, but the evidence suggests that there is considerable mo-
mentum in that direction.535  
C. INTEGRATING THE INTERMEDIARIES‘ FUNCTIONS INTO 
TRANSNATIONAL DIGITAL KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENTS 
Aggressive resort to open access licensing conditions es-
poused by funders could, but not necessarily would, persuade 
some private publishers to abandon the field. This has not hap-
pened so far because funders are increasingly willing to enable 
grantees to purchase open access conditions from publishers at 
prices that appear to remain profitable for them. Pressure from 
funders can thus change the commercial publishers‘ business 
model and persuade some to allow scientists to purchase open 
access rights and even make a profitable business out of selling 
such rights at about the same costs as publishing in an open 
access journal.536 Unfortunately, the percentage of grantees 
that actually opt to exercise this option, when not otherwise 
mandatory, still remains relatively small.537  
Although reliance on intermediaries is deeply entrenched 
in the system, science policymakers might eventually want to 
reevaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining customary re-
lationships with them and consider alternative strategies for 
disseminating research results. Such an exercise could, in par-
ticular, focus attention on the advantages of absorbing the pub-
lishing function, when feasible, into integrated, open-knowledge 
environments—as one study underway now advocates.538  
 
 534. See supra notes 345, 492. 
 535. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1647–48, 1652–57 (discussing 
the Budapest, Bethesda, and Berlin declarations, and similar initiatives). 
 536. David J. Brown, Repositories and Journals: Are They in Conflict? A 
Literature Review of Relevant Literature, ASLIB PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 1, 2010, 
at 116, available at 2010 WLNR 25881660 (noting that Springer Science and 
Business Media recently acquired BioMed Central).  
 537. See Contreras, supra note 479. 
 538. See Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–87 (summarizing Open Knowledge 
Environments (OKEs) thesis, with illustrative examples developed in GLOBAL 
IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382, 
Part III). Obviously, much depends on the availability of funding. For the view 
that such funding would yield greater benefits per research dollar than the 
present system, see Paul F. Uhlir et al., Measuring the Social and Economic 
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Once anchored in appropriate institutions and freed from 
the legal and commercial fetters of both the professional socie-
ties and the commercial publishers, the very object of the pub-
lishing exercise could dramatically change. No longer would it 
be bound by obsolete concepts of the print model, which treat 
each monthly installment as a discrete legal and substantive 
unit. Rather, every new collection of research results made 
available to the relevant thematic community could enrich and 
expand an ever growing, digitally integrated database of aggre-
gate scientific results.  
Each of these thematically organized repositories, in turn, 
would remain fully open to data mining, manipulation, and 
other automated knowledge discovery tools, with full respect 
for reputational benefits but without palpable legal or economic 
constraints.539 Moreover, digital portals could link the formally 
published literature with so called grey literature, i.e., confer-
ence proceedings, and the like (which are not peer-reviewed). 
This aggregate resource can then be further linked with other 
data and relevant information bearing on all aspects of the sci-
ence, including voluntarily contributed data pertaining to re-
search of interest to a given thematic community.540 
While this is not the place to fully elaborate on this con-
cept, the astounding creative possibilities of unlimited, fully in-
tegrated knowledge hubs along these lines clearly dwarfs the 
gains that could be made from incremental or even structural 
reforms of the global intellectual property system. We believe 
that these or similar initiatives are essential for the progress of 
both science and culture, and would especially be needed to im-
plement the sweeping new research vision that the National 
Research Council recently put forward for the life sciences.541  
Support for these and other initiatives could further en-
courage publishing intermediaries either to accommodate the 
 
Costs and Benefits of Public Sector Information Online: A Review of the Litera-
ture and Future Directions, in NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SOCIOECONOM-
IC EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION ON DIGITAL NETWORKS: TOWARD 
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFERENT ACCESS AND REUSE POLICIES 61, 62 
(Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2009) ( listing reports on benefits of open access for publicly 
funded data and literature).  
 539. See Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–87.  
 540. See id. at 83–89 (finding that the ―logical response is to cut the Gordi-
an knot by retaining ownership and control of all knowledge assets produced 
by the relevant research community with public funding within the science 
framework itself, rather than assigning them to external publishing interme-
diaries‖).  
 541. A NEW BIOLOGY, supra note 4. 
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open access movement or leave the scientific publishing busi-
ness. By the same token, digitally integrated knowledge hubs 
could greatly magnify the creative and educational powers of 
universities and other analogous research institutions.542 
For all these reasons, we question the customary practices 
of wholesale reliance on external-information brokers in a sci-
entific world where it has become conceptually and technically 
feasible to link a given thematic community‘s essential-
knowledge resources into a seamless, digitally integrated net-
work of inputs and outputs that remains open to all the con-
tributors to any given research commons or semi-commons.543 
The scientific community, now operating within a hostile intel-
lectual property environment, faces the challenge of organizing 
and managing these knowledge assets with a view to establish-
ing a broad upstream research space544 in which its own con-
tractually imposed rules could apply without compromising the 
possibilities for commercial exploitation of downstream applica-
tions of the resulting research results.545  
Nevertheless, the long-term drive to achieve these science 
policy goals should not obscure nor detract from the pressing 
short-term need to make the global intellectual property sys-
tem more science-friendly than at present, along the lines we 
have explored. Legislatures concerned about the future of sci-
 
 542. In principle, universities themselves could consider reintegrating 
some academic journals into their publishing operations. Alternatively, one or 
more universities could jointly produce the journals in question, with direct 
support of the funding agencies. In so doing, they could integrate the skills 
and services of different departments, such as the relevant scientific groups, 
the computer and technical service departments, and especially library ser-
vices, which could coordinate and manage editorial and publishing functions. 
Students and postdoctoral candidates could similarly be co-involved at all lev-
els as part of their educational experience, a phenomenon that routinely oc-
curs in U.S. law schools. University librarians so far exposed to these pro-
posals have expressed a positive response. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess, 
Institutional Design and Governance in the Microbial Research Commons, in 
DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 255, 177, 184; 
Interview with Richard Danner, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law librarian in Durham, 
N.C. However, we think more is to be gained from thematically organized digi-
tally integrated knowledge hubs, as indicated in the text. See generally 
REICHMAN ET AL., GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH 
COMMONS, supra note 382 (Part III) (discussing the concept of ―Open 
Knowledge Environment‖); Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–89 (discussing the 
―open knowledge environment‖). 
 543. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 10, at 123–44. 
 544. See A NEW BIOLOGY, supra note 4. 
 545. Cf. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2. 
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entific research in the digital online environment546 should take 
steps now to reconfigure a legal domain that has become in-
creasingly inimical to the needs of the scientific research com-
munity. Policymakers in OECD countries should join with key 
national institutions, such as the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health, in affirmatively promoting open access to scientific 
publications.  
To this end, the relevant government agencies and private 
foundations should become funders of first resort for scientific 
publications and for the institutional repositories and e-
commons in which those publications can be collected. Policy-
makers should likewise support the process of making govern-
ment-funded research publications widely available through self-
archiving and institutional archiving, with the fewest possible 
restrictions on use or reuse of published results.547 
  FINAL OBSERVATIONS   
Scientific discoveries depend upon access to a robust public 
domain, in which preexisting discoveries become the building 
blocks of future investigations548 and existing information and 
data become inputs to future-knowledge assets that cannot be 
generated nearly as effectively without them.549 However, the 
recent tendency to elevate standards of intellectual property 
protection at both the national and international levels has 
been motivated largely by interests seeking to protect existing 
knowledge goods, destined mainly for end users, with insuffi-
cient regard for the social costs and burdens imposed on future 
creation and innovation, and with a corresponding bevy of new 
problems that hinder both objectives.550 This movement has 
generated thickets of intellectual property rights, high transac-
 
 546. See, e.g., EC Green Paper, supra note 332. See generally Ritch, supra 
note 37, at 136–81. 
 547. For a positive step in this direction, see the U.K. government‘s re-
sponse to the Hargreaves Review‘s call for a broad research exemption that 
cannot be overridden by contract, see Chambers, supra note 318, at 600; see 
also HARGREAVES, supra note 26. 
 548. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 3, at 160–78; David, supra note 25, at 16; 
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
147, 165 (1981).  
 549. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 332.  
 550. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 184–92; David, supra note 
25, at 27–28; Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research, supra note 330, 
at 784–86; see also Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 20–23 (discussing 
the imbalance in modern intellectual property regimes resulting from a ―pro-
longed effort to strengthen the protection of investors‖).  
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tion and litigation costs, receding access to the public domain, 
growing anticommons effects, and the stifling of privileged uses 
by means of technological protection measures and digital 
rights management tools in the online environment.551 
In this Article, we have traced the contradictory measures 
in copyright and related laws that have increasingly impeded 
upstream scientific investigation and thereby complicated the 
exploitation of downstream applications of research results. By 
over-extending the protection of scientific information and data, 
these laws have made it harder for all investigators to build 
upon, rework, or further elaborate upon the contributions of 
others and to harness the astounding research potential of digi-
tal information technologies to their fullest extent. 
From this perspective, the worldwide copyright system as 
it has lately evolved can hardly be said to benefit scientists qua 
authors. On the contrary, authors and compilers of scientific 
works and databases are still often obliged to surrender their 
outputs to publishers from whom they must buy back the very 
information and data they supplied (often at government ex-
pense). Rather than opening new vistas for producers of re-
search data and information—as occurred after the printing 
press was invented and at regular intervals of technological 
change since then—copyright and database protection laws in 
the digitally networked environment seem bent on closing off 
new horizons in order to defend old business models for which 
publishers have sought few alternatives.552  
A. BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PRIVATE RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC SCIENCE 
Given the opportunities that digital networks and auto-
mated knowledge discovery tools make possible, the logical goal 
for policymakers is to remove obstacles that the existing legal 
infrastructure poses for twenty-first century scientific endeav-
or. In this context, copyright law‘s limitations and exceptions 
have an important role to play. They are not some nuisance-
like sideshow of demands to be appeased as narrowly as possi-
ble. Rather, they should at least be viewed as a form of users‘ 
 
 551. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3 (dealing with patents); HELLER, 
supra note 3, at 1–22; see also Geller, supra note 357, at 166 (―Copyright law is 
in crisis . . . . [ I ]t has become more and more complicated and less and less re-
liable, while losing legitimacy.‖); Lunney, supra note 96, at 869–92.  
 552. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 41–42. 
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rights,553 which help to supply inputs for scientific discoveries, 
innovation, and trade that are as indispensable to the dynamic 
production and dissemination of knowledge goods as suitably 
crafted incentives for authors and inventors. 
A fundamental change of attitudes would be necessary. A 
top priority for policymakers should be to avoid generating le-
gally established fiefdoms, in which a few private rights holders 
can combine the bulk of all scientific data and literature into 
monopolized repositories where access and use are restricted 
and controlled from the top down, and in which the commodi-
fied inputs of publicly funded science are distributed on a pro-
prietary basis. Failure to achieve such a shift in priorities plac-
es digital and computational science in developed countries at 
risk of becoming progressively entangled in ―copyright thick-
ets‖554 precisely at a time when these countries face stiff chal-
lenges from the growing scientific and technological capacities 
of the emerging economies.555 
Despite the complexity of these issues, and the countervail-
ing pressures of a powerful publishers‘ lobby, policymakers 
need to resist the temptation to leave copyright and database 
protection laws where they stand or to strengthen them further 
in keeping with present trends. Few decisions could generate so 
many unintended harmful consequences. If these laws continue 
to impede e-science in the ways portrayed above, the much 
vaunted comparative advantages that industry and govern-
ment spokespersons associate with maximalist levels of intel-
lectual property protection could give way to private-sector 
strangleholds on the most promising avenues of public digital 
 
 553. See, e.g., HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 16–27; see also 
Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Access: On the Specificity of Cop-
yright vis-à-vis Patent and Trademark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 199–204 
(2008) (arguing that users‘ rights, instead of simply serving as an exception to 
copyright, are so integral to the modern copyright system that they entail a 
redefinition of the wrongs copyright laws were meant to address). 
 554. In patent law, such thickets had threatened to undermine information 
science and such frontier sciences as synthetic biology at least until the U.S. 
Supreme Court intervened to readjust the most fundamental design principles 
of preexisting patent law itself. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & James Boyle, Synthetic 
Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Com-
mons, 5 PLOS BIOL. e58, 390 (2007); Arti K. Rai & Sapna Kumar, Synthetic 
Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1756–58 
(2007). 
 555. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 477; Peter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements 
and China‘s Global Intellectual Property Strategy, in IP ASPECTS OF FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION 2–4 (Christoph Antons & 
Reto M. Hilty eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333431. 
 1478 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1362 
 
research, with the predictable result of killing the goose that 
lays the golden eggs.556 
B. RECONCILING THE GOALS OF INNOVATION POLICY WITH THE 
NEEDS OF SCIENCE POLICY  
In retrospect, it seems ironic that just as new technologies 
were producing significant breakthroughs in scientific research, 
and as digitally networked sites and other information technol-
ogies began empowering new models of collaborative investiga-
tion, innovation policies that should embrace these develop-
ments were instead using intellectual property rights to control 
or, in many cases, impede them. The successive use of public 
and private law to preclude access to basic knowledge re-
sources, as well as knowledge-based goods, has increased the 
political and social burden of an intellectual property regime 
that, in theory, remains dedicated to the public interest of soci-
ety at large.  
Meanwhile, within the public-science community, efforts 
are underway to promote the formation of contractually con-
structed research commons (or semi-commons, as the case may 
be), that can flourish in an otherwise highly protectionist intel-
lectual property environment. If successful, the resulting infra-
structure could help to maintain a steady flow of downstream 
research products and socially beneficial commercial applica-
tions that do respond positively to the incentives of intellectual 
property rights.557 Given this transnational movement, what 
both the European Union and United States require is a long-
term policy perspective that discriminates between the needs of 
the scientific community, operating within an emerging re-
search commons that is increasingly capable of managing and 
integrating its own supplies of data and information, and the 
needs of the downstream technology sectors, which depend on 
the traditional incentives of intellectual property law to trans-
late scientific discoveries into commercial applications.558  
 
 556. For farsighted comments in this regard, see Tilman Lüder, Remarks 
at the Workshop on Creation and Innovation, Seventeenth Annual Fordham 
Intellectual Property Law Institute Conference, Cambridge, United Kingdom 
(Apr. 15–16, 2009) (advocating urgent reforms of copyright law‘s limitations 
and exceptions to meet needs of digital and computational science). 
 557. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 9, at 122–27; BRETT M. FRISCHMAN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012).  
 558. Cf. Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intel-
lectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008) (articulating a multi-firm, public and private col-
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The object is to avoid pushing the exclusive rights that 
primarily govern those downstream incentives deep into the 
realm of basic science, where they will fracture and balkanize 
the research commons.559 Needed instead are measures that 
broaden the research commons and enable it to operate its 
computational tools in digitally integrated, field-specific com-
munities that span the world, smoothly and without disruption 
from domestic toll collectors waiving IP stop signs.  
These projects will require more than tinkering at the edg-
es of copyright law. They will depend on some overall vision, a 
willingness to remove obstacles to modern research methods, 
and a determination to fund the necessary operations. Reforms 
on this scale will entail more than recognition of ―users‘ 
rights,‖560 which denote important cultural interests and the 
public enrichment that ensues from access to literary and artis-
tic works in general. Where science is concerned, information 
and data function as inputs to the process of discovery and 
thereby constitute an essential ingredient of future scientific 
progress. 
Exclusive intellectual property rights do not provide the 
appropriate set of incentives in this upstream research 
space.561 Policymakers should accordingly take pains to ensure 
that domestic and international intellectual property laws no 
longer undermine or impede the most promising opportunities 
that automated knowledge discover tools now make possible. 
 
laboration model for research in the field of medicinal drug discovery). 
 559. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, A Framework for Analyzing 
the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 10, at 41, 
41–82; Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the 
Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra, at 3, 3–26; see 
also Jerome H. Reichman, How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semi-
commons of Applied Industrial Know-How, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 185, 185–201 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011). 
 560. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users 
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004) (considering the question of how a 
system with a background rule of proprietary rights should be structured to 
recognize positive users‘ rights). 
 561. However, liability rules may resolve many conflicts between incentives 
and user research needs that otherwise seem intractable. See, e.g., Rai et al., 
supra note 558, at 25–27; Jerome H. Reichman, A Compensatory Liability Re-
gime to Promote the Exchange of Microbial Genetic Resources for Research and 
Benefit Sharing, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 479, at 43, 43–53; 
Reichman, supra note 284, at 185–200; see also ROSA CASTRO BERNIERS, EX 
POST LIABILITY RULES IN MODERN PATENT LAW 47–56 (2010) (summarizing 
arguments for and against liability rules in patent law). 
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These tools are critical for addressing the most pressing social 
and environmental challenges of our time.  
Making the internet safe for publishers of print media 
should no longer justify hindering the aggregation of scientific 
information and data, or the uses of digitally integrated re-
search methods capable of analyzing them on a global scale. 
Rather, the task is to reconcile the historical values of intellec-
tual property law with the modalities of a digital age, in order 
to reinforce the needs of scientific investigators operating under 
twenty-first century conditions, and to stimulate maximum 
public welfare payoffs from their new technological tools. 
